Catlin v. Sobol, s. 1225
| Decision Date | 04 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | D,1226,Nos. 1225,s. 1225 |
| Parties | , 111 Ed. Law Rep. 1114, 18 A.D.D. 146 Daniel CATLIN and Dundeen Catlin, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Dunbar Elliott, a/k/a "Dell" Catlin, a handicapped child, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Thomas SOBOL, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, John F. Holdorf, Superintendent of Schools of the Edmeston Central School District, and the Board of Education of the Edmeston Central School District, Defendants-Appellants. ockets 95-7912, 95-7914. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Nancy A. Spiegel, Assistant Attorney General, Albany, NY (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, Daniel Smirlock, Assistant Attorney General, Albany, NY, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant Commissioner of Education.
Edward J. Sarzynski, Binghamton, NY (Hogan & Sarzynski, L.L.P., Binghamton, NY, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellants John F. Holdorf and the Board of Education of the Edmeston Central School District.
Lawrence W. Thomas, Mount Kisco, NY (James P. Drohan, Anderson, Banks, Curran & Donoghue, Mount Kisco, NY, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Jay Worona, General Counsel, Albany, NY (Pilar Sokol, Albany, NY, of counsel), for amicus curiae The New York State School Boards Association, Inc.
Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, PARKER, Circuit Judge, and NICKERSON, District Judge. *
I. BACKGROUND
Defendants appeal a final judgment entered in the Northern District of New York, Howard G. Munson, Judge, holding that New York Education Law § 3202(4)(b) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See Catlin v. Sobol, 881 F.Supp. 789 (N.D.N.Y.1995). On appeal, defendants argue that the court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the Due Process claim. Plaintiffs contend that the Equal Protection Clause, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. ("IDEA"), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provide alternate bases for affirming the district court. We reverse because we find that the district court's judgment was based on an incorrect application of the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine.
The facts in this case are undisputed. Plaintiff Dunbar Elliot Catlin (Dell) was born in 1973 in New York City. Dell was born with Down's Syndrome. His parents, Daniel and Dundeen Catlin, are also plaintiffs. In 1973, the Catlins resided in Bedford, New York.
When Dell was three weeks old, his parents moved him from the hospital where he was born to a "family home at board" operated by Samuel and Elizabeth Conde in Edmeston, New York. The Condes operate a home for children with Down's Syndrome. They have experience and expertise caring for Down's Syndrome children and have provided a home for approximately twenty-seven children over the years. The Catlins sent Dell to live with the Condes because of their expertise in caring for Down's Syndrome children. The Condes do not provide schooling for Dell or the other children, and choice of schools was not a factor in choosing to send Dell to live with the Condes. The Catlins have always intended that Dell remain permanently with the Condes.
Dell lived with the Condes his entire life until 1991. 1 He has never lived with his biological parents. He has never visited their home. Dell refers to the Condes as "mama" and "dad" and has extended family relationships with the Condes' natural children. He has shared a room with another child afflicted with Down's Syndrome; these boys treat each other as brothers.
The Condes are responsible for the day-to-day decisions regarding Dell's care: they take him to the doctor, dentist and barber.
Dell's school deals directly with the Condes regarding the day-to-day aspects of his education; they call the Condes when Dell is sick, or if they need permission to take him on a field trip. He is integrated in the community of Edmeston: he knows the postman, the neighbors and the shopkeepers.
Despite the Condes daily supervision of Dell, the Catlins retain parental responsibility for him. In the context of his education, they have participated in meetings to plan Dell's special educational program. In addition, the Catlins are financially responsible for Dell. They pay the Condes $900 a month for Dell's room and board. They also pay for Dell's clothing, medical and dental costs, and other incidentals such as a new bicycle.
When Dell reached school age in 1978, and from time to time thereafter, the Catlins worked with the Committee on the Handicapped in Bedford, New York to plan Dell's educational program. As a result of these meetings, Dell was enrolled in the Primary Trainable Mentally Retarded Program at the Board of Cooperative Educational Services--Mt. Vision School in Green County, within the Edmeston school district. From 1978 until 1985, the Bedford school district, where the Catlins resided, financed Dell's special education in Edmeston. When the Catlins moved from Bedford to Massachusetts, the Bedford school district stopped paying for Dell's education. The Edmeston school district subsequently notified the Catlins that Dell would not be permitted to continue in the public school special education program unless the Catlins' new school district, or the Catlins themselves, assumed financial responsibility for Dell's education.
The Catlins appealed the district's decision to the Commissioner of Education, who affirmed the school district in a written decision in January of 1986. The Commissioner ruled that under New York Education Law § 3202, 2 a district is required to fund a child's education if the child resides in the district. When a child, such as Dell, lives in a family home at board, the district must fund that child's education if the home is his "actual and only residence".
In deciding whether Edmeston must fund Dell's education, the Commissioner applied the common law presumption that a child resides with his biological parents even when the child is not physically present in their home. The Commissioner explained that this presumption can only be overcome by a showing that the parents neither exercise control nor maintain financial responsibility for the child. Pointing to the Catlins' ongoing parental responsibility for Dell, the Commissioner determined that Dell resided with the Catlins. The Commissioner therefore concluded that the Condes' home was not Dell's "actual and only residence," and thus the district would not be required to provide Dell with a free education. The Catlins filed suit in federal court seeking a reversal of the Commissioner's decision.
In federal court, the Catlins challenged the constitutionality of the Commissioner's interpretation of the "actual and only residence" provision of § 3202(4)(b), arguing that it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. In addition, they sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Education for all Handicapped Children Act, (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq., and The district court held that the New York residency requirement as interpreted by the Commissioner violates the Equal Protection Clause because it does not further a substantial state interest. Catlin v. Ambach, 644 F.Supp. 161, 166-68 (N.D.N.Y.1986) (). Defendants appealed and this court vacated the district court's opinion on abstention grounds in order to allow New York State courts to rule on the meaning of "actual and only residence." Catlin v. Ambach, 820 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir.1987) (citing Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)).
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
On remand, the Catlins filed suit in state court and the defendants filed suit for payment of tuition; the suits were consolidated. The state trial court rejected the Commissioner's interpretation of § 3202(4)(b) and held that § 3202(4)(b) creates a class of children, including Dell, who are not subject to the common law presumption of residency with their biological parents. Catlin v. Sobol, 141 Misc.2d 169, 532 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Albany Cty. S.Ct.1988). The intermediate appellate court held that the presumption of residency with biological parents did apply to § 3202(4)(b), but ruled that the Commissioner's determination that the presumption could only be rebutted by parental abandonment was absurd. The court found that on the facts in this case the presumption had clearly been rebutted, and thus ruled in favor of the Catlins. Catlin v. Sobol, 155 A.D.2d 24, 553 N.Y.S.2d 501 (3d Dep't 1990).
A divided New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the presumption that children reside with their parents was part of § 3202(4)(b): "this presumption may be overcome by showing that the parents or guardians have given up parental control and that the child's permanent domicile--i.e., the child's 'actual and only residence'--is within the district." Catlin v. Sobol, 77 N.Y.2d 552, 559, 569 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357, 571 N.E.2d 661 (1991). Thus, the court adopted the Commissioner's interpretation of "actual and only residence," which incorporates the presumption that children reside with their parents in the absence of parental abandonment. In addition, the court found the Commissioner had properly determined that the Catlins had not rebutted the presumption. Finally, the court held that the Commissioner's application of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis.
The Catlins returned to federal court and reasserted their claim that § 3202(4)(b) violates the Equal...
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