Goyer v. Ashe "Camp Admin" United States
| Decision Date | 04 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-2059-JTF-atc |
| Parties | BRYAN GOYER, Plaintiff, v. ASHE “CAMP ADMIN” UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER MODIFYING THE DOCKET; DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITH PREJUDICE IN PART AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART; AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND THE CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff Bryan Goyer, Federal Bureau of Prisons register number 24771-076, who is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, Milan (the “FCI-Milan”) in Milan, Michigan[1] filed (1) a pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and (2) a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) On April 2, 2021, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the $350.00 filing fee. (ECF No. 4.)
The complaint (ECF No. 1) is before the Court.
For the reasons explained below, the complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in part and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part. Leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice is GRANTED.
Goyer alleges that when he arrived at the Federal Correctional Institute-Memphis (the “FCI-Memphis”) on December 27, 2016, “a health screen was completed, [but] I was not provided routine lab work.” (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 7.) Sometime during Goyer's confinement, he was transferred to Satellite Prison Camp, Millington (the “SPC-Millington”) in Millington, Tennessee, where he remained for two years. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.)
Goyer says that on July 30, 2018, he exercised twice at the SPC-Millington, performed his prison job, napped in his cell and “did not awake again until 8/6/2018.” (Id. at PageID 2.) Goyer's fellow inmates thought that Goyer was having a seizure, and they notified jail personnel. (Id. at PageID 3-4.) Goyer was transported to Methodist Le Bonheur Healthcare. (Id. at PageID 4.) Goyer alleges that he had suffered “a diabetic attack.” (Id. at PageID 2 (the “Incident”).)
Goyer claims that his blood sugar levels were never checked during his confinement at the SPC-Millington, “which could have detected if [I] was a diabetic.” (Id.) Goyer contends that “had I known I was a diabetic, I would have [observed] proper dieting.” (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 7.) Goyer alleges that he “was denied and/or delayed medical treatment by trained healthcare professionals” during the Incident “largely due to the fact that SPC-Millington does not have medical staff available 24 hours.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4-5.) Goyer claims that he “was in extreme pain and mild pain every day for approximately 6 months where I had to perform physical therapy on myself.” (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 9.) Goyer says that he “has been and will continue to be in great physical, mental, and emotional pain and distress.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)
The complaint asserts claims of: (1) violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 261, et seq.; (2) deprivation of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4-6; ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8-9); and (3) use of excessive force (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8.)
Goyer seeks: (1) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive relief; and (3) three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) in damages. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6; ECF No. 1-2 at PageID 12.)
Goyer sues “B. Ashe ‘Camp Admin' United States of America” as the Defendant. (Id. at PageID 1.) The Clerk is directed to MODIFY the docket to record the Defendants as: (1) B. Ashe, the SPC-Millington Camp Administrator; and (2) the United States of America (“USA”).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Goyer sues the Ashe as SPC-Millington's “Camp Admin.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.)
The SPC-Millington is a satellite prison camp of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”). (See https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mem/ (last accessed Mar. 23, 2023).) The BOP is a federal law enforcement agency within the Department of Justice. (See https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart/map (last accessed Mar. 23, 2023).)
The FTCA provides a cause of action against the USA for personal injury or property loss suffered as a result of the negligence of a federal government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); Jackson v. United States, 24 F.Supp.2d 823, 832 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir. 1993)). The FTCA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Goyer exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the instant lawsuit. (See ECF No. 1-2 at PageID 11-13 (Goyer's March 30, 2020 administrative claim and the BOP's September 30, 2020 claim denial.)
The USA is the only proper defendant for clams under the FTCA. Jones v. Johns on, 707 Fed.Appx. 321, 331 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). “In order to sue successfully under the FTCA, a plaintiff must name the United States as the sole defendant.” Harris v. Federal Med. Ctr., Fort Worth, No. 4:06-cv-701, 2007 WL 836828, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2007).[2] Goyer cannot sue Ashe under the FTCA.
Goyer's claim under the FTCA against Ashe fails to state a claim to relief as a matter of law and is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Goyer asserts a claim under the FTCA on the grounds that (1) his “blood A1C levels w[ere] never checked .. .[when] I arrived at FCI-Memphis on December 27, 2016 [or] while [I] [was] held at SPC-Millington for 2 years” and (2) the SPC-Millington failed to provide medical treatment during the Incident because the jail “does not have medical staff available 24 hours.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1 & 4; ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 7 (the “FTCA Claim”).) Goyer's FTCA Claim alleges medical malpractice. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 5 (alleging that “prison officials” committed “negligence”); ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8 (alleging that “my injuries were suffered as a direct result of staff negligence”).) The FTCA Claim arose during Goyer's confinement at the FCI-Memphis and SPC-Millington, which spanned December 27, 2016 through July 30, 2018. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2 & 4; ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 7.)
The FTCA contains a two-part statute of limitations for cases brought in federal court. First, the claimant must present the claim “to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).[3] Second, after the claim is “finally denied by the agency in writing,” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)[4], the claimant must file in federal court “within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Federal law determines when an FTCA claim accrues. Chomic v. United States, 377 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004). Tort claims under the FTCA accrue at the time of a plaintiff's injury, and “accrual of a claim does not await awareness by the plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted.” Wood v. Wilson, No. 21-5153, 2021 WL 7161614, 2021 WL 7161614, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2021) (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979) and Hertz v. United States, 560 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Goyer submitted his administrative claim to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office of the BOP on March 30, 2020 - i.e. within two years of the July 30, 2018 Incident. The BOP denied Goyer's...
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