United States v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 07 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 04–CR–1016 (NGG).,04–CR–1016 (NGG).
• Citation: 922 F.Supp.2d 334
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Ronell WILSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

922 F.Supp.2d 334

UNITED STATES of America

v.Ronell WILSON, Defendant.

No. 04–CR–1016 (NGG).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

Feb. 7, 2013.

Carter H. Burwell, Colleen Elizabeth Kavanagh, Jack Smith, James G. McGovern, Jason Allen Jones, Celia Cohen, Shreve Ariail, United States Attorneys Office, Eastern District Of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.

Colleen Quinn Brady, The Law Office of Colleen Quinn Brady, David Stern, Rothman, Schneider, Soloway & Stern, P.C., Beverly Van Ness, New York, NY, Michael N. Burt, Law Office of Michael Burt, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

The execution of those who are mentally retarded violates both the Federal Death Penalty Act and the Eighth Amendment. See18 U.S.C. § 3596(c); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Defendant Earl Ronell Wilson, a convicted murderer of two undercover police officers, claims that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible to receive the death penalty. For the reasons that follow, he is incorrect.

I. BACKGROUND¹

In 2003, Wilson murdered two undercover NYPD detectives who were posing as gun purchasers. ( See Second Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 179) ¶¶ 7, 9.) He was tried in this court for capital-eligible crimes. (Trial Tr. (Dkts. 362–404).) The jury convicted Wilson and voted to impose the death penalty. (Jury Verdict (Dkt. 351).) The court accordingly sentenced Wilson to death. (Judgment (Dkt. 407).) Wilson appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed Wilson's convictions but vacated his death sentence on constitutional grounds and remanded to this court for retrial of his penalty phase. United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2010).

After the Second Circuit's mandate issued, Wilson requested “a pretrial hearing to determine whether he is a person with mental retardation” and thus ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act (the “Atkins claim”). (Dkt. 614.) The court granted this request and set a schedule for exchange of expert information, motions related to the Atkins claim, and an evidentiary hearing (the “Atkins hearing”). ( See Feb. 2, 2012, Order (Dkt. 618).)

Wilson provided notice of his intent to call four mental health experts at the Atkins hearing: (1) John Olley, Ph.D., a psychologist; (2) Bruce Shapiro, M.D., a developmental pediatrician; (3) Joette James, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist; and (4) George Woods, Jr., a licensed physician. (Mar. 7, 2012, Def. Ltr. (Dkt. 637).) The Government stated that it would call three experts at the hearing: (1) Robert Denney, Psy.D., a neuropsychologist; (2) Robert Mapou, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist; and (3) Raymond Patterson, M.D., a psychiatrist. (Mar. 7, 2012, Gov't Ltr. (Dkt. 638); Apr. 6, 2012, Gov't Ltr. (Dkt. 676); May 2, 2012, Gov't Ltr. (Dkt. 697).) Since then, the parties and their experts have conducted extensive discovery and testing in preparation for the Atkins hearing. The court has also issued two opinions in response to motions filed by the parties regarding the scope of discovery. See United States v. Wilson, No. 04–CR–1016 (NGG), 2012 WL 3890951, at *4–8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); United States v. Wilson, No. 04–CR–1016 (NGG), 920 F.Supp.2d 287, 295–306, 2012 WL 6962982, at *6–16 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2012).

On September 7, 2012, the parties exchanged expert reports. ( See Sept. 7, 2012, Def. Ltr. (Dkt. 868).) Each of the Government's experts opined that Wilson is not mentally retarded. (Denney Rep. (Dkt. 956) at 48; Patterson Rep. (Dkt. 957) at 18; Mapou Rep. (Dkt. 958) at 35.) Each of Wilson's experts opined that he is mentally retarded. (James Rep. (Dkt. 959) at 1, 17; Olley Rep. (Dkt. 960) at 28; Shapiro Rep. (Dkt. 961) at 2, 22; Woods Rep. (Dkt. 962) at 29.)

The court held the Atkins hearing over nine days in November and December 2012. ( See Minute Entries (Dkts. 950–55, 976–78).) It heard testimony from all seven of the experts mentioned above and four other witnesses. ( See Atkins Hr'g Tr. (“Tr.”).) The parties submitted briefing on the Atkins claim after the hearing. (Def. Mem. (Dkt. 982); Gov't Mem. (Dkt. 983); ² Def. Reply (Dkt. 999).)

II. STANDARD FOR MENTAL RETARDATION

Two provisions of law forbid federal courts from imposing a death sentence upon a person who is mentally retarded. First, the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”), originally enacted by Congress in 1988 and amended in 1994, provides that a “sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded.” 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). Second, the execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); seeU.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).

In Atkins, the Supreme Court found that, due to the relatively recent legislative efforts of several states, “a national consensus ha[d] developed against” the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Such executions were therefore inconsistent with “ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ ”—the guiding principle of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 311–12, 126 S.Ct. 941 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). The Court concluded that although the intellectual deficiencies of mentally retarded criminals did “not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions ”—including life imprisonment—such criminals “should be categorically excluded from execution ” for two main reasons. Id. at 318, 126 S.Ct. 941 (emphases added). First, there was a “serious question” as to whether the execution of mentally retarded offenders would serve the deterrence or retribution justifications of the death penalty. Id. at 318–319, 126 S.Ct. 941. Second, there was an enhanced risk in the case of mentally retarded offenders “that the death penalty w[ould] be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,” both because of “the possibility of false confessions” by mentally retarded defendants and because of the “lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation.” Id. at 320, 126 S.Ct. 941.

It is therefore clear that this court may not sentence a mentally retarded criminal to death, but that is where most of the clarity ends. The difficult task is deciding which persons qualify as “mentally retarded” under the FDPA and Atkins—an issue of first impression in this Circuit.

A. Sources of the Definition

Neither the FDPA nor Atkins mandates a particular definition of mentally retardation. The FDPA provides simply that “mentally retarded” persons may not be executed. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c); see also Garcia Briseno v. Dretke, No. 05–CV–08, 2007 WL 998743, at *10 n. 8 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 29, 2007). And Atkins expressly left “to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (alterations omitted); see also Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 2150, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009) (“Our opinion [in Atkins ] did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for determining when a person who claims mental retardation ‘will be so impaired as to fall [within Atkins ’ compass].' ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242)). Atkins noted, however, that although state “statutory definitions of mental retardation [we]re not identical, [they] generally conform[ed] to [ ] clinical definitions” promulgated by two groups: (1) the American Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”), which has since changed its name to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD”); and (2) the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”). Id. at 308 n. 3, 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court further noted that these clinical definitions “require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.” Id. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242. In short, Atkins declined to mandate a definition of mental retardation but left it to the states to define the term, while noting that existing state definitions generally conformed to the clinical definitions set forth by the AAMR and the APA.

Atkins did not hold that federal courts are bound to apply the mental retardation definitions of the particular states in which they are located, nor does the FDPA contain any such mandate. Federal courts that have decided cases involving both Atkins and FDPA claims have taken inconsistent approaches in this regard: some have applied their forum state's law, see, e.g., United States v. Cisneros, 385 F.Supp.2d 567, 571–72 (E.D.Va.2005) (applying Virginia law), while others have made no mention of their state's law and applied only clinical definitions of mental retardation, see, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 762 F.Supp.2d 849 (E.D.La.2010) (no mention of Louisiana law); United States v. Davis, 611 F.Supp.2d 472 (D.Md.2009) (no mention of Maryland law).³ This court will consider New York law in determining the definition of mental retardation, while noting that: (1) Atkins does not explicitly require that the court be bound by New York law; and (2) even if it did, an application of New York law would, as discussed below, ultimately lead the court to rely primarily upon clinical definitions of the term.

New York has been without the death penalty since 2004, when the New York Court of Appeals held that the State's capital sentencing statute violated its Constitution. See People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 817 N.E.2d 341 (2004)....