Torres v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12 CV 923 DRH ARL.,12 CV 923 DRH ARL.
• Citation: 920 F.Supp.2d 368
• Parties: Janira TORRES, Victor Feliciano, and Maria S. Fonseca, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

920 F.Supp.2d 368

Janira TORRES, Victor Feliciano, and Maria S. Fonseca, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. 12 CV 923 DRH ARL.

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

Feb. 1, 2013.

Shulman Kessler LLP, Melville, NY, By: Troy L. Kessler, Esq. Marijana F. Matura, Esq., Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Seyfarth Shaw LLP New York, NY, By: Christopher H. Lowe, Esq., Mary Ahrens, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HURLEY, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiffs Janira Torres (“Torres”), Victor Feliciano (“Feliciano”), and Maria S. Fonseca (“Fonseca”) commenced this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, asserting that defendant United Healthcare Services, Inc. (“defendant”) deprived its sales representative employees, including plaintiffs, of earned overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).

Presently before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint and to compel individual arbitration of each plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and the parties' submissions.¹

Plaintiffs' Employment

Defendant is an insurance company that operates in New York. Defendant “customarily and regularly deploys” its sales representative employees, including plaintiffs, “to one of [its] fixed sites in order to enroll eligible individuals in a Medicaid program.”(Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert that in those roles they “had little or no discretion in the performance of their duties” and “had no supervisory functions.” ( Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs and other sales representatives “work long hours in order to meet aggressive quotas [defendant] imposes on them.” ( Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that defendant “had a policy to deprive its sales representatives ... of earned overtime wages by uniformly misclassifying them as exempt from federal and state overtime protections.” ( Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs further allege that defendant failed to record all of the time its employees worked or to maintain certain payroll records as required by the FLSA and NYLL. ( Id. ¶ 42.)

Torres worked as a sales representative between August 2009 and October 2011. ( Id. ¶¶ 48, 50.) During that time, she worked more than 55 hours “in most workweeks” but was never paid “overtime pay at the statutory rate of time and one-half her regular rate of pay” after working 40 hours per week. ( Id. ¶¶ 54–56.) Feliciano, who worked as a sales representative between November 2007 and November 2011, also worked more than 55 hours “in most workweeks” while employed by defendant. ( Id. ¶¶ 57, 59, 63.) Defendant also allegedly failed to compensate Feliciano for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week with a time-and-a-half overtime rate. ( Id. ¶ 64.) Fonseca worked more than 50 hours “in most workweeks” during her employment as a sales representative for defendant between November 2010 and July 2011. ( Id. ¶¶ 65, 67, 72.) Fonseca was not compensated at a rate of one and one-half her regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. ( Id. ¶ 73.)

The Arbitration Agreement

At the commencement of their respective employment periods as sales representatives for defendant, Torres, Feliciano, and Fonseca were each provided with electronic copies of the “UnitedHealth Group Employment Arbitration Policy” (the “Arbitration Agreement”). (Decl. of Deveri Ray, dated June 20, 2012 (“Ray Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–6.) Thereafter, plaintiffs were asked to provide an electronic acknowledgment of receipt by logging on to defendant's PeopleSoft Human Resources Management System and pressing a button that indicated “I have read and agree to the above.” ( Id.) Torres electronically acknowledged receipt of the Arbitration Agreement on August 22, 2009—19 days after the commencement of her employment. ( Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. A.) Feliciano did the same on November 9, 2007—4 days after his employment began ( id. ¶ 5 & Ex. B), and Fonseca did the same on December 20, 2010—approximately 21 days after her employment began ( id. ¶ 6 & Ex. C). None of the named plaintiffs dispute that they received copies of the Arbitration Agreement.

The Arbitration Agreement provides that it is “a contract requiring both parties to resolve most employment-related disputes ... that are based on a legal claim through final and binding arbitration.” ( Id., Ex. A ¶ B.) A dispute was “based on a legal claim,” so as to subject it to arbitration, if it arose “under any federal, state or local statute ... relating to employment discrimination, terms and conditions of employment, or termination of employment including ... the Fair Labor Standards Act.” ( Id.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that their FLSA and NYLL claims are “disputes ... that are based on a legal claim” under this definition.

The Arbitration Agreement also contains a class and collective action waiver, as follows:

Any dispute covered by this Policy will be arbitrated on an individual basis. No dispute between an employee and UnitedHealth Group may be consolidated or joined with a dispute between any other employee and UnitedHealth Group, nor may an individual employee seek to bring his/her dispute on behalf of other employees as a class or collective action.

( Id.)

The Arbitration Agreement provides that the rules and procedures used by the parties “are generally based on the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules of the American Arbitration Association” (the “AAA”). ( Id. ¶ C.) However, the “provisions regarding fees and costs [were] modified to provide that many of the costs typically shared by the parties will be borne by” defendant. ( Id.) Thus, under the Arbitration Agreement, if an employee commenced the arbitration process, defendant would pay “100 percent in excess of the first twenty-five ($25) of the required AAA administrative fee.” ( Id. ¶ C(1)(a).) Defendant would pay the entirety of the AAA administrative fees when it initiated the arbitration process. ( Id. ¶ C(1)(b).) With respect to other costs and attorney's fees, the Arbitration Agreement provided:

The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be paid by the party requiring the presence of such witnesses. Each side shall pay its own legal fees and expenses, except where such legal fees and expenses may be awarded under applicable law. All other expenses ... of the arbitration, such as required travel and other expenses of the arbitrator ... and the expenses of a representative of AAA, if any, shall be paid completely by UnitedHealth Group. This allocation of expenses may not be changed by the arbitration award. However, if the arbitrator finds that the employee's or UnitedHealth Group's demand for arbitration is frivolous, or vexatious, or was not filed in good faith, the arbitrator may require the offending party to reimburse the other party for the arbitrator's expenses.

( Id. ¶ C(25).)

Pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement, “[e]ither party may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel arbitration under this Policy....” ( Id. ¶ C(24).) Thus, after plaintiffs commenced this action on February 27, 2012, defendant filed the present motion to compel arbitration.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“In the context of motions to compel arbitration brought under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), the court applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.” Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175. Thus, “[a] motion to compel arbitration may be granted when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 124590, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘A party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.’ ” Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000)). “Once a court is satisfied that an arbitration agreement is valid and the claim before it is arbitrable, it must stay or dismiss further judicial proceedings and order the parties to arbitrate.” Nunez v. Citibank, N.A., 2009 WL 256107, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2009); see also Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir.1987) (“By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandatesthat district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”).

II. Legal Standard

Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 “in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). The FAA provides, in relevant part:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has “described this provision as reflecting both a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms.” Id. at 1745–46 (internal citations omitted).

To decide a motion to compel arbitration of claims pursuant to...