920 S. Beach Blvd. v. City of Bay St. Louis
| Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-cv-263-TBM-RPM |
| Parties | 920 SOUTH BEACH BLVD., LLC PLAINTIFF v. CITY OF BAY SAINT LOUIS, MISSISSIPPI; SWK, LLC; and JAMES J. CHINICHE, P.A. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Located on the beach in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, is the Plaintiff's 15-acre parcel of land, 920 South Beach Boulevard. In 2019, the City of Bay Saint Louis approved SWK LLC's preliminary plat for a thirty-four-home subdivision on the 17-acre parcel next to the Plaintiff's property. Following the approval of the preliminary plat, the Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against the City of Bay Saint Louis Mississippi, SWK, LLC, and James J. Chiniche, P.A., asserting various constitutional and state law claims. Since the filing of this action, however, it is undisputed that the preliminary plat has expired-and the Plaintiff concedes that its claims for substantive due process, equal protection takings violations, and declaratory relief are now moot.
Despite the expiration of the preliminary plat, the Plaintiff argues that its procedural due process claims against each Defendant satisfy Article III's justiciability requirements. However, the Court finds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert its claims against Chiniche and SWK because the Plaintiff's injuries are not fairly traceable to either of these Defendants. And although the Court agrees that the Plaintiff's procedural due process claim against the City is justiciable, the Plaintiff nevertheless fails to state claim for relief because the process that was provided was constitutionally sufficient. For the reasons discussed below this action is dismissed.
920 South Beach Boulevard consists of 15 acres on the beach in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Next door is 928 South Beach Boulevard, 17 acres owned by SWK, LLC. In 2019, SWK sought to develop the 17-acres into a thirty-four-home subdivision. SWK hired the City of Bay St. Louis' engineer, James J. Chiniche, P.A., to draw a preliminary plat for the development. [50], ¶¶ 4, 25. SWK submitted an application to the City of Bay St. Louis for approval of the preliminary plat. [50], ¶ 16. The preliminary plat was advertised, and a public hearing was held before the City's Planning and Zoning Commission. At the hearing, the Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, argued against preliminary plat approval. The Plaintiff argued that SWK's application allegedly did not comply with city ordinances, as the application failed to include: (1) a drainage plan; (2) a tree survey; (3) easements; and (4) grade, gradients, elevation, or width of roads. [50], ¶ 36. Despite the Plaintiff's arguments, the Planning and Zoning Commission voted to recommend plat approval to the City Council.
About a week later, the City Council held a public hearing and heard discussion from members of the public-including the Plaintiff, SWK, and SWK's retained engineer, Chiniche. At this hearing, SWK and Chiniche discussed its drainage plans for the first time-“after all other interested parties had spoken, and without allowing [the Plaintiff] notice of or opportunity to respond.” [50], ¶25. Although the Plaintiff again argued against preliminary plat approval due to the alleged deficiencies in the application, the City Council unanimously approved the preliminary plat. The approval, however, was contingent on modifications to the preliminary plat to include easements, road plats, a complete tree survey, and the addition of two 25-foot buffers to adjacent properties. [50], ¶¶ 27, 28. The Plaintiff's procedural due process claims-the sole claims before this Court-arise out the alleged failure to be heard on these modifications.
The Plaintiff appealed the City Council's decision to the Circuit Court of Hancock County arguing that, in modifying the preliminary plat, the City “improperly approved an unapplied for, unadvertised and altered plat.” [50], ¶ 28. The suit was dismissed on procedural grounds, and the Plaintiff appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. A decision reversing and remanding the Circuit Court's decision was handed down on October 20, 2022.
In the instant suit, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants violated its constitutional rights-including its procedural due process right to be heard at a fair, neutral, and impartial hearing; substantive due process; equal protection; and takings violations. [50]. As for the Plaintiff's procedural due process claims, the Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the City's modification of the preliminary plat without advertisement or any alleged hearing or opportunity to be heard. Also, the Plaintiff complains how the City did not require SWK to submit grades and gradients of roads, which allegedly deprived the Plaintiff of the opportunity to be heard on those gradients, and how SWK did not submit other matters required of subdivisions that are within flood zones. [50], pp. 16-31.
The Defendants have each filed a Motion to Dismiss [53], [55], [57], pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) arguing that the Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[1][54], pg. 5; [56], pg. 8; see also [58], pg. 14. In the alternative, the City and SWK argue that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a procedural due process violation, and that this matter must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).[2] The Court will first address the jurisdictional arguments and will then turn to the merits of the Plaintiff's procedural due process claims.
“Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). “In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss a court may consider (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen Liab. Corp., 757 F.3d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 2014). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion lies with the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
Review of whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) involves a different set of considerations than a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. “The pleading standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are derived from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, that a pleading stating a claim for relief must contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 2012). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The Fifth Circuit has explained the Iqbal/Twombly standard as follows:
In order for a claim to be plausible at the pleading stage, the complaint need not strike the reviewing court as probably meritorious, but it must raise ‘more than a sheer possibility' that the defendant has violated the law as alleged. The factual allegations must be ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'
Oceanic Expl. Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ZOC, 352 Fed.Appx. 945, 950 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
The Court need not “accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). However, “[p]leadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law remain.” Chaudhary v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 832 Fed.Appx. 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2020). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff[] will ultimately prevail, but whether [they are] entitled to offer evidence to support [their] claim[s].” Cook v. City of Dallas, 683 Fed.Appx. 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
In its Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts various claims arising out of the City's approval of the preliminary plat contingent on certain modifications, which were allegedly made without notice or advertisement, and without allowing the Plaintiff the opportunity to be heard on these modifications. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges violations of substantive and procedural due process, equal protection, and the takings clause for which the Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claims fail to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response to the Defendants' Motions, the Plaintiff concedes that its claims for substantive due process, equal protection, takings violations, and declaratory relief are now moot due to the expiration of the preliminary plat. Despite this, the Plaintiff argues that the expiration of the preliminary plat has no bearing on the justiciability of its procedural due process claims.
For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff's procedural due process claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot, but its claim for...
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