Stott Et Al v. Rutherford
| Citation | 23 L.Ed. 486,92 U.S. 107 |
| Parties | STOTT ET AL. v. RUTHERFORD |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1875 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Mr. W. A. Meloy for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Walter S. Cox and Mr. L. G. Hine, contra.
This is an action of covenant brought upon an indenture of lease executed by the plaintiffs in error, and one P. D. Gurley, since deceased, to the defendant in error. The declaration sets out sundry breaches of stipulations contained in the lease. The defendant pleaded non est factum, and satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiffs by payment. Upon the trial, several bills of exception were taken by the defendant. They show that he made numerous points, all of which were overruled by the court. Only one of them requires consideration. He objected to the admission of the lease in evidence, upon the ground that it showed upon its face that the lessors had no title to the premises, and that the instrument was, therefore, a nullity. The court admitted the evidence, and an exception was regularly taken.
A verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs. The defendant moved for a new trial, and the case was heard by the full court in general term. That court ordered a judgment to be entered for the defendant, non obstante veredicto. The plaintiffs have brought the case before this court for review. The judgment of the court below proceeded solely upon the ground of the invalidity of the lease, and that subject is the only one argued here.
The lease created a term beginning on the first day of February, 1864, and to continue five years. It recites that the lessors, in making the lease, 'were acting as a church-extension committee by authority and on behalf of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Old School.' The leasehold premises are described as 'being lot number four and part of lot number five,' &c., 'as now held by the parties of the first part,' &c. The lessee covenants, among other things, 'that he will well and truly surrender and deliver up the possession of said premises to the said parties of the first part, their successors and assigns, in accordance with the stipulations herein contained, whenever this lease shall terminate.'
It was provided that the lessors might terminate the lease for non-payment of rent, or otherwise, at their option, by giving the requisite notice. The language of the grant was, 'have granted, demised, and to farm let.' The words 'grant' and 'demise' in a lease for years create an implied warranty of title and a covenant for quiet enjoyment. Burney v. Keith, 4 Wend. 502; Grannis v. Clark, 8 Cow. 36; Young v. Hargrave's Adm., 7 Ohio Rep., pt. 2, 68.
The declaration avers, 'that, by virtue of which said indenture, the said defendant immediately thereupon entered into the occupancy and enjoyment of said premises and appurtenances, and was possessed thereof until about the first day of October, 1869, when he vacated such possession and occupancy, and the term of said lease was determined.' This is not denied by the defendant's pleas, and is, therefore, according to settled rule of the law of pleading, to be taken as admitted. The lessors executed the lease in their own names, and not as agents. They demised the premises in the same way. The rent was stipulated to be paid to them in their own right. The covenants of the lessee were all to them personally. If there had been a breach of the covenants of title and for quiet enjoyment, they would have been personally liable for the damages. The lessee entered into possession, and remained in possession, enjoying that possession as long as he chose to do so. He had, on his part, the full benefit of the contract.
When called upon to pay and perform as he had covenanted to do, he answered that the lessors had no title, and that he was in no wise responsible to them.
In Laws v. Purser, 6 Ell. & Bl. 932, the plaintiff, a patentee, had licensed the defendant to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Straight Side Basket Corporation v. Webster Basket Co., 744 A.
...Oil & Gas Co., 216 N. Y. 40, 109 N. E. 860; Heller & Son, Inc., v. Lassner Co., 214 App. Div. 315, 212 N. Y. S. 175; Stott v. Rutherford, 92 U. S. 107, 23 L. Ed. 486; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Headley Good Roads Co. (D. C.) 284 F. 177; Hein v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (C. C.) 172 F. 52......
- United States v. Husayn
- Spock v. United States
- American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency
-
Masquerading Justiciability: the Misapplication of State Secrets Privilege in Mohamed v. Jeppesen—reflections from a Comparative Perspective
...it was premised on the existence of a "contract for secret services with the government," which was "a fact not to be disclosed." Totten, 92 U.S. at 107; see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (affirming that the Totten bar precluded judicial review of any claim based on a covert agreemen......
-
SOURCES AND LIMITS FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER: PERSPECTIVES OF ROBERT H. JACKSON.
...v. Reynolds. 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (citing Totten v. United States. 92 U.S. 105, 107(1875)). (494) See id. at 7 n.11 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107). (495) FISHES, supra note 95, at (496) Id. (497) Id. (498) Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. (499) Id. (500) See id. at 106. (501) For details on those......
-
State secrets are a privilege, not a right: can foreign victims of extraordinary rendition and torture overcome the state secrets privilege using the alien tort statute?
...time national security was used as a rationale to preclude the disclosure of evidence. Murray, supra note 103, at 8. (114) See Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (stating Court's rationale for holding). Justice Field It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of......