U.S. v. Todd

• Citation: 920 F.2d 399
• Decision Date: 04 December 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 89-2262,89-2345,s. 89-2262
• Parties: 31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1100 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Lawrence Douglas TODD, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 399

920 F.2d 399

31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1100

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Lawrence Douglas TODD, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 89-2262, 89-2345.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 20, 1990.

Decided Dec. 4, 1990.

Michael Hluchaniuk, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Bay City, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant.

Richard L. Lee, Jr. (argued), Midland, Mich., for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.

Before KENNEDY and GUY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Lawrence Todd ("defendant") was tried on October 17, 1988, for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. This proceeding, however, resulted in a mistrial. In a second trial, a jury found defendant guilty. The District Court departed downward from the federal sentencing guidelines when it sentenced defendant. Both parties appeal.

Defendant raises five issues on appeal. First, defendant argues that the District Court in the second trial failed to follow the law of the case by admitting evidence in contravention to a previous ruling on the same issue by another court in the trial which ended in a mistrial. Second, defendant contends that the District Court erroneously denied defendant's discovery motion pertaining to certain reports in the government's possession. Third, defendant alleges that there was insufficient evidence to prove certain acts allegedly done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fourth, defendant argues that the District Court erred by refusing to give the jury a special interrogatory verdict vis-a-vis the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy. Finally, defendant alleges that the District Court erroneously predicated defendant's sentence upon defendant's involvement with two kilograms of cocaine. The government cross-appeals and contends that the District Court erred when it departed downward from the federal sentencing guidelines without providing an adequate justification. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM defendant's conviction but REMAND the case to the District Court for resentencing.

I.

Between June of 1986 and April of 1988, Greg Diehl ("Diehl") headed a drug trafficking ring that brought large amounts of cocaine and marijuana from Florida to Michigan for distribution. Dennis Todd, defendant's brother, met Diehl in the fall of 1986 and quickly became a major player in this operation. Diehl and Dennis Todd would sometimes transport the drugs themselves from Florida to Michigan.

On one of the trips from Florida to Michigan, Diehl and Dennis Todd needed a place to divide up the two kilograms of cocaine they were transporting. Dennis Todd suggested this could be done at defendant's house, so Diehl and Todd drove there. It is at this point that defendant was exposed to this drug operation. At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether and to what extent defendant became involved in this conspiracy to distribute drugs.

One account, based on the testimony of Diehl, is that defendant played a minor role in this drug operation. Diehl testified that defendant allowed Diehl and Dennis Todd to divide up the cocaine at his house, providing them with a cake pan and plastic bags. Defendant remained present while the cocaine was being weighed and bagged, and discussed various aspects of the business with Diehl and Dennis Todd. After accomplishing this task, defendant allowed Diehl and Dennis Todd to store the cocaine in his basement.

Diehl also testified that defendant was present in February 1988, when Dennis Todd retrieved four ounces of cocaine from defendant's house and gave it to Diehl. Further, the government introduced into evidence a piece of paper seized at defendant's house on which Diehl and defendant had written information relating to a planned money-laundering scheme. Thus, the government pointed to three particular instances to prove defendant's involvement in the conspiracy with Diehl and Dennis Todd: defendant's acquiescence of Diehl and Dennis Todd preparing two kilograms of cocaine for distribution and storing the cocaine at his house; defendant's presence when Diehl and Dennis Todd removed four ounces of cocaine from defendant's house; and defendant's role in the proposed money-laundering scheme.

The other account of defendant's involvement was based on the testimony of defendant, defendant's girlfriend ("McCloy"), and Dennis Todd. Their testimony portrayed defendant as an unwilling participant when Diehl and Dennis Todd divided the cocaine at his house. Further, defendant did not know that Diehl and Dennis Todd stored cocaine at his house and objected to this practice upon discovery. Although Diehl and Todd attempted to involve defendant in a money-laundering scheme, these witnesses asserted that defendant took no part in the plan. Defendant contends that the government failed to prove that he participated in the measuring, diluting or packaging of cocaine; nor did it prove that he knew cocaine was stored in his house.

II.

A. The District Court's Failure to Follow Another Court's Prior Evidentiary Ruling

In an effort to prove defendant's involvement in the money-laundering scheme, the government sought to introduce the testimony of Diehl and a piece of paper on which defendant and Diehl had written information relating to the money-laundering scheme. The document contained information necessary to draft a fraudulent loan document, purporting to show that defendant had loaned Diehl and Dennis Todd $100,000 in order to purchase a bar. In defendant's first trial, the court sustained defendant's objection that this evidence was inadmissible because the money-laundering scheme was beyond the scope of the conspiracy. The mistrial was for reasons unrelated to this evidentiary ruling. In defendant's second trial, the court admitted this evidence, ruling that it was not bound by a prior evidentiary ruling made in the earlier trial which ended in a mistrial. Defendant now asserts that the District Court erred in its ruling because it violated the doctrine of the law of the case. We hold that under these circumstances a coordinate court is not bound by prior evidentiary rulings made during the course of a prior proceeding, but may, in its discretion, reconsider such rulings. Our holding is based on an analysis of three areas of the law: the doctrine of the law of the case; the nature of the ruling revisited by the court; and the effect of a mistrial on the application of this doctrine.

Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a decision on an issue made by a court at one stage of a case should be given effect in successive stages of the same litigation. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2177, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)); 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice p 0.404, at 117 (1988) [hereinafter "Moore's"]. This doctrine applies with equal vigor to the decisions of a coordinate court in the same case and to a court's own decisions. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816, 108 S.Ct. at 2177. The purpose of this doctrine is twofold: (1) to prevent the continued litigation of settled issues; and (2) to assure compliance by inferior courts with the decisions of superior courts. Moore's p 0.404, at 118. The Supreme Court has noted that this doctrine will not deprive a court of the power to revisit an issue: ¹

[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power." ... A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances....

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817, 108 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912)); In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.1981) (stating that a transferee court should accord considerable deference to the judgment of a transferor court). The doctrine of the law of the case, therefore, does not foreclose a court from reconsidering issues in a case previously decided by the same court or another court. Applied to coordinate courts, the doctrine is a discretionary tool available to a court in order to promote judicial efficiency. As such, a decision to reconsider a previously decided issue will be deemed erroneous only if it is shown that the transferee court abused its discretion.

We note that other courts have limited a court's discretion to revisit issues previously decided by another court. See, e.g., Handi Inv. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 653 F.2d 391, 392 (9th Cir.1981) (stating that decisions "should be followed unless there is substantially different evidence at a subsequent trial, new controlling authority, or the prior decision was clearly erroneous"). We do not think that such limitations are warranted. It is within the sole discretion of a court to determine if a prior ruling should be reconsidered. Thus, we decline to impose any conditions or limitations upon a court's power to review a prior ruling of another court.

The nature of the decision being reconsidered--an evidentiary ruling made during the course of trial--also mandates giving the transferee court broad discretion in this matter. Generally, a trial judge has broad discretion on evidentiary rulings because this type of decision turns upon the evidence as developed during the course of a trial. United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir.1984) (recognizing that the law-of-the-case doctrine is flexible and that "some deference must be given to [the court's] view of the evidence as the case was presented...