United States v. Diekelman
| Citation | 92 U.S. 520,23 L.Ed. 742 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. DIEKELMAN |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1875 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Court of Claims.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Edwin B. Smith for the appellant.
Mr. J. D. McPherson, contra.
This suit was brought in the Court of Claims under the authority of a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress, passed May 4, 1870, as follows:——
'That the claim of E. Diekelman, a subject of the King of Prussia, for damages for an alleged detention of the ship 'Essex' by the military authorities of the United States at New Orleans, in the month of September, 1862, be and is hereby referred to the Court of Claims for its decision in accordance with law, and to award such damages as may be just in the premises, if he may be found to be entitled to any damages.'
Before this resolution was passed, the matter of the claim had been the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the governments of the United States and Prussia.
The following article, originally adopted in the treaty of peace between the United States and Prussia, concluded July 11, 1799 (8 Stat. 168), and revived by the treaty concluded May 1, 1828 (8 Stat. 384), was in force when the acts complained of occurred, to wit:——
When the 'Essex' visited New Orleans, the United States were engaged in the war of the rebellion. The port of that city was, at the very commencement of the war, placed under blockade, and closed against trade and commercial intercourse; but, on the 12th of May, 1862, the President, having become satisfied that the blockade might 'be safely relaxed with advantage to the interests of commerce,' issued his proclamation, to the effect that from and after June 1 'commercial intercourse, . . . except as to persons, things, and information contraband of war,' might 'be carried on subject to the laws of the United States, and to the limitations, and in pursuance of the regulations . . . prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury,' and appended to the proclamation. These regulations, so far as they are applicable to the present case, are as follows:——
The 'Essex' sailed from Liverpool for New Orleans June 19, 1862, and arrived Aug. 24. New Orleans was then in possession of the military forces of the United States, with General Butler in command. The city was practically in a state of siege by land, but open by sea, and was under martial law.
The commanding general was expressly enjoined by the government of the United States to take measures that no supplies went out of the port which could afford aid to the rebellion; and, pursuant to this injunction, he issued orders in respect to the exportation of money, goods, or property, on account of any person known to be friendly to the Confederacy, and directed the custom-house officers to inform him whenever an attempt was made to sent any thing out which might be the subject of investigation in that behalf.
In the early of September, 1862, General Butler, being still in command, was informed that a large quantity of clothing had been bought in Belgium on account of the Confederate government, and was lying at Matamoras awaiting delivery, because that government had failed to get the means they expected from New Orleans to pay for it; and that another shipment, amounting to a half million more, was delayed in Belgium from coming forward, because of the non-payment of the first shipment. He was also informed that it was expected the first payment would go forward through the agency of some foreign consuls; and this information afterwards proved to be correct.
He was also informed early in September by the customhouse officers, that large quantities of silver-plate and bullion were being shipped on the 'Essex,' then loading for a foreign port, by persons, one of whom had declared himself an enemy of the United States, and none of whom would enroll themselves as friends; and he thereupon gave directions that the specified articles should be detained, and their exportation not allowed until further orders.
On the 15th September, the loading of the vessel having been completed, the master applied to the collector of the port for his clearance, which was refused in consequence of the orders of General Butler, but without any reasons being assigned by the collector. The next day, he was informed, however, that his ship would not be cleared unless certain specified articles which she on board were taken out and landed. Much correspondence ensued between General Butler and the Prussian consul at New Orleans in reference to the clearance, in which it was distinctly stated by General Butler that the clearance would not be granted until the specified goods were landed, and that it would be granted as soon as this should be done. Almost daily interviews took place between the master of the vessel and the collector, in which the same statements were made by the collector. The master refused to land the cargo, except upon the return of his bills of lading. Some of these bills were returned, and the property surrendered to the shipper. In another case, the shipper gave an order upon the master for his goods, and they were taken away by force. At a very early stage in the proceeding, the master and the Prussian consul were informed that the objection to the shipment of the articles complained of was that they were contraband.
A part only of the goods having been taken out of the vessel, a clearance was granted her on the 6th of October, and she was permitted to leave the port and commence her voyage.
Upon this state of facts, the Court of Claims gave judgment for Diekelman, from which the United States took an appeal.
One nation treats with the citizens of another only through their government. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sovereignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed. Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of another nation, must seek redress through his own government. His sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it need not be considered. If this responsibility is assumed, the claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts, as of right, but by diplomacy, or, if need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign against whom the demand is made to determine for himself what he will do in respect to it. He may pay or reject it; he may submit to arbitration, open his own courts to suit, or consent to be tried in the courts of another nation. All depends upon himself.
In this case, Diekelman, claiming to have been injured by the alleged wrongful conduct of the military forces of the United States, made his claim known to his government. It was taken into consideration, and became the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the two nations. Subsequently, Congress, by joint resolution, referred the matter to the Court of Claims 'for its decision according to law.' The courts of the United States were thus opened to Diekelman for this proceeding. In this way the United States have submitted to the Court of Claims, and through that court upon appeal to us, the determination of the question of their legal liability under all the circumstances of this case for the payment of damages to a citizen of Prussia upon a claim originally presented by his sovereign in his behalf. This requires us, as we think, to consider the rights of the claimant under the treaty between the two governments, as well as under the general law of nations. For all the purposes of its decision, the case is to be treated as one in which the government of...
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