Floyd v. Laws

Citation929 F.2d 1390
Decision Date30 April 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-35208,89-35208
PartiesDebbie FLOYD, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Larry LAWS, and City of Sherwood, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Thomas J. Sullivan, Tigard, Or., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., argued, William D. Peek, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland, Or., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before WRIGHT, CHOY, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

Debbie Floyd and her three children sued Police Chief Larry Laws and the City of Sherwood in federal district court for $250,000 in damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Floyd also filed pendent state tort actions for assault, battery, false arrest, 1 and intentional infliction of mental distress. Floyd raises four issues on appeal, alleging that the trial court, Judge O'Scannlain sitting for Judge Marsh, abused its discretion by (1) issuing a jury instruction on qualified immunity, (2) misstating the law of qualified immunity in its charge to the jury, (3) declaring Floyd's special verdict award of $7,500 to be surplusage, and (4) refusing to enter judgment in her favor and refusing to award her $1.00 in nominal damages. We AFFIRM, in part, and REVERSE and REMAND, in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 30, 1986, Floyd was at home babysitting five children, including her two-year-old stepdaughter Crystal. Her husband, Larry Floyd, was away at work. Acting on a complaint from Kimberly Floyd, Crystal's biological mother, Chief Laws went to Larry's home to find out why he had not returned his daughter as scheduled. Although Larry had visitation privileges, his ex-wife Kimberly retained permanent custody of Crystal.

After Laws explained his purpose, Debbie Floyd refused to answer any questions about Crystal's whereabouts. When he asked to see the child, Floyd refused on the ground that Laws had no writ or court order. Laws had a police dispatcher call Larry's workplace, but he was away at a construction site and could not be reached. In the meantime, Laws alleges, Floyd became hysterical and abusive, calling him obscene names. Floyd, on the other hand, alleges that when she tried to enter her home, Laws blocked her way and proceeded to follow her around the yard for forty-five minutes. Laws estimates the encounter lasted only 17 to 18 minutes. Crystal was returned to her mother two hours later.

At trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Laws and the City of Sherwood had not violated the constitutional rights of Floyd's three children under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, the jury found that Laws and the City of Sherwood had violated Floyd's constitutional rights. The jury accepted Laws's defense of qualified immunity and awarded no damages as to either defendant. The district court instructed the jury that the defense of qualified immunity was not available to the City of Sherwood. As for the state claims, the jury found Laws guilty of assault and false imprisonment, but not guilty of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

After the jury was discharged, counsel for Laws pointed out that the jury's answers to questions 13 and 14 were apparently inconsistent with one another. Question 13 read: "Was plaintiff Debbie Floyd damaged as a result of any of the actions of defendant Laws' found in questions 9, 10, 11, or 12?" [i.e., assault, battery, false After question 13, appeared the following instruction: "If your answer to question 13 is 'No,' do not answer any further questions, but proceed to the end of this form and sign the verdict. If you answered 'Yes' to question 13, proceed to question 14." Question 14 read: "What amount of money will reasonably compensate plaintiff Debbie Floyd for any of the actions of defendant Laws' found in questions 9, 10, 11, or 12?" To which the jury responded: "$7,500.00."

imprisonment, or intentional infliction of emotional distress] To which the jury replied: "No."

The trial court declared the answer to question 14 to be surplusage because, after replying "No" to question 13, the jury disobeyed the express instructions of the verdict form and answered question 14. Although Floyd prevailed against the City of Sherwood on her constitutional claim, the trial court entered judgment for the defendants, plaintiff to take nothing.

I.

The question whether the trial court erred, by giving the jury a qualified immunity instruction, is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1988). Floyd properly preserved this issue for appeal, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, by voicing a timely objection to the giving of the jury instruction on qualified immunity. However, Floyd's argument fails on its merits.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 573 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The relevant inquiry, an objective, fact-specific test, is "whether a reasonable government official could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)) (emphasis added).

In Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 573, this court held that the presence of settled law regarding broad constitutional or statutory rights, by itself, is not sufficient to preclude a defense of qualified immunity. Although it may be clearly established, as a matter of constitutional law, that arrests without probable cause are prohibited by the fourth amendment, this general proposition of law sheds no light on whether an official's conduct was objectively reasonable in any given situation. Similarly, in Anderson 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, the Supreme Court held that although it may be clearly established that the fourth amendment prohibits warrantless searches unsupported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, it does not immediately follow from this general conclusion that a particular search was objectively legally unreasonable.

In this case, Floyd argues that she alleged violations of four clearly established constitutional rights--"unlawful arrest, use of unreasonable force in making the arrest, interference with her family relations, and intimidation intended to cause her to relinquish a constitutional right." Because these rights are clearly established, Floyd contends, defendant Laws was not entitled to a jury instruction on qualified immunity.

If Floyd's line of reasoning were correct, then any plaintiff could preclude her opponent's qualified immunity defense simply by alleging violations of clearly established constitutional rights. It is precisely this kind of absurd conclusion which the Supreme Court rejected in Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038, and which we rejected in Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 573-74. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing jury instruction 28 on qualified immunity. The trial court could reasonably have concluded, upon the facts here presented, that Laws was entitled to raise this defense. Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 575.

II. JURY INSTRUCTION ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WAS CORRECT STATEMENT OF LAW

Whether jury instruction 28 was a correct statement of the law on qualified immunity is a question which we review for abuse of discretion. Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 573. Jury instructions need not be perfect to withstand challenge on appeal. The proper inquiry is whether, considering the charge as a whole, the trial court's instructions fairly and adequately covered the issues presented, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading. In a civil trial, erroneous instructions "need only be more probably than not, harmless." Frank Briscoe Co., Inc. v. Clark County, 857 F.2d 606, 612 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1048, 109 S.Ct. 1957, 104 L.Ed.2d 426 (1989) (quoting Coursen v. A.H. Robbins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337, modified, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.1985)). Consequently, the trial court enjoys "substantial latitude" in tailoring the instructions. Thorsted, 858 F.2d at 573.

Floyd mistakenly contends that to prevail on qualified immunity under Anderson, Laws must prove both (1) that Floyd's constitutional rights were not clearly established and (2) that he relied on some legal authority to support his actions. Anderson supports neither of these contentions. First, the proper fact-specific inquiry under Anderson is not whether the law is settled, but whether, in light of clearly established law and the information available to him, a reasonable person in Laws's position could have objectively believed his actions to be proper. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039.

Second, Laws was not required to prove both confusion in the law and reasonable reliance on other authority. Rather, he could establish a valid defense by prevailing on either point. For example, even though it is clearly established that probable cause is required under the Constitution to effect a valid warrantless arrest, Laws could still prevail by proving that he reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause was present. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. This mistaken belief may be based on facts or legal authority, but there is no requirement that Laws's mistake stem exclusively from reliance on "some legal authority." In this case, the jury may have been persuaded by the fact that Laws did contact a Deputy District Attorney to discuss the possible crime committed by Floyd when she concealed Crystal's...

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