93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95, State v. Soraparu

• Decision Date: 19 January 1995
• Parties: 93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 1100

649 So.2d 1100

93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/95

STATE of Louisiana v. George SORAPARU.

No. 93-KA-1636.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Fourth Circuit.

Jan. 19, 1995.

Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Karen E. Godail, Philip A. Spence, Asst. Attys. Gen., New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellee.

Sherry Watters, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant/appellant.

Before JONES, WALTZER and LANDRIEU, JJ.

[93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 1] LANDRIEU, Judge.

George R. Soraparu was charged by grand jury indictment on March 11, 1993, with second degree murder in violation of La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:30.1 (West Supp.1994). Following the trial on April 20, 1993, a twelve-member jury found him guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense. He was sentenced on April 27, 1993, to serve forty (40) years at hard labor. On appeal defense counsel raises two assignments of error and the defendant raises two pro se assignments of error for the reversal of his conviction and sentence. We affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

At trial NOPD Officer Anthony Joseph Haywood, Jr., testified that on January 6, 1993, at about 1:19 A.M. when he responded to a call from 1000 Desire Street, he found Jimmy Watson face down in the middle of the street bleeding from a gunshot wound in his head. The officer tried unsuccessfully to find witnesses; however, he found a man who said that the victim had been arguing earlier with Darnell Williams.

[93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 2] NOPD Detective Norman McCord testified that he interviewed Darnell Jones, who is also known as Darnell Williams, and learned that the defendant was a suspect in the case.

NOPD Officer Larry Singleton arrested the defendant on January 6, 1993, after he had received information that the defendant was being chased by a group of people around the 1000 block of Piety Street. When Officer Singleton arrived there, he stopped the defendant who told Singleton that his name was Roy Nelson. The crowd behind him identified the defendant as George Soraparu.

Ronnie Lloyd, a sixteen-year-old resident of 1013 Desire Street, testified that he and his family were on his front porch about 1:00 a.m. on January 6, 1993, when he noticed the victim, whom he knew as "Poochie," coming from the store. Lloyd also saw the defendant, whom he knew as Roy, on the street; then Lloyd heard Roy and Poochie arguing, and at one point, Roy turned to Lloyd and his family saying, "Y'all go inside." Lloyd stayed on the porch, and he saw Roy shoot Poochie in the head. Roy then said "Now, it's over," walked down the street, and entered the house on the corner. The next day Lloyd went to the police station to report what he had seen.

Dr. Paul McGarry, the forensic pathologist who autopsied Jimmy Watson, testified that Watson died of a single gunshot wound to the left side of the head.

Victoria Robinson of 1037 Desire Street testified for the defense that on the night in question, she heard a gunshot, jumped out of bed, and saw "somebody laying in the street." She said she saw Ronnie Lloyd's mother on her porch but that she did not see Lloyd there. Robinson claimed that Ronnie Lloyd told her he was testifying against Roy because he was getting [93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 3] paid to do so. Robinson also stated that Roy had come by her house to use the telephone about 10:30 p.m. January 5, 1993, and then left for his girlfriend's house.

Hakeem Richards and Nicole Richards, cousins, of 2504 Jonquil Street stated that the defendant was at their house at the time the victim was killed. Nicole Richards, Roy's girlfriend, stated that Roy arrived at 11:00 p.m. and that they all watched television until 1:45 a.m.

DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

Our review of the record reveals no errors patent.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 & 2

In these pro se assignments of error, ¹ the defendant contends that (1) it was error for him to be arrested without a warrant or probable cause and (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Noting that these pro se assignments of error were never briefed, we, nonetheless, have considered these arguments and find them to be without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Defense counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony which bolstered the credibility of Ronnie Lloyd, the State's only eye witness. Specifically, the defendant alleges that the State, on redirect of Detective McCord, had the detective testify that Ronnie Lloyd's statement corroborated Darnell Jones' statement.

[93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 4] At trial NOPD Detective Norman McCord testified he became involved in the investigation of this crime when two officers arrived at his office with Darnell Jones, who is also known as Darnell Williams. From his interview with Jones, McCord learned that the defendant was involved in the crime. At that point Ronnie Lloyd came into the office and McCord took a statement from him; Lloyd also implicated the defendant. On cross-examination, the defense attorney asked Detective McCord if Officer Haywood had told him that Jones and the defendant had been in a fight moments before the murder. McCord responded that Jones had told him of that fight.

On redirect examination, when the assistant district attorney asked McCord how he learned of an argument between the defendant and Jones, McCord answered, "Jones advised us in his statement." The State then asked if Jones was considered a suspect in the case, and the detective said that Lloyd then came in and corroborated Jones' statement. McCord did not finish his statement because the defense objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. La.Code Evid.Ann. art. 801(C) (West 1994). State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321 (La.1990); State v. Preston, 623 So.2d 938 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993).

If a reviewing court is able to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted hearsay did not contribute to the verdict, then the error is deemed harmless. State v. Banks, 439 So.2d 407 (La.1983).

The defense asserts that the detective's testimony about Jones was offered to prove that the defendant committed the offense. He states that [93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 5] Jones' statement was introduced; however, it was not. On direct examination, the detective testified that as a result of his interview with Jones, he developed a suspect in the case. A police officer may refer to a statement made to him by others in order to explain the sequence of events leading to the arrest of the defendant. State v. Tucker, 405 So.2d 506 (La.1981); State v. Lard, 459 So.2d 1189 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984), writ denied 464 So.2d 1376 (La.1985).

Although this court has held as above, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 737 (La.1992), significantly limited the admissible testimony police officers may give to explain actions taken during investigations. In Hearold, where the officers testified at length about the defendant's criminal activity over a period of time, the court stated:

The fact that an officer acted on information obtained from an informant may be relevant to explain his conduct, but may not be used as a passkey to bring before the jury the substance of the out-of-court information that would otherwise be barred by the hearsay rule.

In the instant case, the substance of the statement (Lloyd's allegation corroborated Jones' account) does not have the same significance as the statement in the Hearold case. Here, the trial court allowed evidence that a conversation took place between the officer and Jones but refused to allow statements which were made during the conversation--except for the facts that Jones gave information concerning the defendant and that Jones himself had fought with the victim moments before the homicide. The trial court did not permit the witness to testify concerning out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., what Jones told the officer.

[93-1636 La.App. 4 Cir. 6] The defense next argues that Lloyd's testimony was verified by Jones' statement. However, all the jury--and this Court--can know of Jones' statement is that Jones implicated the defendant in the shooting and also implicated himself. Thus, Jones' statement cannot be seen as convincing the jury of the defendant's guilt. While the detective suggests that Jones and Lloyd named the defendant as the offender, Lloyd did not place Jones at the scene of the shooting. Therefore, Jones would not have been an eye witness and could not have given a first-hand account of the incident.

The defense cites State v. Arbuthnot, 367 So.2d 296 (La.1979), for the proposition that an eye witness to a crime who identifies a suspect yet who does not testify at trial may not be quoted by a police officer at trial. In Arbuthnot, the Supreme Court reversed co-defendant Williams' conviction because it found that clearly inadmissible hearsay evidence had been admitted. Arbuthnot is distinguishable from the case at bar in that Jones was not an eye witness, and there is no evidence that Jones identified the defendant as the offender.

The defense also cites State v. Phillips, 471 So.2d 319 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985), where a police officer testified in rebuttal that an employee of a car shop told him that the defendant's car was released from the shop before the offense when the defendant had just testified that his car was in the shop on the date of the crime. This Court in reversing the conviction noted that the officer's hearsay testimony directly contradicted the defendant's argument that this was a case of mistaken identification. Unlike Phillips, the defendant's alibi in the instant case--that he was at his friends' house--was contradicted by testimony of the only eye...