Duggan v. Slocum

• Citation: 92 F. 806
• Decision Date: 25 January 1899
• Docket Number: 41.
• Parties: DUGGAN et al. v. SLOCUM.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

92 F. 806

DUGGAN et al. v. SLOCUM.

No. 41.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 25, 1899

John C Donnelly and C. Walter Artz, for appellants.

John O'Neill, for appellee.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

SHIPMAN Circuit Judge.

John H Duggan, of Waterbury, Conn., a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, who had never married, died on November 10, 1895 leaving a last will and testament, which was duly proved, and was approved by the probate court for the district of Waterbury. In this will he gave two legacies for religious or charitable purposes, and the residue of his property in the manner following:

'Fourth. All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, and wheresoever situated, I give, devise, and bequeath to my executors hereinafter named, in trust, however, for the following purposes, viz.: One-half to be used for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a library and reading room in connection with St. Patrick's parish, in said Waterbury, or in whatever part of said Waterbury may be deemed by my said executors most suitable and convenient for the general public; and one-half for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a Roman Catholic protectory for boys in said diocese of Hartford; it being my will that the personal estate and the rents accruing from any real estate of which I may die possessed be invested in safe securities for a term of ten years or more, at the discretion of my said executors. I also will that the management and disposal of my real estate be at the discretion of my said executors.

'Fifth. I name and appoint the Rt. Rev. Michael Tierney, of Hartford, Conn., and Hon. William C. Robinson, of New Haven, Conn., executors of this, my last will and testament.'

Bishop Tierney and Mr. Robinson declined the executorship, whereupon Rev. William J. Slocum, of Waterbury, was appointed administrator with the will annexed.

Hugh Duggan, a citizen of the state of Michigan, and William Duggan, an alien, were the brothers, and Ann Enright, an alien, was the sister, of Father Duggan, and the three are his next of kin. This bill in equity was brought by the named brothers and sisters against Mr. Slocum, as administrator, before the circuit court for the district of Connecticut, to obtain a decree that the provisions of the residuary clause of the will are void, and that in respect to the property mentioned therein John H. Duggan died intestate. The estate had not been settled, and no successors in the trusteeship had been appointed, when the suit was brought. The record is silent in regard to the amount of the estate, except that the bill avers that the amount to be disposed of under the residuary clause is 'twenty thousand dollars and upwards.' To this bill a demurrer was filed, which was sustained by the circuit court, upon the ground of the validity of the fourth clause, and the bill was dismissed. 83 F. 244.

The statute of Connecticut in regard to charitable uses was passed in 1684, but did not appear in the printed statutes until the Revision of 1702, and therefore has been generally called 'the Statutes of 1702.' Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60. It has been uniformly regarded by the courts of that state as a statute of importance, because, inasmuch as it declared the fixed purpose of the state to preserve estates for charitable uses in accordance with the intent of the grantor, it was an instruction to the courts to enforce such gifts accordingly. It is as follows:

'Sec. 2951. All estates that have been or shall be granted for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel, or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for the preservation, care, and maintenance of any cemetery, cemetery lot, or of the monuments thereon, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which they have been or shall be granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.'

The statute which had existed in Connecticut in regard to perpetuities was repealed before the testator's death, and no statute now exists on the subject. The rule of the common law, which limits the inalienability of an estate to a life or lives in being at the death of the testator and 21 years afterwards, is now the rule in that state.

The special demurrer raises a number of legal questions in regard to the jurisdiction of a federal court over a decedent's estate at this stage in its progress of settlement in the probate court which are worth of consideration, but we shall only look at the vital questions arising under the fourth clause of the will, which are whether its provisions are void either because the beneficial enjoyment of the charities may be postponed for a period which is styled 'remoteness,' or because the objects of the charities and the beneficiaries are too indefinitely stated. By the residuary clause an immediate and unconditional gift of the estate is made to trustees, to be used by them in the establishment and maintenance of two distinct charities. Their title is burdened with no conditions. They are not to hold it until some other person appears, who may wish to establish these charities, or until a corporation is formed, or until a certain amount of money is contributed, but the gift is absolute, and they can have the permanent control of the charities, subject to the provision that the income is to accumulate for at least 10 years, 'or more,' at their discretion. This discretionary provision in regard to accumulation makes the gift obnoxious to criticism in the mind of the complainants. 'A perpetuity is a limitation of property which renders it inalienable beyond the period allowed by law. That period is a life or lives in being and twenty-one years more, with a fraction of a year added for the time of gestation in cases of posthumous birth. ' Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U.S. 303. A secondary meaning is 'an interest which will not vest till a remote period' (Gray, Perp. Sec. 140); and the complainants assert that the beneficial interest in this fund may not be enjoyed by the people of Waterbury, or the boys of the diocese of Hartford, for a remote period, if the trustees should neglect or decline to establish the charities; and that, therefore, the entire gift is void. It is true that the time before a gift can take beneficial effect may be so remote as to avoid the gift. 'There may be such an interval of time possible between the gift and the consummation of the use as will be fatal to the former. The rule of perpetuity applies to trust as well as to legal estates. ' Ould v. Hospital, supra. The validity of this class of bequests depends upon the law of the state of the testator; but the law of Connecticut, as will hereafter be seen, is that of England and of the states of this country generally, except where special statutes have created a peculiar system, and by this general law 'trusts for public charitable purposes are upheld under circumstances under which private trusts would fail. ' Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 2 Sup.Ct. 327; Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 A. 846. Charities are favored; the 'stern rule against perpetuities is relaxed...