Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 89-5261

Citation923 F.2d 1277
Decision Date09 January 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-5261,89-5261
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,739 David MORRIS, Appellant, v. BARKBUSTER, INC. Isanti Engineering, Inc. Diversified Industries, Inc., F.W. and Associates, Inc. Fred W. Wagenhals, Individually, Ed Fochtman, Jr., Individually, Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Charles E. Moore, Owensboro, Ky., for appellant.

Robert W. Kettering, Jr., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees.

Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a product liability suit. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff David Morris appeals from the order of the District Court 1 granting the motion of defendants F.W. and Associates, Inc. (FWA), Fred W. Wagenhals, and Ed Fochtman, Jr. for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

FWA is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona. 2 From 1976 to 1978 FWA developed and marketed a log splitter powered by tractor power takeoff. This log splitter was sold under the trade name Barkbuster through a number of distributors including Diversified Distributing, Inc. (DDI), a Minnesota corporation, which handled the largest volume. 3 On December 5, 1978, FWA sold the Barkbuster log splitter product line to DDI. This sale was negotiated and executed in Arizona.

At that same time Wagenhals and Fochtman, both residents of Arizona and co-owners of FWA, entered into a separate consultation agreement with DDI. This agreement obligated Wagenhals and Fochtman to assist DDI in the engineering, production, and marketing of log splitters, and required DDI to pay royalties to Wagenhals and Fochtman upon the sale of the devices. This, too, was negotiated and executed in Arizona.

Pursuant to the contract for the sale of the Barkbuster product line, FWA shipped twenty-one truckloads of material, including some completed units, to DDI at its place of business in Minnesota. Shortly thereafter, FWA sent five employees to Minnesota to assist DDI in conducting a physical inventory of this material. In addition, either Wagenhals or Fochtman attended a dinner and cocktail party in Minnesota to help facilitate the transfer to DDI of the goodwill associated with the Barkbuster line. 4 Finally, following a default by DDI in its payments to FWA, both Wagenhals and Fochtman made a trip to Minnesota to investigate DDI's failure to make its payments. DDI never called upon Wagenhals or Fochtman to provide consultation services, nor did either of them ever provide such services to DDI. DDI failed to make all its contractually required payments to Wagenhals and Fochtman.

On January 7, 1984, David Morris, a citizen of Kentucky, lost both of his arms in an accident in Kentucky involving a Barkbuster log splitter manufactured and distributed by DDI. He subsequently filed suit for damages in the federal district court for the Western District of Kentucky naming FWA as one of the defendants. 5 That court found personal jurisdiction over FWA lacking and therefore granted FWA's motion dismissing it from the action. Morris then filed the present action in the District Court of Minnesota and moved the District Court in Kentucky to hold the action in that court in abeyance pending the outcome of his Minnesota action. Kentucky v. Morris, No. 88-H-003 (December 20, 1988). In his Minnesota action Morris charges FWA with having designed the log splitter negligently and having failed to warn DDI, as well as the previous and potential users of the log splitter, of the dangerous condition of the device. Plaintiff's Complaint at 7-8, Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., No. 4-87-108 (D.Minn. Filed Feb. 23, 1987). He also charges Wagenhals and Fochtman with "manufacturing, designing, selling and promoting" defective log splitters, failing to "redesign, render safe, or recall" the devices, and failing to warn DDI as well as present and potential users of the log splitter, of its dangerous condition. Id. at 8-9. In an unreported opinion the District Court concluded that the Minnesota contacts of these defendants did not give rise to any of the plaintiff's claims, that the defendants did not have continuous and systematic contact with Minnesota, and therefore that, under the Due Process Clause, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over FWA, Wagenhals, and Fochtman and therefore dismissed Morris's claims against these defendants. Morris v. Barkbuster, No. 4-87-108 (D.Minn. July 20 1988) (order granting motion to dismiss). Morris appeals from that order. 6

II.

A federal court in a diversity action may assume jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state and by the Due Process Clause. Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, 906 F.2d 369, 372-73 (8th Cir.1990). Here the District Court went directly to the constitutional question without first giving any apparent consideration to the question whether the Minnesota long-arm statute would provide a threshold basis for jurisdiction over the FWA defendants. Because we agree with the District Court that it would be inconsistent with due process to require the FWA defendants to litigate this case in Minnesota, we need not and do not pause to analyze the Minnesota long-arm statute. Instead, like the District Court, we go directly to the constitutional analysis.

III.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, jurisdiction over the person of an out-of-state defendant is proper only if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). Minimum contacts exist where the defendant has "purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The minimum contacts test is satisfied where "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

When the plaintiff's claims "arise out of or are connected with the [defendant's] activities within the [forum] state," International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160, maintenance of the action within the forum state generally does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," id. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S.Ct. at 343), as in these circumstances the defendant ordinarily "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. Conversely, when the plaintiff's claims do not relate to the defendant's forum-state activities, jurisdiction is likely to be improper since the defendant has "no reason to expect to be haled before [the forum state's] court[s]." Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1271 (8th Cir.1978) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). Where a court premises jurisdiction over a defendant upon the relationship between the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's forum state activities, it has been said that the court is exercising "specific jurisdiction." Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 8, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).

Jurisdiction may be proper despite the fact that the plaintiff's claims neither arise out of nor are related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952). However, a defendant may only be subject to this type of "general jurisdiction," Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 n. 9, where the defendant's contacts with the forum are "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 418-19, 104 S.Ct. at 1872-73, 1874-75 (finding no jurisdiction because corporate defendant's forum contacts were not "of a continuous and systematic" nature); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448, 72 S.Ct. at 419-20 (corporation carried on "continuous and systematic" activities within forum). We conclude, as did the District Court, that none of the FWA defendants has established this type of continuous and systematic contact with the state of Minnesota. They therefore are not subject to general jurisdiction in Minnesota. Accordingly, our inquiry is limited to the question of whether any of Morris's dismissed claims arise out of or are related to the Minnesota contacts of the defendants, i.e., whether the defendants are properly subject in this case to specific jurisdiction. 7

IV.

We turn first to FWA. Morris has charged FWA with negligently designing the log splitter and failing to warn of its dangerous propensity and maintains that jurisdiction over these claims is proper in Minnesota. We disagree.

FWA is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona. It is not licensed to do business in Minnesota, and it has no agents, offices, employees, or property there, nor does it solicit or advertise any business there. In addition, though it did originally create the design of the Barkbuster log splitter, 8 nothing in the record suggests that the design process was in any way connected with Minnesota.

Morris argues that FWA's contract with DDI for the sale of the Barkbuster product line, together with the three trips FWA's employees made to Minnesota, constitute contacts from which Morris's claims against FWA arise. While we agree that the sales contract and the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
94 cases
  • Copperhead Agric. Prods. v. KB AG Corp., CIV. 18-4127
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. District of South Dakota
    • 24 September 2019
    ...to be improper since the defendant 'has no reason to expect to be haled before [the forum state's courts]." Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co, 572 F.2d 1267, 1271 (8th Cir. 1978)). "However, if......
  • Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 04-0432.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 2 March 2007
    ...Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (1st Cir.1990); Marino, 793 F.2d at 429-30; Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir.1991); Pearrow v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir.1983); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, 339 F.......
  • Brown v. Kerkhoff, 4:06-cv-00342-JEG.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa
    • 23 August 2007
    ...478, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (mere making of a contract with a resident is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction), accord Morris v. Barkbuster, 923 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (8th Cir.1991); Wines, 846 F.2d at 43 (per curiam), with Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ("[W]here the defendan......
  • Woodke v. Dahm, C 94-4050.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Northern District of West Virginia
    • 17 January 1995
    ...forum to examine plaintiff's facilities and subsequent telephone and mail communications insufficient contact); Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1279 (8th Cir.1991) (defendant's employees' three trips to forum insufficient contact), and correspondence between the Florida defendant......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • Simplicity And Clarity In The Administration And Enforcement Of Jurisdictional Rules
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • 21 April 2015
    ...255 (3d Cir. 2001); Phillips Exeter Academy v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999); Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (8th Cir. 1991). To hold otherwise would be to bootstrap jurisdiction over parties and claims and eliminate any meaningful specifi......
1 books & journal articles
  • FORD'S UNDERLYING CONTROVERSY.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 99 No. 4, April 2022
    • 1 April 2022
    ...be proper for each and every cause of action in the complaint."); see infra Section II.B. (8.) See, e.g., Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir. 1991) (evaluating the elements of the contract to decide personal jurisdiction); see infra Section (9.) See, e.g., Def. Trainin......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT