925 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1991), 90-2605, Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc.
|Citation:||925 F.2d 1007|
|Party Name:||Jane DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||February 26, 1991|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Argued Dec. 6, 1990.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied April 1, 1991.
Timothy J. Abeska, Roemer & Mintz, Carmen M. Piasecki, Thomas H. Singer, Eugenia S. Schwartz, Nickle and Piasecki, South Bend, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas J. Piskorski, Lawrence C. DiNardo, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill. and Robert H. Michaud, Allied-Signal Inc., Law Dept., South Bend, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
We must decide whether the plaintiff Jane Doe ("Doe") was the "employee" of
the defendant Allied-Signal ("Allied") under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act, IND.CODE Sec. 22-3-1-1 through 22-3-11-5 (the "Act"). If she was, then Allied is immune from liability in this negligence suit arising under our diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332. The District Court concluded Doe was Allied's employee and granted Allied summary judgment. From this judgment, Doe appeals. We affirm.
Allied hired Doe to perform janitorial services in 1975. But in January 1987, Allied terminated its cleaning staff and contracted with Acme Service Corporation ("Acme") for the cleaning of Allied's building. As a condition to this contract, Acme was to hire any former Allied cleaning employee who wished to come to work for Acme. Additionally, when these former Allied employees were cleaning Allied's building, Acme was to pay them an hourly wage that exceeded the normal Acme wage and to provide them insurance benefits not available to other Acme employees. Allied was to reimburse Acme for the cost of these added wages and benefits. Finally, either Allied or Acme could terminate the cleaning contract upon thirty days notice. Doe became one of the former Allied employees who accepted employment with Acme.
Twice in February 1988, Doe was attacked by unknown assailants while she worked on Allied's premises. On February 17, Doe was assaulted in the Allied parking lot while she was taking trash to the dumpster. On February 25, Doe was raped while cleaning one of the Allied offices. She filed this suit, seeking damages for the latter attack and claiming that Allied was negligent in failing to provide various security measures. Allied moved for summary judgment, claiming that Doe was the employee of both Acme and Allied at the time of her attack for purposes of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. And so, Allied was immune from liability because Doe's exclusive remedy was through worker's compensation. See IND.CODE Sec. 22-3-2-6. The District Court agreed with Allied and granted Allied summary judgment. We conclude that Allied exercised substantial control over Doe causing her to be the employee of both Allied and Acme and therefore affirm the decision of the District Court. 1
We review de novo the decision of a district court granting summary judgment. See, e.g., La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria Modelo, S.A., 914 F.2d 900, 905 (7th Cir.1990). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories...
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