U.S. v. Anderson

• Citation: 929 F.2d 96
• Decision Date: 02 April 1991
• Docket Number: D,No. 1135,1135
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Terrance ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 90-1741.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 96

929 F.2d 96

59 USLW 2639

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Terrance ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1135, Docket 90-1741.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued Jan. 31, 1991.

Decided April 2, 1991.

Mark Cohen, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Andrew J. Maloney, U.S. Atty., Susan Corkery, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for appellant.

John Apicella, Brooklyn, N.Y., for defendant-appellee.

Before FEINBERG, MESKILL and CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Korman, J.) dated November 19, 1990 that granted defendant Terrance Anderson's motion to suppress his confession upon a finding that it was procured in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After the defendant was given the prophylactic warnings and said he understood them and did not need a lawyer present when questioned, the arresting officer should have been satisfied

that he was about to obtain a voluntary confession. But, like Semele ¹ who was not content with what she had, and used trickery to obtain more proof, the arresting officer in his eager pursuit of a confession also employed trickery to browbeat defendant into making a statement. As might be expected, such an attempt had negative consequences. Here it led the district court to suppress the defendant's confession given at the scene and his later confession made at headquarters. From the order granting suppression the government appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

On June 14, 1989 Agent Patrick Valentine, a supervising special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), acting pursuant to a warrant, arrested Terrance Anderson in Brooklyn, New York after he left the Guy Food Store. Valentine informed Anderson he was under arrest for conspiracy to distribute cocaine as a member of the Alfred Jonas narcotics organization. Later, while both were seated in a government car, he advised Anderson of his Miranda rights by reading them to him from a DEA printed card. Each right was read individually and Anderson responded that he understood them. When asked if he wanted a lawyer present before answering any questions, Anderson replied that he did not need one.

Valentine then proceeded to tell Anderson that if he asked for an attorney, no federal agents would be able to speak to him further; the agent added "this [is] the time to talk to us, because once you tell us you want an attorney we're not able to talk to you and as far as I [am] concerned, we probably would not go to the U.S. Attorney or anyone else to tell them how much [you] cooperated with us." The "if you want a lawyer you can't cooperate" language was repeated three times, after which Anderson made several incriminating statements admitting he was a "small time" drug dealer working with Alfred Jonas.

Valentine testified he then asked Anderson how many people were in the Guy Food Store (where the agents were about to execute a search warrant), whether people there might have guns, and whether there were drugs on the premises. The defendant was unable to answer the first two questions, and "danced around" the third, according to the agent, in a frustratingly evasive manner. Valentine testified he then told him: " 'You're not helping us at all here. Time is of the essence. We've got a search warrant here. We're going to do this and then we're going to take you downtown.' " At this point the agent ended his interrogation and returned to the store where he and another agent executed the search warrant and arrested several of defendant's co-conspirators, including Jonas.

While Anderson was at the scene in the back of the car, he screamed at another agent, Arnold Moorin: "I have to talk to you. I'm not the one you want. The one you want is a man named Alfred Jonas." Moorin approached Anderson and replied: "you're 100% correct. We just locked him up. Now is not the time to talk to me, just wait until we get back to the office." After the DEA agents transported Anderson to their office at Federal Plaza in Manhattan, an agent there asked Anderson if he wanted to make a statement. Anderson said he did, and Moorin was called into the room. Moorin told Anderson that if he wanted to make a statement he had to read and sign a waiver of rights form, and then have his statement taken down in writing. Moorin also said it would be in Anderson's best interest to cooperate fully, and that he would inform the U.S. Attorney's Office of Anderson's cooperation. Moorin testified he was trying to get from Anderson the location of a so-called "stash" house where he thought there might be a large quantity of drugs.

The waiver of rights form was read to Anderson, who said he understood it. After signing the form, defendant made a second statement in which he admitted to being an "enforcer" for the Alfred Jonas crack organization, and gave details regarding other members and their roles in the organization.

In suppressing Anderson's statements to agents Valentine and Moorin, the district court ruled that because agent Valentine's statements were factually and legally erroneous they effectively undermined the Miranda warnings given Anderson and, in effect, compelled him to talk. In a subsequent opinion, dated December 11, 1990, 752 F.Supp. 565, the district court reiterated the same point. It found, in the alternative, that even if the original Miranda warnings were properly administered, the defendant's statements still should be suppressed because they were procured by coercion. It concluded the second statement had been tainted by the first, and therefore it suppressed that statement too.

DISCUSSION

I The Miranda Warnings

The district court based its decision to suppress Anderson's statements in part on its conclusion that the Miranda warnings administered initially by Agent Valentine failed to overcome the "presumption of coercion" those warnings were designed to dispel. We review the warnings not for whether they adhered to a certain form, but for their substance. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989). We must ascertain if Anderson had his Miranda rights brought home to him in an intelligible fashion. See id; California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curiam); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1687, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).

All the Miranda bases were touched in the initial warnings agent Valentine gave Anderson. It was at this point--after the warnings were complete and Anderson had agreed to speak further with the agent without a lawyer present--that Valentine should simply have taken defendant's statement. Instead, the agent told defendant that if he asked for a lawyer it would permanently preclude him from cooperating with the police. Thus, the issue before us is not whether the Miranda warnings were adequate. It is quite clear that they were. Rather, we must decide whether the agent's statements--made immediately after the warnings were given--coerced the defendant into confessing. We therefore address the propriety of the agent's post-Miranda-warning statements in the context of their impact on the voluntariness of defendant's confession.

II The First Confession

The district court, in suppressing Anderson's statements, relied on its conclusion that they were coerced, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The police may use a defendant's confession without transgressing his Fifth Amendment right only when the decision to confess is the defendant's free choice. Since custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), the aim of Miranda and its progeny is to safeguard a suspect's right, if he so chooses, to remain silent when questioned by the police. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1143, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) ("Miranda attempted to reconcile [competing] concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation.") (emphasis in original); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) ("Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities").

By administering the Miranda warnings police protect and reinforce the citizen's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Because in-custody interrogation contains psychological pressures that cause a suspect to speak when he would otherwise remain silent, the prosecution must show that this safeguard of informing the accused of his rights was actually employed, so that a right enshrined in the words of the Constitution is not lost in the reality of the street.

A confession is not voluntary when obtained under circumstances that overbear the defendant's will at the time it is given. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963). Whether a confession is a product of coercion may only be determined after a careful evaluation of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the accused's characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct of law enforcement officials. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 945, 109 S.Ct. 374, 102 L.Ed.2d 363 (1988); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (to determine whether defendant made "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" courts must examine "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including...