Jackson v. State, SC04-410.

Decision Date30 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. SC04-1505.,No. SC04-410.,SC04-410.,SC04-1505.
Citation926 So.2d 1262
PartiesIsiah JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee, Daly N. Braxton, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

John G. Crabtree, Key Biscayne, FL, for Appellant (SC04-410).

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee (SC04-410).

Bernard Robert Ohle of Ohle and Ohle, St. Petersburg, FL, for Petitioner (SC04-1505).

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent (SC04-1505).

PER CURIAM.

Appellants Isiah Jackson and Daly Braxton attempt to invoke this Court's mandatory review jurisdiction by claiming a district court of appeal inherently invalidated a state statute or provision of the state constitution by issuing an unelaborated per curiam decision in each of their cases. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We consolidate these cases for purposes of this opinion. For the reasons explained below, we hold that article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution does not authorize this Court's jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam decisions issued by a district court of appeal.

Facts

On March 17, 2004, Isiah Jackson attempted to invoke this Court's jurisdiction by filing a pro se "Notice of Appeal." This notice of appeal was initially treated as a notice to invoke discretionary review and dismissed under Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So.2d 974 (Fla.2002). Jackson responded by filing a "Motion to Reclassify Defendant's Case As Filed: Notice of Appeal, Per App. Rule 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii),"1 in which he claimed this Court had "unfairly reconfigured" his claim for jurisdiction. This Court vacated its order dismissing Jackson's case, appointed counsel to represent Jackson, and ordered counsel to show cause why this mandatory review proceeding should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Jackson's appointed counsel filed a "Response to Order to Show Cause Why This Appeal Should Not Be Dismissed" on December 20, 2004, and the State filed a reply on January 24, 2005.

In the motion to reclassify his appeal, Jackson asserted jurisdiction on the grounds that the First District Court of Appeal inherently declared two Florida Statutes, as well as a provision of the Florida Constitution, invalid when it denied Jackson's motion to file a belated appeal following his criminal convictions.2 Nothing in the district court's decision or the special master's report substantiated Jackson's claim that the trial court invalidated these laws. The First District issued an unpublished order in this case, stating only, "The petition seeking belated appeal is denied on the merits." See Jackson v. State, 868 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)(table case).

On July 29, 2004, Daly Braxton commenced a similar process by filing a "Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction." This notice was treated as a petition for review and dismissed under Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356 (Fla.1980). Braxton responded by filing a "Motion for Clarification," in which he claimed this Court erred in dismissing his original complaint because he had asserted a basis for mandatory review jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.3 On September 3, 2004, this Court vacated its order dismissing Braxton's initial notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction under Jenkins and issued a second order dismissing Braxton's petition for review on the grounds that it did not appear jurisdiction was established under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. The September 3 order granted Braxton fifteen days to file a motion for reinstatement, which Braxton did by filing an "Initial Brief of Jurisdiction."4 In this initial brief and its subsequent amendments, Braxton asserted jurisdiction, in part, on the grounds that the district court invalidated a state statute by affirming a trial court's decision that allegedly invalidated this law.5 The First District's opinion stated only "Per Curiam Affirmed." The State filed a response to Braxton's claims on November 12, 2004, and Braxton filed a reply to the State's response on November 22, 2004.

Analysis

This Court has long recognized that it lacks jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam decisions in the context of discretionary review jurisdiction. Today, we find that the analysis which led us to this determination applies just as readily to the context of mandatory review jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. Therefore, we determine that article V, section 3(b)(1) does not authorize this Court to review unelaborated per curiam decisions issued by the district court. By issuing an unelaborated per curiam decision, the district court has not "declared" a statute or constitutional provision invalid, as is required by the language of article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. In the future, the clerk's office will administratively dismiss notices of appeal and petitions for discretionary review asserting jurisdiction over a district court's unelaborated per curiam decision.

More than twenty-five years have passed since this Court first held that unelaborated per curiam decisions do not constitute a decision of the district court of appeal sufficient to warrant discretionary review jurisdiction. In Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980), this Court held that "the Supreme Court of Florida lacks jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the several district courts of appeal . . . rendered without opinion." We based this holding, first, on the language of article V, section 3(b)(3), which limits our jurisdiction to district court opinions that "expressly" conflict with another district court of appeal. In addition, we looked to the history surrounding this constitutional provision and the design of the Florida court system. We noted that "[i]t was never intended that the district courts of appeal should be intermediate courts." Id. at 1357 (quoting Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla.1958)). Instead, the district courts were established to preserve the Florida Supreme Court's "function[] as a supervisory body in the judicial system for the State, exercising appellate power in certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public importance and the preservation of uniformity of principle and practice." Id. at 1357-58. Likewise, when article V, section 3 was amended in 1980, the purpose behind these amendments was to ensure that this Court retained its supervisory role by limiting its jurisdiction and relieving its overburdened caseload. Id. at 1359.

In subsequent cases, we applied Jenkins to find that we lacked jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam decisions in virtually all contexts of discretionary review. See, e.g., Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So.2d 974, 976-77 (Fla.2002) (finding that this Court's "all-writs" jurisdiction does not authorize it to review a district court's "per curiam denial[] of relief issued without opinion or explanation"); Grate v. State, 750 So.2d 625, 626 (Fla.1999) (stating that "[r]egardless of how a petition seeking review of a district court decision is styled, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions rendered without opinion"). In fact, we have even applied Jenkins in the context of mandatory review. In Byrd v. State, 880 So.2d 616, 617 (Fla.2004), we determined that we lacked jurisdiction over a case in which a concurring opinion declared a statute invalid, because Jenkins required that the language warranting jurisdiction be included in the majority opinion.

Applying this same analysis to the cases at hand leads to the conclusion that article V, section 3(b)(1) does not authorize jurisdiction over a district court's unelaborated per curiam decision when the petitioner/appellant asserts jurisdiction on the grounds that a trial court allegedly invalidated a state statute or constitutional provision. While the language of article V, section 3(b)(1) does not require that the district court "expressly" declare a statute invalid, it still requires that the district court of appeal make a declaration. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (authorizing this Court's jurisdiction over "decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution").

In conclusion, we hold that article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution does not authorize this Court's jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam decisions issued by a district court of appeal. As we have long recognized in the context of discretionary review jurisdiction and now apply to mandatory review jurisdiction, per curiam decisions issued without an opinion do not constitute a decision of a district court sufficient to establish jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. Therefore, we dismiss the notices of appeal and petitions for discretionary review filed in both Jackson and Braxton. We also hold that in the future, the clerk's office will dismiss notices of appeal and petitions for discretionary review asserting jurisdiction on similar grounds. No motions for rehearing or clarification will be entertained in these cases or in cases which are dismissed in the future based on the reasoning set forth in this opinion.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.

1. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii) mirrors article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. It states that "[t]he supreme court shall review, by appeal . . . decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution."

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