Abbott Laboratories v. Young
Citation | 920 F.2d 984 |
Decision Date | 07 December 1990 |
Docket Number | Nos. 89-5183,88-5260,s. 89-5183 |
Parties | , 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1027 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, Appellant, v. Frank D. YOUNG, Dr., Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Harold D. Murry, Jr., with whom Robert P. Reznick was on the brief, for appellant. Bryan Jay Yolles, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance, for appellant.
Irene M. Solet, Attorney, Dept. of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Washington, D.C., Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for appellee. Jacqueline H. Eagle, Atty., Rockville, Md., Dept. of Justice, also entered an appearance, for appellee.
Peter R. Mathers, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., urging affirmance.
Before MIKVA, EDWARDS, and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
This is an unusual case in which both the appellant and the government present us with unreasonable interpretations of a statute we think ambiguous. We therefore direct the district court to remand to the agency for reconsideration.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (the "Hatch-Waxman Amendments"), amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 301-392. The statute created a new system for protecting both the interests of drug manufacturers who produce new drugs and the interests of generic drug manufacturers and their consumers. Facing the classic question of the appropriate trade-off between greater incentives for the invention of new products and greater affordability of those products, Congress struck a balance between expediting generic drug applications and protecting the interests of the original drug manufacturers. See H.R.REP. No. 98-857 (Pt. 1), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 2647, 2648. It reserved a longer period of market exclusivity for newly developed drugs than for drugs for which the approval process had already been completed in a prior application. The statute gives the original drug producer a specified period of market exclusivity depending primarily on the pharmaceutical novelty of a drug.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's guidance in Chevron, we must first determine whether Congress manifested an "unambiguously expressed intent" that resolves this dispute over the statute's meaning. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Of course, the language of the statute itself is always the best indication of congressional intent. Abbott argues, with the support of the Federal Circuit, that the "plain meaning" of the language supports its interpretation. Both Abbott and the Federal Circuit, see Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 393-94, focus only on the phrase "active ingredient," claiming it has a well understood meaning. The district court, on the other hand, thought that the usage of the reference words "which," "of which," and "that" in sections (i) and (v) created an overlap and therefore an irreconcilable conflict between the sections because the same active ingredient was ostensibly covered by both provisions, resulting in different periods of exclusivity mandated for the same substance. See 691 F.Supp. at 472. The government disavows the district judge's perceived irreconcilable conflict. 3 Instead, the government reads the parenthetical phrase ("including any ester or salt of the active ingredient") to permit an interpretation of "active ingredient" that includes even more than salt or ester derivatives. According to the government, that phrase can be interpreted to mean that Congress was using the term active ingredient loosely, possibly as a virtual synonym for active moiety.
Indeed, it was at least suggested in an agency letter, subsequent to the decision in Abbott's case, that the phrase "active ingredient" itself, even without the parenthetical, could be interpreted to include active moiety notwithstanding that the FDA construes that term narrowly in another section of the act, 335(j)(4)(D). See McNeil Pharmaceutical 6, Docket No. 87P-0339 (FDA July 26, 1989). The agency appears to contend that the different purpose of that other section 335(j)(4)(D) ( ) justifies a different interpretation of the same phrase. We note that it is not impermissible under Chevron for an agency to interpret an imprecise term differently in two separate sections of a statute which have different purposes. See National Ass'n of Casualty and Surety Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 856 F.2d 282, 287 (D.C.Cir.1988) (, )cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090, 109 S.Ct. 2430, 104 L.Ed.2d 987 (1989); Comite Pro Rescate v. Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir.1989) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1476, 108 L.Ed.2d 613 (1990). But we cannot consider whether active ingredient is such a term because the agency did not in its decision on Abbott's application employ this theory.
Putting aside for a moment the relative merits of the various constructions offered, we first conclude the language is ambiguous as it relates to the issue before us. The parenthetical phrase ("including any ester or salt of the active ingredient") can refer to either the active ingredient of the original approved drug or to the active ingredient in the new drug, depending on how "the" in the parenthetical and the words surrounding the parenthetical--"no active ingredient ... of which has been approved"--is interpreted. In other words, the definition of an active ingredient as including both the active ingredient and an ester or salt of the active ingredient can In this section of the Act, Congress was concerned with defining the chemical entity on which a subsection (j) (generic drug) application is based. 4 When Congress used the definition "an active ingredient (or the salt or ester of the active ingredient)," Sec. 355(j)(4)(D)(v) (emphasis added), that definition arguably referred to all the subsection (b) applications in question. The FDA's authorization to approve a generic drug (subsection (j) application) depends on its relationship to all original drugs (subsection (b) applications). Therefore, Congress may have intended for its...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Henney
...be characterized as an express or implied delegation of authority by Congress to an agency. See Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 995 (D.C.Cir.1990) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting o.g.) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Rather, deference is appropriate where the ......
-
Kiakombua v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-1872 (KBJ)
...636 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and the "statutory purposes[,]" Abbott Labs. v. Young , 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Court cannot discern a reasonable fit between the Lesson Plan's corroboration requirement and the credible fear......
-
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
...instead to the "plain and established meanings" of the relevant terms "in scientific and regulatory parlance." Abbott Lab'ys. v. Young , 920 F.2d 984, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ; see also FAA v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 284, 292, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) ("[I]t is a ‘cardinal rule of stat......
-
Takeda Pharm., U.S.A., Inc. v. Burwell
...new applicant relies upon so that the drug owner has an opportunity to take steps to protect its patent rights.See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C.Cir.1990) ( “Facing the classic question of the appropriate trade-off between greater incentives for the invention of new products......
-
Aia Proceedings: a Prescription for Accelerating the Availability of Generic Drugs
...expediting generic drug applications and protecting the interests of the original drug manufacturers.'" (quoting Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). Patent validity is "determined on a claim-by-claim basis"; however, the "Hatch......
-
Regulatory and Enforcement Framework
...21 U.S.C. § 355, 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271). 55. aaiPharma v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 56. This chapter does not include discussion of applications submitted under Section 505(b)(2) (21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)), w......
-
Table of Cases
...306 Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006), 306, 309, 313, 330, 331, 333, 334, 335 Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), 82 Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care, 461 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2006), 383 Actavis/Warner Chilcott PLC, No. C-4414 (FTC 20......
-
From a nonpollutant into a pollutant: revising EPA'S interpretation of the phrase "discharge of any pollutant" in the context of NPDES permits.
...404, the agency easily could have used different language to make this clear. (142) See also supra Part III. (143) Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Weaver v. United States Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1437-38 (D.C. Cir. 1996). (144) See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, ......