Ex parte Karstendick
| Decision Date | 01 October 1876 |
| Citation | 23 L.Ed. 889,93 U.S. 396 |
| Parties | EX PARTE KARSTENDICK |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
PETITION for habeas corpus.
Mr. David C. Labatt for the petitioner.
Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips, contra.
Karstendick, the petitioner, was indicted for a conspiracy, and convicted May 1, 1876, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, under sect. 5440 of the Revised Statutes. The punishment for his offence, prescribed by the statute, is a penalty of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, and imprisonment not more than two years. The sentence, as passed by the court, so far as it is material to the present inquiry, is as follows:——
'And, it having been in due form determined and ascertained that there is no penitentiary within the district of Louisiana, suitable for the confinement of persons convicted of crime in the courts of the United States, in said district of Louisiana, and the Attorney-General of the United States having, in due form, and by and with competent authority, designated the penitentiary at Moundsville, in West Virginia, as the place of confinement, subsistence, and employment of all persons convicted, or who may hereafter be convicted, by the courts of the United States, of crime against the United States of America, in said district of Louisiana, and such designation having been in due form notified to the court and entered upon the record thereof, . . . it is considered, by reason of the verdict herein, . . . that the said Otto H. Karstendick be confined in the penitentiary of the State of West Virginia, at Moundsville, in said State, for and during the full period of sixteen calendar months from and after this day, and that he do also further pay a fine of $2,000,' &c.
In execution of this sentence, Karstendick is now imprisoned in the penitentiary at Moundsville, and he seeks through this application to obtain a discharge, alleging for cause that the order of the court for his imprisonment in a penitentiary, and without the State of Louisiana, is not authorized by law, and consequently void.
Sect. 5440 of the Revised Statutes is a reproduction of sect. 30 of an act of Congress, passed March 2, 1867, 'to amend existing laws relating to internal revenue, and for other purposes.' 14 Stat. 484. At that time another act, passed March 3, 1865, 'regulating proceedings in criminal cases, and for other purposes,' was in force, which provided, in sect. 3, that 'in every case where any person convicted of any offence against the United States shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period longer than one year, it shall be lawful for the court, by which the sentence is passed, to order the same to be executed in any State prison or penitentiary within the district or State where such court is held, the use of which prison or penitentiary is allowed by the legislature of such State for such purposes.' 13 Stat. 500. This provision is also reproduced in sect. 5541 of the Revised Statutes, save only that the words 'State jail' are substituted for the words 'State prison,' where they occur in the original act.
As early as 1834 Congress enacted that, whenever any criminal convicted of any offence against the United States shall be imprisoned in pursuance of such conviction, or of the sentence thereupon, in the prison or penitentiary of any State or Territory, such criminal shall, in all respects, be subject to the same discipline and treatment as convicts sentenced by the courts of the State or Territory in which such prison or penitentiary is situated, and, while so confined in such prison, shall also be exclusively under the control of the officers having charge of the same, under the laws of such State or Territory. 4 Stat. 739.
This provision is re-enacted in sect. 5539 of the Revised Statutes, the word 'jail,' however, being substituted in the revision for 'prison,' where it occurs in the original.
All these several statutes, being in pari materia, were, when in force before the revision, to be construed together. The same is true of the corresponding revised sections, and, under this rule, the same effect must be given to sect. 5440, that it would have if it read as follows: 'All the parties to such a conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $10,000, and to imprisonment not more than two years.' Sect. 5440. If the sentence of imprisonment shall be for a longer term than one year, the court passing the same may order it to be executed in any State jail or penitentiary within the district or State where said court is held (sect. 5541), and the criminal so imprisoned shall, in all respects, be subject to the same discipline and treatment as convicts sentenced by the courts of the State or Territory in which such jail or penitentiary is situated, and shall, while so confined therein, be exclusively under the control of the officers having charge of the same under the laws of the State. Sect. 5539.
This language is explicit, and, taken by itself, is certainly sufficient to authorize imprisonment in a penitentiary, at the discretion of the court, in all cases where the sentence is for a longer term than one year. But the counsel for the petitioner, in their argument, refer to other sections of the statute, which in terms provide for punishment by imprisonment at hard labor, and they seek to confine the power of imprisonment in a penitentiary to such cases; because, as they claim, imprisonment in a penitentiary necessarily implies imprisonment at hard labor; and where the punishment provided for by the statute is imprisonment alone, a sentence to confinement at a place where hard labor is imposed as a consequence of the imprisonment, is in excess of the power conferred.
We have not been able to arrive at this conclusion. In cases where the statute makes hard labor a part of the punishment, it is imperative upon the court to include that in its sentence. But where the statute requires imprisonment alone, the several provisions which have just been referred to place it within the power of the court, at its discretion, to order execution of its sentence at a place where labor is exacted as part of the discipline and treatment of the institution or not, as it pleases. Thus, a wider range of punishment is given, and the courts are left at liberty to graduate their sentences so as to meet the evervarying circumstances of the cases which come before them. If the offence is flagrant, the penitentiary, with its discipline, may be called into requisition; but if slight, a corresponding punishment may be inflicted within the general range of the law.
This view of the case is strengthened by a further examination of the legislation upon this subject. As early as 1825, in an 'Act more effectually to provide for the punishment of crimes against the United States, and for other purposes' (4 Stat 118), it was enacted (sect. 15) that 'in every case where any criminal convicted of any offence against the United States shall be sentenced to imprisonment and confinement at hard labor, it shall be lawful for the court by which the sentence is passed, to order the same to be executed in any State prison or penitentiary within the district or State where such court is holden, the use of which prison or penitentiary may be allowed or granted by the legislature of such State for such purposes.' With this statute in force, the act of 1865, which has already been referred to, was passed, giving the same power in nearly the same words, where the punishment was by imprisonment for a longer term than one year, without any special requirement as to hard labor.
These two acts are separately re-enacted in the Revised Statutes. The act of 1825 is reproduced in sect. 5542, and that of 1865 in sect. 5541, the language of the two original acts being substantially retained in the revision. With this legislation in full force, it is impossible to believe that it was the intention of Congress to confine imprisonment in penitentiaries exclusively to cases in which hard labor is in express terms made by statute a part of the punishment.
Without extending the argument further upon this branch of the case, we are clearly of the opinion that the order of the court directing the imprisonment in a penitentiary is not void. It still remains to consider whether that part of the sentence...
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