Town of Coloma v. Eaves
Decision Date | 01 October 1875 |
Citation | 92 U.S. 484,23 L.Ed. 579 |
Parties | TOWN OF COLOMA v. EAVES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
'State of Illinois, Town of Coloma:——
'Know all men by these presents, That the township of Coloma, in the county of Whiteside, and State of Illinois, acknowledges itself to own and be indebted to the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company, or bearer, in the sum of $1,000, lawful money of the United States; which sum the said town of Coloma promises to pay to the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company, or the bearer hereof, on the first day of July, 1881, at the office of the treasurer of the county of Whiteside aforesaid, in the State of Illinois, on the presentation of this bond, with interest thereon from the first day of January, 1872, at the rate of ten per centum per annum, payable annually at the office of the treasurer of the county of Whiteside aforesaid, on the presentation and surrender or the annexed coupons.
'[U. S. $5 revenue-stamp.]
'This bond is issued under and by virtue of a law of the State of Illinois entitled 'An Act to incorporate the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company,' approved March 24, 1869, and in accordance with a vote of the electors of said township of Coloma at a regular election held July 28, 1869, in accordance with said law, and under a law of the State of Illinois entitled 'An Act to fund and provide for the paying of the railroad debts of counties, townships, cities, and towns,' in force April 16, 1869; and, when this bond is registered in the State auditor's office of the State of Illinois, the principal and interest will be paid by the State treasurer, as provided by said last-mentioned law.
'In witness whereof, the supervisor and town-clerk of said town have hereunto set their hands and seals this first day of January, A.D. 1872.
Recovery was resisted by the town, mainly upon the alleged ground of a want of power in the officers of the town to issue the bonds, because the legal voters of the town had not been notified to vote upon the question of the town's making the subscription in question.
On the trial of the case, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the amount of the coupons, and interest after they were due.
Mr. C. M. Osborn for plaintiff.
Mr. J. Grant, contra.
It appears by the record that the plaintiff is a bona fide holder and owner of the coupons upon which the suit is founded, having obtained them before they were due, and for a valuable consideration paid. The bonds to which the coupons were attached were given in payment of a subscription of $50,000 to the capital stock of the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company, for which the town received in return certificates of five hundred shares, of $100 each, in the stock of the company. That stock the town retains, but it resists the payment of the bonds, and of the coupons attached to them, alleging that they were issued without lawful authority.
Saying nothing at present of the dishonesty of such a defence while the consideration for which the bonds were given is retained, we come at once to the question, whether authority was shown for the stock subscription, and for the consequent issue of the bonds. At the outset, it is to be observed that the question is not between the town and its own agents: it is rather between the town and a person claiming through the action of its agents. The rights of the town as against its agents may be very different from its rights as against parties who have honestly dealt with its agents as such, on the faith of their apparent authority.
By an act of the legislature of Illinois, the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company was incorporated with power to build and operate a railroad from Rock Falls on Rock River to Chicago, a distance of about one hundred and thirty miles. The tenth section of the act enacted, that, 'to aid in the construction of said road, any incorporated city, town, or township, organized under the township organization laws of the State, along or near the route of said road, might subscribe to the capital stock of said company.' That the town of Coloma was one of the municipal divisions empowered by this section to subscribe fully appears, and also that the railroad was built into the town before the bonds were issued. But it is upon the eleventh section of the act that the defendant relies. That section is as follows:——
Sect. 12 provides, 'It shall be the duty of the clerk of any such city, town, or township, in which a vote shall be given in favor of subscriptions, within ten days thereafter, to transmit to the county-clerk of their counties a transcript or statement of the vote given, and the amount so voted to be subscribed, and the rate of interest to be paid.'
Most of these provisions are merely directory. But conceding, as we do, that the authority to make the subscription was, by the eleventy section of the act, made dependent upon the result of the submission of the question, whether the town would subscribe, to a popular vote of the township, and upon the approval of the subscription by a majority of the legal voters of the town voting at the election, a preliminary inquiry must be, How is it to be ascertained whether the directions have been followed? whether there has been any popular vote, or whether a majority of the legal voters present at the election did, in fact, vote in favor of a subscription? Is the ascertainment of these things to be before the subscription is made, and before the bonds are issued? or must it be after the bonds have been sold, and be renewed every time a claim is made for the payment of a bond or a coupon? The latter appears to us inconsistent with any reasonable construction of the statute. Its avowed purpose was to aid the building of the railroad by placing in the hands of the railroad company the bonds of assenting municipalities. These bonds were intended for sale; and its was rationally to be expected that they would be put upon distant markets. It must have been considered, that, the higher the price obtained for them, the more advantageous would it be for the company, and for the cities and towns which gave the bonds in exchange for capital stock. Every thing that tended to depress the market-value was adverse to the object the legislature had in view. It could not have been overlooked that their market-value would be disastrously affected if the distant purchasers were under obligation to inquire before their purchase, or whenever they demanded payment of principal or interest, whether certain contingencies of fact had happened before the bonds were issued,—contingencies the happening of which it would be almost impossible for them in many cases to ascertain with certainty. Imposing such an obligation upon the purchasers would tend to defeat the primary purpose the legislature had in view; namely, aid in the construction of the road. Such an interpretation ought not to be given to the statute, if it can reasonably be avoided; and we think it may be avoided.
At some time or other, it is to be ascertained whether the directions of the act have been followed; whether there was any popular vote; or whether a majority of the legal voters present at the election did, in fact, vote in favor of the subscription. The duty of ascertaining was plainly intended to be vested somewhere, and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
I IS Ljo State v. County Court Op Wirt County.
...(Ky.) 219; 16 Wall. 667; 3 Wall. 327; Jri., 654; 94 U. S. 310; 96 U. S. 205; 110 U. S. 156; 111 U. S. 363; 93 U. S. 502; 105 U. S. 370; 92 U. S. 484; 111 U. S. 1; 1 Wall. 175; 99 U. S. 676; Id., 686; 21 How. 539; Id., 546; 109 U. S. 735; 117 U. S. 336; 16 Wall. 452; 105 U.S. 739; 128 U. S. ......
-
Hughes County, S.D., v. Livingston
...86 F. 272, 279, 30 C.C.A. 38, 45, 57 U.S.App. 593; School Dist. v. Stone, 106 U.S. 183, 187, 1 Sup.Ct. 84, 27 L.Ed. 90; Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 23 L.Ed. 579; Commissioners v. Bolles, 94 U.S. 104, 24 L.Ed. Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83, 17 L.Ed. 548; Commissioners v. Beal, ......
-
First Nat. Bank v. Obion County
...value. Mercer County v. Hackett, 68 U. S. 83, 17 L. Ed. 548; Kenicott v. Wayne County, 83 U. S. 452, 466, 21 L. Ed. 319; Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484, 23 L. Ed. 579; Moultre County v. Bank, 92 U. S. 631, 23 L. Ed. 631; Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 637, 23 L. Ed. 748; Daviess County v. Huideko......
-
Town of Aurora v. Gates
...62 F. 778, 792, 793, 10 C.C.A. 639, 651, 652; School District v. Stone, 106 U.S. 183, 187, 1 Sup.Ct. 84, 27 L.Ed. 90; Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484, 23 L.Ed. 579; Commissioners v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227, 5 Sup.Ct. 28 L.Ed. 966; City of Cairo v. Zane, 149 U.S. 122, 13 Sup.Ct. 803, 37 L.Ed......
-
The Municipal Bond Cases Revisited.
...v. Darlington, 101 U.S. 407 (1879) (Illinois; reformatory). (55) Dillon, supra note 38. (56) Id. (57) See Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484 (1875). (58) See, e.g., Cty. of Dixon v. Field, 111 U.S. 83 (1884) ("This bond is one of a series of eighty-seven thousand dollars issued under and ......