Burchett v. Mastec North America, Inc., 03-019

Citation93 P.3d 1247,2004 MT 177,322 Mont. 93
Decision Date06 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-019,03-019
PartiesRONALD BURCHETT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MASTEC NORTH AMERICA, INC, a Florida corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana

For Appellant: Thomas E. Towe, Towe, Bail, Enright, Mackey & Sommerfield, P.L.L.P., Billings, Montana

For Respondent: Donald R. Herndon, Melanie S. Pfeifer, Herndon, Sweeney & Halverson, P.C., Billings, Montana

Justice JIM REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Appellant Ronald Burchett (Burchett) was discharged from his employment with Respondent MasTec North America, Inc. (MasTec) and filed a Complaint in Montana's Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, against MasTec alleging violations of the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). The District Court granted MasTec's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Montana lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Burchett's claim and that Montana's WDEA did not apply. Burchett appeals. We reverse and remand to the District Court.

¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act did not apply to Burchett's claim?

¶4 2. Did the District Court err when it dismissed Burchett's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?

BACKGROUND

¶5 Burchett was employed by C&S Directional Boring from March 2000 to January 2001. C&S Directional Boring is now a subsidiary of MasTec. MasTec is a Florida corporation, and the division of its business relevant to this appeal is operated out of Purcell, Oklahoma. MasTec lays fiber optic cable throughout the United States.

¶6 Burchett was hired by telephone while working temporarily in Massachusetts. The employment contract was never reduced to writing. MasTec hired Burchett to work as a field mechanic, a job which required travel. During the time Burchett was employed by MasTec, he lived and worked in Purcell, Oklahoma, Red Bluff, California, and LaPorte, Indiana. At the time of his hiring, MasTec asked Burchett his state of residence and requested a copy of his driver's license. Burchett informed MasTec he was a Montana resident and produced a Montana driver's license.

¶7 While working in Indiana, Burchett had a dispute with his supervisor and was fired. Burchett filed a Complaint in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court against MasTec alleging violations of Montana's WDEA, Title 39, Chapter 2, Part 9, Montana Code Annotated. Specifically, Burchett alleges MasTec violated the WDEA by discharging him without cause after fulfilling his probationary period, and in retaliation for his refusal to violate public policy and reporting a public policy violation.

¶8 MasTec filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion. Burchett appeals from the District Court's Order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 2000 MT 131, ¶ 7, 300 Mont. 16, ¶ 7, 3 P.3d 603, ¶ 7. However, a court's determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Pickens, ¶ 7.

DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE

¶10 Did the District Court err when it concluded that Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act did not apply to Burchett's claim?

¶11 In granting MasTec's Motion to Dismiss, the District Court concluded that Montana did not have a significant enough relationship with the case for a Montana court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.

¶12 At issue in this case is an employment contract. In determining the choice of law rules for contract disputes, this Court adopted the approach contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). See Casarotto v. Lombardi (1994), 268 Mont. 369, 373-74, 886 P.2d 931, 934,

cert. granted and vacated on other grounds sub nom. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1995), 515 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 2552, 132 L.Ed.2d 807, and on remand sub nom. Casarotto v. Lombardi (1995), 274 Mont. 3, 901 P.2d 596,

and cert. granted on other grounds sub nom. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996), 516 U.S. 1036, 116 S.Ct. 690, 133 L.Ed.2d 594,

and rev'd on other grounds Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996), 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902. Our conflict of laws analysis begins with the general principles set forth in § 6 of the Restatement (Second), which states:

Choice-of-law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

¶13 Applying the first paragraph of § 6, we look to § 28-3-102, MCA, Montana's statutory directive for choice of law. Section 28-3-102, MCA, provides that, "[a] contract is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be performed or, if it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where it is made." Under the unique facts of this case, however, § 28-3-102, MCA, is not instructive. At the time Burchett and MasTec entered into the employment contract, the parties did not know where it was to be performed; the work Burchett was hired to perform was transitory by nature. Furthermore, in this case it would be inappropriate to apply the law of the place where the contract was made. The contract was formed during a telephone conversation when Burchett was temporarily in Massachusetts and the representative of MasTec who hired him was in Oklahoma. The connections to Massachusetts and Oklahoma are far too tenuous to justify applying the laws of either state here.

¶14 We next turn to § 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which gives us more specific guidance in this situation. "When parties specify their choice of law in a contract, that choice will be effectuated subject to the limitations in section 187(2) . . . ." M + W Zander v. Scott Co. of California (Or. Ct. App. 2003) 78 P.3d 118, 121. Section 187 states:

Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen states in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law of the state of the chosen law.

¶15 Burchett argues that with regard to § 187, the parties chose Montana law to govern their contract. Although the decision to apply Montana law was not stated expressly in the employment contract, the parties agreed that income taxes, unemployment insurance premiums, and wages were to be paid to Montana. This, Burchett asserts, constitutes an expression of the parties to have all of the contract provisions governed by Montana law. A Comment to § 187 explains that generally, when parties have chosen the state of the applicable law they will generally refer to it expressly in their contract. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 187, cmt. a (1971). The Comment goes on to state that, "even when the contract does not refer to any state, the forum may nevertheless be able to conclude from its provisions that the parties did wish to have the law of a particular state applied." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 187, cmt. a (1971).

¶16 We agree with Burchett on this point. By agreeing to pay income taxes, unemployment insurance premiums, and wages to Montana, MasTec manifested its intent to be governed by Montana law. A contract provision may be broad enough to indicate the entire contract be governed by the laws of the state governing the particular provision. In Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co. v. Amerotron Corp. (Mass. 1959), 158 N.E.2d 875, 878, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that because a clause in a contract called for arbitration in one state, that state's laws applied for the entire contract.

¶17 In Dailey v. Transitron Electronic Corp. (5th Cir. 1973), 475 F.2d 12, the Fifth Circuit addressed a factually similar situation. In that case, the employee resided in California when initially contacted by the employer regarding his employment. The employee was assigned to work in Mexico but maintained a residence in Texas. The written employment contract was signed in Mexico. The Fifth Circuit held that the parties manifested their intent...

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