Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River

• Decision Date: 29 May 2007
• Docket Number: Docket: Som-06-554.
• Citation: 922 A.2d 484,2007 ME 68
• Parties: Linda RODRIGUEZ v. TOWN OF MOOSE RIVER et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

922 A.2d 484

2007 ME 68

Linda RODRIGUEZ v. TOWN OF MOOSE RIVER et al.

Docket: Som-06-554.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: April 9, 2007.

Decided: May 29, 2007.

Jason M. Jabar, Esq. (orally), Jabar, Batten, Ringer & Murphy, Waterville, for plaintiff.

Edward R. Benjamin Jr., Esq., Rosie M. Williams, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, (for Town of Moose River), Anne M. Carney, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLP, Portland, (for Elizabeth Bell), for defendants.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] Elizabeth Bell, the former town clerk and tax collector of the Town of Moose River, appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Somerset County, Mills, J.) denying her motion for summary judgment in a negligence action filed by Linda Rodriguez. Rodriguez suffered injuries falling down the front steps of Bell's residence. Because Bell's residence is where she performed her duties as the town clerk, Bell argues that she is entitled to discretionary function and/or intentional act immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118 (2006).

[¶ 2] Rodriguez cross-appeals from the Superior Court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of the Town of Moose River, arguing that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bell's residence may be considered a "public building" pursuant to the MTCA. We affirm the trial court's denial of Bell's motion for summary judgment, but vacate the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Town.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 3] The parties' statements of material facts reveal no material disputes of fact with respect to the issues relevant to this appeal. The Town of Moose River has a population of approximately 230 residents. Like other small towns in Maine, the Town does not own an office building suitable for conducting Town business. As a condition for holding office, the Town required the town clerk to conduct official duties at his or her personal residence. The Town conducts its selectmen's meetings at a selectman's home. The annual town meeting occurs at a school in the neighboring Town of Jackman.

[¶ 4] In March 2000, Bell was elected town clerk and tax collector. Accordingly, she opened her home to the public to conduct Town business. The Town brought its computer, file cabinets, desk, and office supplies to Bell's home. Bell could request or use a Town charge card for other supplies as needed. Shortly after becoming the town clerk, Bell placed a sign on the side of her house, which read, "Moose River Town Clerk and Tax Collector."

[¶ 5] Bell's responsibilities included issuing birth and death certificates and marriage licenses, running elections, registering motor vehicles and snowmobiles, and collecting real estate and excise taxes. She was also responsible for keeping Town records. Bell received about $300 per month as compensation for her work for the Town. During an average year, approximately 200 people would enter Bell's home to conduct Town business.

[¶ 6] The Town never inspected Bell's home after she became the town clerk and never imposed any requirements on her to keep the home safe. The Town never helped Bell with shoveling, sanding, or plowing her property, nor did it provide any support for the maintenance of her home. There were no written policies or agreements between the Town and Bell regarding her responsibilities as town clerk.

[¶ 7] On January 23, 2004, Rodriguez went to Bell's home with her husband and two children to register two motor vehicles. Rodriguez had called Bell beforehand to schedule the appointment. There was some snow and ice on the sides of the steps leading into Bell's home, but the middle of the steps was clear. During the registration process, Rodriguez had to leave Bell's home to retrieve her checkbook. She descended and ascended the three steps into the home without incident.

[¶ 8] After conducting her business, Rodriguez exited the home carrying one of her children in a car seat. As she reached the top step, Rodriguez turned around to thank Bell and say goodbye. Rodriguez asserts that she fell when she stepped down to the middle cement step outside of Bell's home. Bell asserts that she observed Rodriguez catch her feet on the threshold of the door before ever exiting the house. Rodriguez did not remember anything slippery on the step, but said that her foot slipped or gave way. As she fell, Rodriguez dropped the car seat flat, so that her son would not be injured. Rodriguez injured her leg as a result of the fall.

[¶ 9] Some time prior to Rodriguez's fall, there was a handrail on Bell's front steps. She had removed the handrail when she noticed that it was wiggling. Bell did not check with the Town before removing the handrail. The Town never took any steps to replace the handrail at Bell's home. The Town's first selectman stated that if Bell had asked the Town to replace her handrail, the Town would not have done so because the town clerk should be responsible for maintaining his or her property.

[¶ 10] At some point after Bell became town clerk, her homeowner's insurance policy expired. The first selectman was aware of this, but believed that the Town's insurance policy would cover injuries sustained by someone conducting Town business on Bell's premises. Bell also believed that her home would be covered under the Town's insurance policy for the purposes of theft or fire. Bell did not consider insurance coverage for a personal injury because in her belief, "neighbors don't sue . . . neighbors."

[¶ 11] At the time of the fall, the Town was a member of the Maine Municipal Association Property & Casualty Pool (MMA), a self-insured municipal risk pool. The MMA member coverage certificate listed three buildings. Bell's home was not among the covered buildings. Under the MMA policy, coverage was not available for private residences such as Bell's. The first selectman had not looked through the entire policy and did not realize that the Town had not sought, nor could the MMA provide, coverage for injuries that could occur on Bell's property. The Town has now changed its practice and utilizes leased space in a commercial building for the Town office.

[¶ 12] In her lawsuit, Rodriguez claimed that Bell and the Town had been negligent in failing to properly maintain Bell's property. Rodriguez alleged that, had there been a handrail in place, it could have assisted her in walking down the steps, or she could have grabbed it to prevent her fall. In responding to Bell's and the Town's motions for summary judgment, Rodriguez submitted the deposition testimony of her expert who asserted that the lack of a handrail contributed to Rodriguez's fall "because a handrail is a very essential necessary safety device on any stairway," and it would have helped guide Rodriguez down the stairway.

[¶ 13] Based on this record, the court denied Bell's motion for summary judgment on Rodriguez's complaint against her. The court determined that it could not conclude that Bell was entitled to discretionary function immunity or limited liability. Furthermore, the court found that Rodriguez had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bell was negligent.

[¶ 14] The court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment. The court held that because the Town did not pay any rent or lease payments to Bell, did not take any responsibility for maintenance or upkeep of the residence, and did not require any specific maintenance responsibilities, the court could not find that the Town operated, maintained, or exercised control over the residence. Thus, the court found that Bell's residence was not a "public building" pursuant to the immunity exception of the MTCA, 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2).

[¶ 15] Bell filed her appeal of the denial of her motion for summary judgment. After the court denied Rodriguez's motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting the Town's motion for summary judgment, Rodriguez filed her cross-appeal. Rodriguez also filed a motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) with respect to her claim against the Town. The court, however, did not act on this motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Final Judgment Rule

[¶ 16] Although an appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment is generally barred by the final judgment rule, appeals based on a denial of a dispositive motion asserting immunity from suit are immediately reviewable. Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 6, 850 A.2d 325, 328. Even when the trial court decides that there is a dispute of material fact regarding immunity, we will reach the merits of an appeal if the parties do not dispute the facts as alleged by the nonmoving party. See Andrews v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 1998 ME 198, ¶ 5, 716 A.2d 212, 215.

[¶ 17] Here, there does not appear to be a dispute about the facts relevant to whether Bell is entitled to immunity. Therefore, we will reach the merits of her appeal. Additionally, although Rodriguez's cross-appeal is interlocutory, because Bell's appeal is ripe for consideration and contains similar questions of law, for efficiency purposes, we also reach the merits of Rodriguez's appeal. See Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 17, 728 A.2d 1261, 1267.

B. Bell's Entitlement to Immunity

[¶ 18] Bell contends that, on the undisputed facts, she is entitled to discretionary function immunity, 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C), because her decision not to replace the handrail was a discretionary decision in furtherance of her role as the town clerk. She also asserts her entitlement to intentional act immunity, 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(E), because she claims her decision was in the course and scope of her employment.

[¶ 19] We review a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of immunity for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 6, 850 A.2d at 328.

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