Caruthers v. State Of Ind.

• Decision Date: 14 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 46S05-0910-CR-431.,46S05-0910-CR-431.
• Citation: 926 N.E.2d 1016
• Parties: Chawknee CARUTHERS, Appellant (Defendant below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

926 N.E.2d 1016

Chawknee CARUTHERS, Appellant (Defendant below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 46S05-0910-CR-431.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 14, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Cupp, Michigan City, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 46A05-0810-CR-623

SHEPARD, CHIEF Justice.

Chawknee Caruthers shot and killed Karim Turner after mistaking him for someone else, and a jury found Caruthers guilty of murder. During his trial, the court took security measures to address juror concerns that remain unspecified. He now appeals based on (1) the trial court's failure to sua sponte interrogate the jury about the effect of these concerns on their impartiality, (2) his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, and (3) sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

During the evening of September 15, 2007, Chawknee Caruthers and his friend Krista Anderson were in her bedroom watching television and smoking marijuana when Santana Miller and one or two associates entered the room. Miller asked, “Man, you got my guns?” (Tr. at 138.) Confused because he did not know that Krista Anderson had promised to sell Miller some guns, Caruthers asked Miller to whom he was talking. Instead of answering, Miller repeated his inquiry, in response to which Caruthers lifted his shirt to show the other men he was not carrying a firearm. Miller then punched Caruthers. Apparently taken aback, Caruthers looked to Anderson for an explanation, when Miller punched him again. Anderson told Miller and his friends to leave; Miller proceeded to choke Caruthers and then finally departed.

Caruthers called one Richard Smith to come pick him up. Caruthers and Smith stopped at the home of Richard Smith's brother Corey, where Richard Smith showed Caruthers his brother's nine millimeter handgun. Corey Smith grabbed his gun from his brother, unloaded and cleared it, handed it back, and left to another room to talk to his wife. Richard Smith then followed Corey, leaving the gun with Caruthers. When Richard Smith returned, the gun was not visible.

The three men, who had been drinking at Corey Smith's, left at around 8:30 p.m. in a green Ford Escort to buy more alcohol at the liquor store. Richard Smith drove, Caruthers rode in the passenger seat, and Corey Smith, who was by now “stumbling drunk,” sat in the back. (Tr. at 253, 520-21, 526.) As the three headed to the liquor store, Caruthers told the driver to head toward Pleasant Avenue. After they rode around the neighborhood for a time, Caruthers called someone to ask where Miller lived. They then looked for the house and drove around the block two or three times until they saw people standing by a truck with a trailer carrying a lawnmower, on the street where they expected to find Miller. As they drove by, Caruthers declared, “That looked like the guy.” (Tr. at 523.) Richard Smith drove around the block another time, when they saw the truck and trailer up the street and began to follow it. After a while, Richard Smith “lost interest in following the vehicle,” so he again headed toward the liquor store, against Caruthers' wishes, where he purchased some alcohol. (Tr. at 524-26.) After leaving the liquor store, they pulled into an alley where Richard Smith began relieving himself; Caruthers once again spotted the group he thought included Miller. He told Smith to start driving. Caruthers eased out of the passenger window, reached in his pants, and, seated on the window and reaching across the car's roof, fired three or four shots at two individuals who had started to approach the car. (Tr. at 530-31.) Returning to his seat, he shouted at Smith to drive.

In fact, Miller was not one of the two people Caruthers shot at. Instead, they and the rest of the group had stopped to fix their trailer's tail-light on Miller's street, and Caruthers confused one of them for Miller in part because he and Miller had been wearing similar shirts. (Tr. at 17, 148.) The group had seen the green Escort pass by twice while they fixed the tail-light. When Caruthers spotted them later, they were unloading a lawnmower from the trailer in an empty lot. After spotting the green Escort yet again, this time in the nearby alley, two of them, Kersee Anderson and Karim Turner, walked toward the car to investigate. Caruthers shot Turner, thinking him to be Miller. Turner died of the gunshot in a matter of minutes.

The police arrested Caruthers the next day, thwarting his attempt to board a bus for Detroit. The State charged Caruthers with murder, and a jury trial commenced on July 28 and ended August 1, 2008. At the beginning of the last day, before the jury entered the courtroom, Caruthers' lawyer James Cupp made the following statement:

There apparently is some information afloat which I would characterize as somewhat a thinly veiled allegation of jury tampering, and that concerns me greatly. Apparently, someone somewhere has received some information from a juror or jurors that one or more of them, the jurors, are feeling intimidated by actions that such juror or jurors attribute to my client. I wanted to make a record on that, Your Honor because I think it's a very serious allegation and I just-I am thankful that the Court has given me an opportunity to do so.

(Tr. at 500-01.) Mr. Cupp did not ask the court to take any action, and the trial continued with the State's next witness. (Tr. at 501.) The jury convicted Caruthers of murder and found him to be a habitual offender.

At the sentencing hearing, Judge Lang addressed the security concerns mentioned at the jury trial. She opened the sentencing hearing by saying

During the trial, an issue was raised by the defense that there was information concerning what was loosely referred to as jury tampering. Members of the jury did express security concerns on more than one occasion to the bailiff as a result of various family members of the victim, of the defendant, as well as the defendant himself. In response, the Court arranged for extra security and alternate parking in front of [the] exit and [the] entrance for the jurors. To allay the jurors['] concerns, the Court did personally inform the jurors of the additional security precautions that were in place and instructed them on the ministerial aspects of the precautions. At no time did any juror express to the Court that they had been personally approached or threatened after the security precautions were put in place and the concerns regarding personal safety were expressed to the bailiff or made known to the Court.

(Sent. Tr. at 1.)

The court sentenced Caruthers to sixty-five years for murder with a thirty-year enhancement for being a habitual offender. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in failing to interrogate the jury on its own initiative regarding any prejudice that might have resulted from their feelings of intimidation. (Appellant's Br. at 11-12.) A divided Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Caruthers v. State, 909 N.E.2d 500 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). We granted transfer. 919 N.E.2d 554 (2009) (table).

Standard of Review

The failure to raise a claim of error generally waives that issue for appeal. Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind.2009). We nevertheless sometimes entertain such claims under fundamental error, meaning an error that makes a fair trial impossible or that constitutes a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id. (citing Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748 (Ind.2002)).

I. Failure to Interrogate the Jury Was Not Fundamental Error.

The right to trial before an impartial fact-finder is a cornerstone of our justice system. Article 1, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury; therefore, a biased juror must be dismissed. Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232 (Ind.2000). This right is an essential element of due process. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 n. 4 (Ind.2000); Kennedy v. State, 258 Ind. 211, 218, 280 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1972).

A juror's bias may be actual or implied, but a court must remove a juror for implied bias-that is, regardless of actual bias-only where a relationship exists between the juror and one of the parties. Joyner, 736 N.E.2d at 238 (concluding implied bias does not apply where defendant's acquaintances threatened juror). By stating he “was denied trial by an impartial jury,” Caruthers necessarily implies that jurors had actual bias, as he does not assert any juror had a disqualifying relationship with one of the parties.¹ (Appellant's Br. at 11.)

Upon a suggestion of extrajudicial comments made to a juror, the trial court should make a threshold assessment of the likelihood of resulting prejudice. Daniels v. State, 264 Ind. 490, 346 N.E.2d 566 (1976). If the court determines that no risk of substantial prejudice exists, it need not investigate further. Joyner, 736 N.E.2d at 239. If it finds the risk of prejudice is substantial, as opposed to imaginary or remote, it should interrogate the jury collectively to determine who if anyone has been exposed, and individually interrogate any such jurors away from the others. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. State, 260 Ind. 351, 358-59, 295 N.E.2d 819, 824 (1973)). If the court determines any degree of exposure and the likely effect thereof, it must take appropriate action, including at least a collective admonishment. Daniels, 264 Ind. at 494, 346 N.E.2d at 568-69. At all stages in this process, the trial court has discretion to take what actions it deems necessary and appropriate.

Caruthers asserts the trial court failed “to ensure the absence of any bias resulting from security concerns of the jury.” (Appellant's Br. at 12.) While courts have a duty to ensure an impartial jury, we have never...