LoVuolo v. Gunning

• Citation: 925 F.2d 22
• Decision Date: 06 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-1632,90-1632
• Parties: Kevin LoVUOLO and Antonio Musto, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. John GUNNING and Elaine Gunning, Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 22

925 F.2d 22

1991 A.M.C. 1651

Kevin LoVUOLO and Antonio Musto, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. John GUNNING and Elaine Gunning, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 90-1632.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Dec. 6, 1990.

Decided Feb. 7, 1991.

Andre R. Sigourney, for plaintiffs, appellants.

Keith W. Kauppila, with whom Bertram E. Snyder and Looney & Grossman were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a district court judgment entered on June 15, 1990, affixing joint liability and damages in an admiralty case. The case arose from an August 1988 collision between two power-driven pleasure boats in Boston Harbor.

I

The district court's Findings of Fact, Rulings of Law and Order for Judgment set forth the following facts, which we do not disturb: During the evening of August 22, 1986, the parties were aboard their respective pleasure boats cruising Boston harbor. Defendant John Gunning, with five passengers aboard, was at the wheel of his 32-foot twin-screw cabin cruiser. His wife and co-owner of the vessel, defendant Elaine Gunning, was not aboard at the time of the accident. Gunning was proceeding at approximately 10 knots heading into the inner harbor in the main ship channel opposite Castle Island. His running lights, cabin lights and exterior "courtesy lights" were on.

At the same time, Plaintiff Kevin LoVuolo was operating his vessel, an open 23-foot speedboat. Plaintiff Antonio Musto was one of five passengers aboard. LoVuolo was proceeding at approximately 10 knots out of the inner harbor on the airport side of the main ship channel. He assumed a course at an angle to the line of the channel in order to return to Dorchester Bay by rounding the easterly end of Castle Island.

At approximately 10:30 p.m. the two vessels collided. Shortly before the collision, Gunning observed LoVuolo's vessel approaching from about thirty degrees off his starboard bow. He cut the engines and put the drive gears in neutral, but his vessel continued on forward way. He did not reverse the engines or take any other evasive action. Meanwhile, LoVuolo, upon sighting Gunning's approaching vessel, turned sharply to starboard. ¹ The vessels then collided with the contact occurring between the bow of Gunning's vessel and the port quarter of LoVuolo's boat. Upon impact LoVuolo was thrown against the windshield and suffered a broken nose and deviated septum. Musto was thrown against the dashboard and suffered a bruised neck and back strain. The force of the collision caused a large gash in the port quarter and structural damage to the entire aft section of LoVuolo's vessel. The speed boat took on a considerable amount of salt water, which resulted in corrosion of the engine block. There was no serious damage to Gunning's vessel.

The district court attributed the impact both to the forward momentum of the Gunning vessel and the reciprocal motion of the stern of LoVuolo's vessel resulting from its sharp turn to starboard. Finding contributory negligence by both parties, the district court apportioned liability equally. Referring to the Inland Navigational Rules Act ("INRA"), 33 U.S.C. Secs. 2001-2017 (1986), ² it held: "Rule 8 states the overriding obligation of persons operating motor boats, notwithstanding the more specific provisions of Rules 15, 16 and 17."

Plaintiffs LoVuolo and Musto appeal the district court's application of law, its apportionment of liability, its damage awards for personal injuries and its findings regarding Defendant John Gunning's failure to assist plaintiffs at the time of collision as required by 46 U.S.C. Sec. 2303 (1986). ³ Because we find that the district court erred in its application of the INRA and that this legal error infected the issues of liability and damages, we vacate its decision and remand the case for proper application of the law and such reallocation of liability and reapportionment of damages as is necessary.

II

Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) applies to admiralty cases in which the district court sits without a jury. The court "shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon...." Findings of fact based on oral or documentary evidence "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a). See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) (defining the "clear error" standard as based upon "the reviewing court['s]" having weighed "the entire evidence," then reaching a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," even though "there is evidence to support" the finding of the lower court).

In stressing the rigors of the clear error standard, we have emphasized the Rule 52(a) requirement that the lower court's findings be recited "to facilitate appellate review by making clear how it reached its result." Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 977 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941, 98 S.Ct. 1520, 55 L.Ed.2d 537 (1978). While not restraining the appellate power to correct errors of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) "does not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact." Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). Still, the reviewing court must be able to deconstruct the lower court's decision and to evaluate its delineated issues of law and fact by different standards. The less exacting standard of plenary review is reserved for issues of law. Thrifty Rent-a-Car System v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1181 (1st Cir.1987).

Ordinarily, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., United States v. Cochrane, 896 F.2d 635, 639 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2627, 110 L.Ed.2d 647 (1990); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 513 (1st Cir.1983). We have, however, the duty to "look carefully" at district court decisions to "detect infection from legal error." Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 109 n. 2 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045, 100 S.Ct. 733, 62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980). The Supreme Court teaches that "if the trial court bases its findings upon a mistaken impression of applicable legal principles, the reviewing court is not bound by the clearly erroneous standard." Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189 n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (citing United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1773, 1784 n. 9, 10 L.Ed.2d 823 (1963)). ⁴ See also United States v. Cochrane, 896 F.2d at 639; Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1988); Kumar v. Board of Trustees, 774 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1097, 106 S.Ct. 1496, 89 L.Ed.2d 896 (1986).

In determining whether there was legal error, we look to the federal statutes incorporating navigational rules for lookout, crossing and collision, and to the district court's application of them.

III

The relevant statutory standards in this case are six sections of the INRA: Rules 2, 5, 8, 15, 16 and 17, codified at 33 U.S.C. Secs. 2001-2017 (1986). Admiralty law has historically adhered to "the letter of the law" respecting the statutory rules of navigation--deferring to legislative prerogatives and aiming to reduce ambiguity, as well as accidents, on American waterways. See, e.g., T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Sec. 4-1 (1987) ("In areas preempted by legislation, federal courts may not establish principles in derogation of the congressional mandate.").

In a landmark admiralty case, The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1873), the Supreme Court emphasized the dual importance of following navigational rules exactly while carefully construing legislative intent. The Court stated: "To go into the inquiry whether the legislature was not in error ... is out of place. It would be substituting our judgment for the judgment of the lawmaking power." Id. 86 U.S. at 137.

The Eleventh Circuit has restated the principle admirably:

Our reluctance to indulge in judicial innovation as part of statutory interpretation is heightened by the nature of the INRA, itself. The INRA is an elaborate and sophisticated network of interlocking, technical, statutory regulations governing waterborne traffic generally. Moreover, it is based, in large part, on a similar body of international regulations. Evidently, much time, energy and expert thought was invested in the INRA's development by Congress. Especially in light of the history, courts ought to be extremely slow to tamper with this sensitive, regulatory system.... Acting as we must on a case-by-case basis, we are ill prepared to know what the consequences of such innovation might be for the regulatory system and for waterborne traffic in general.

Garrett v. Higgenbotham, 800 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1986). In this case, the district court held that Rule 8, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2008 (1986), requiring all vessels to take effective action to avoid a collision, "states the overriding obligation of persons operating motor boats." Although alluding to Rule 5, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2005 (1986), requiring proper lookout by sight and hearing, as well as the crossing rules, Rules 15 through 17, 33 U.S.C. Secs. 2015-2017 (1986), the district court allowed Rule 8 effectively to trump the other navigational rules.

Rule 2, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2002 (1986), however, states explicitly that these rules are intended to supplement, not to cancel out, each other:

(a) Exoneration

Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.

(b) Departure from rules when...