923 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1990), 89-2144, Jackson v. Hanlon

• Citation: 923 F.2d 856
• Party Name: Marshall JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas HANLON, et al., Defendant-Appellees.
• Case Date: December 19, 1990
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 856

923 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1990)

Marshall JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Thomas HANLON, et al., Defendant-Appellees.

Nos. 89-2144, 89-2368.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

December 19, 1990

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA7 Rule 53 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Decided Jan. 14, 1991.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Nos. IP 89-193-C and IP 89-420-C, Sarah Evans Barker and Larry J. McKinney, Judges.

S.D.Ind.

AFFIRMED.

Before CUDAHY, COFFEY and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Order

Marshall Jackson, a state prisoner, is in administrative segregation at the Indiana State Farm. He has filed a series of suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; we have consolidated these two for decision.

Most of Jackson's objections to the circumstances of his assignment to segregation and the conditions there have no possible merit. The district court dismissed both of these suits as frivolous, without allowing Jackson to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the most part these decisions are beyond serious challenge even under the high standard of Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). For example, Jackson's contention that he was not told before a hearing in 1989 that he might be transferred from the maximum security unit to administrative segregation fails on two grounds: first that the transfer was beneficial rather than detrimental to him, and second that Indiana's rules do not set up exclusive factual predicates for placement in administrative segregation, so that the move did not involve liberty or property for purposes of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10 (1989); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). That the procedures may have violated state law is irrelevant; § 1983 is not a vehicle for enforcing state rules. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).

Jackson's contention that the state must treat prisoners in administrative segregation the same as prisoners in the general population amounts to an assertion that there may be no such thing as administrative segregation; the classification is defined by differences from the way other inmates are treated. Hewitt disposes of any such claim. States maintain minimum, medium, and maximum security prisons; segregation is closer custody within a given prison. If the state need not give identical treatment to prisoners in different institutions, it need not offer identical treatment to those in different grades in the same prison. Jackson might as well argue that the prisoners in USP Marion should be treated the same for all purposes as those in the prison camp that surrounds the penitentiary. For these reasons, as well as those stated by the two...