Young v. Kann, 89-5437

Citation926 F.2d 1396
Decision Date23 August 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-5437,89-5437
PartiesKenneth McClure YOUNG, II, Appellant, v. Warren KANN and Jane Doe, Appellees. . Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Kenneth McClure Young, II, Bastrop, Tex., pro se.

James J. West, U.S. Atty., John C. Gurganus, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Scranton, Pa., for appellees.

Before BECKER, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

This civil rights case, brought by a federal prisoner acting pro se, presents for us a first impression question of the due process rights of a prisoner to the production of documentary evidence at a prison disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff Kenneth McClure Young, II, who lost substantial good time credit as the result of two prison disciplinary hearings, brought suit in the district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania claiming that the disciplinary hearing officer, defendant Warren Kann, violated his due process rights by refusing to produce a letter in which Young allegedly threatened his cellmate, even though the letter formed part of the basis for the disciplinary charges. Although Young contended that the letter contained no such threat, the district court dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d).

We hold that Young's due process claims are arguably meritorious, and that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the order of the district court will be vacated and the case remanded for service of process on the defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While Young was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he was charged with making threats of bodily harm to another inmate and refusing a cell assignment. 1 The prison incident report stated that Young had physically and verbally threatened his cellmate when a guard attempted to return him to their cell. Prior to this incident, the report claimed, Young had given to the guard a letter that also contained threats against this cellmate. At the hearing on this charge, Young denied having made any threatening statements, either verbal or written. He further claimed that he had informed Kann that the letter had been confiscated by prison authorities and that it should be produced in order to demonstrate that it contained no threatening remarks.

Because Kann did not have a copy of the letter, he excused Young from the room and called the reporting officer into the hearing room and questioned him concerning the letter's contents. After the reporting officer was excused, Young was called back and informed by Kann that the letter itself was not relevant and that the hearing would proceed. Young reasserted that the letter contained no threats and informed Kann that he was not prepared to proceed unless the letter was produced. Kann nonetheless elected to proceed.

When the hearing resumed, Young informed Kann that, in the days preceding the incident, his cellmate had assaulted him, threatened to rape him, and threatened his life. 2 Although Young admitted to banging a milk crate against his cell door, he denied that he had physically or verbally threatened his cellmate during the incident. Young was found guilty and received a sanction of 30 days in disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days statutory good time. 3

Following the hearing, Kann filed a Discipline Hearing Officer Report. Although the report stated that his decision was supported by Young's letter, Kann apparently relied upon the guard's oral summary of its contents, rather than his own review of the letter itself. 4 In any event, the copy of the letter provided in Young's appendix contains no threatening remarks of any kind. 5

Young's complaint in the district court alleges that, during the prison disciplinary hearing referred to above and at a second hearing, Kann and an unnamed stenographer (Jane Doe) violated his rights under the fifth and eighth amendments. Prior to service of process upon the defendants, however, the district court dismissed the complaint as legally frivolous and certified that any appeal from the order would be frivolous and not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). 6 This appeal followed. The United States Attorney has entered an appearance and filed a brief.

II. THE FIRST DISCIPLINARY HEARING
A. Standard of Review

Because this case involves only issues of law, our review of the district court's dismissal of Young's complaint as legally frivolous is plenary. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir.1989)). Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) is proper when the complaint is based upon an "indisputably meritless legal theory or on completely baseless factual contentions." Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774; see also, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832-33, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). This standard is more liberal than that governing cases in which the defendants have been served with and answered the complaint. There, the question is whether Young has in fact stated a due process (or other) claim.

B. The Alleged Due Process Violations

The overarching authority is Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-75, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that, while prisoners retain certain basic constitutional rights, including the protections of the due process clause, prison disciplinary hearings are not part of criminal prosecution, and inmates' rights at such hearings may be curtailed by the demands and realities of the prison environment. Wolff, also holds, however, that a prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in good time credit, and it enumerates what due process requires when a prison disciplinary hearing may result in loss of such credit. Id. at 556-57, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-75.

First, a prisoner must receive written notice of claimed violations at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing and must be provided with a written summary of evidence relied upon by the fact-finder in reaching its disciplinary decision. Id. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-79. Second, "an inmate facing disciplinary charges must have an opportunity to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Giano v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1209, 1214 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978, and Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986)). "[T]he inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Ordinarily, the right to present evidence is basic to a fair hearing. ..." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. 7

Under the caselaw, a prisoner's right to produce evidence in his or her defense is limited only by the demands of prisoner safety and institutional order, as determined by the sound discretion of the prison authorities. We note that the discretion to be accorded prison authorities in this area is quite broad. As stated by the Court in Wolff:

We should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the judgment of prison administrators.... [W]e must balance the inmate's interest in avoiding loss of good time against the needs of the prison, and some amount of flexibility and accommodation is required. Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to compile other documentary evidence.

418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979-80; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1868, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). However, the discretion afforded prison officials is not without limits. As we remarked in Woods v. Marks, 742 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.1984), a case involving a prisoner's right to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing, "[t]he policy of deference to the judgment of prison officials does not require ... that a reviewing court defer to the arbitrary denial of an inmate's limited right[s]." Id. at 773.

Based upon the factual allegations in Young's complaint, there do not appear to be any security reasons for denying Young's request to produce his letter. Nor has Kann proffered any such reasons. The security issues that concerned the Wolff Court were the risk of death or injury to inmate witnesses and informants identified at hearings or in produced documents, 8 as well as the potential for breakdown in authority, order and discipline inside the institution. 9 418 U.S. at 567-69, 94 S.Ct. at 2980-81. None of these concerns appear to be implicated in the instant case because no witnesses were involved and no informants would be revealed by the production of the letter that Young admits having written.

This court heretofore has not been called upon to apply the requirements of Wolff to determine the extent of a prisoner's right to produce and view documentary evidence at a disciplinary hearing. We are aided in our analysis by three district court decisions. In Giano v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1209, 1213 (S.D.N.Y.1989), a prison employee assigned to assist a prisoner failed to produce certain investigative reports requested by the prisoner. The hearing officer ignored the prisoner's requests for the production of these reports, saying that he did not have them with him, and continued with the hearing despite the prisoner's repeated protests that he was not prepared to proceed. Id. Not having the reports, the hearing officer relied instead upon the testimony of the investigating officer and a corrections...

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