In The Matter Of The Commitment Of S.T v. Cmty. Hosp. North

• Decision Date: 01 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 49A04-0910-CV-617.,49A04-0910-CV-617.
• Citation: 930 N.E.2d 684
• Parties: In the Matter of the COMMITMENT OF S.T., Appellant-Respondent,v.COMMUNITY HOSPITAL NORTH, In-Patient Psychiatric Unit, Appellee-Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

930 N.E.2d 684

In the Matter of the COMMITMENT OF S.T., Appellant-Respondent,
v.
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL NORTH, In-Patient Psychiatric Unit, Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 49A04-0910-CV-617.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 29, 2010.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 01, 2010.

930 N.E.2d 685

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Suzy St. John, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

David J. Mallon, Jr., Jenny R. Wright, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.OPINIONMAY, Judge.

S.T. appeals her temporary involuntary commitment. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding that she was dangerous to herself, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

On September 20, 2009, S.T., a twenty-three year old female, attempted suicide by swallowing a large amount of Tylenol. After waking up in the Intensive Care Unit at Community Hospital North (“Hospital”), S.T. voluntarily admitted herself to the Psychiatric Care Unit. On September 24, S.T. signed a 24-hour Notice to Leave, but she was not released the next day. Instead, Dr. Dianne Martin, the psychiatrist who had been treating S.T., filed a petition for emergency detention based on

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her interaction with S.T. and S.T.'s behavior and interactions with other staff members.

S.T., an Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran confined to a wheelchair, has been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and a non-specific mood disorder. S.T. told Dr. Martin she also had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder. She engages in behavior consistent with pica, an eating disorder characterized by the ingestion of non-food items.

On September 28, staff took S.T. from the Psychiatric Care Unit to remove earrings from S.T.'s digestive tract. During the procedure she ripped out her IVs and was so inconsolable the procedure had to be stopped. Staff had to wheel her back to the In-Patient Psychiatric Unit on a cot, rather than in her wheelchair. While in the Psychiatric Care Unit, S.T. was verbally abusive and threatening to staff members on at least two occasions. Her behavior put staff members “on guard.” (Tr. at 24.)

On September 29, the trial court heard testimony regarding S.T.'s mental illnesses and the behaviors that prompted the involuntary commitment request. Based on this evidence, the trial court found S.T. was “still a danger to herself and that there remains a substantial risk that she would harm herself.” ( Id. at 48.) The judge ordered involuntary commitment at the Psychiatric Care Unit for no more than ninety days.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

S.T.'s period of involuntary commitment has already passed. Generally, we dismiss cases that are moot, but a moot case may be decided on its merits when it involves questions of great public interest, such as involuntary commitment, that are likely to recur. Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.

Proceedings for involuntary commitment are subject to federal due process requirements. For the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces “a massive curtailment of liberty” and thus “requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); see also C.J. v. Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion County, 842 N.E.2d 407 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom resulting from the confinement. Commitment to a mental hospital “can engender adverse social consequences to the individual; ... [w]hether we label this phenomena stigma or choose to call it something else ... we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804.

The Addington court expressed concern that an involuntary commitment might be ordered on the basis of a few isolated instances of unusual conduct occurring within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable. As everyone exhibits some abnormal conduct at one time or another, “loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.” Id. at 427, 99 S.Ct. 1804. To satisfy the requirements of due process, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the facts justifying an involuntary commitment. Commitment of M.M., 826 N.E.2d 90, 96 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

Standard of Review

S.T. first urges us to reconsider the standard by which we review involuntary commitments. When reviewing whether the evidence supports an involuntary

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commitment, we look only at the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the trial court's judgment Id. We may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. “If the trial court's commitment order represents a conclusion that a reasonable person could have drawn, we will affirm the order even if other reasonable conclusions are possible.” Id.

S.T. argues a de novo review would be more appropriate, and cites Kladis v. Nick's Patio, Inc. 735 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Kladis involved a request for a preliminary injunction based on a non-compete clause in a contract. When stating the standard of review for the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, that panel noted, “we review questions of law and the overall sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law with no deference given to the trial court's determination.” Id. S.T. asserts that statement means we should review de novo this trial court's determination that S.T. was a danger to herself. We disagree.

Just before the language S.T. quoted from Kladis, was this language:

This court has no authority to weigh the evidence and resolve factual controversy in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. Rather we look to the trial court's findings of fact as required by T.R. 52 and 65.

Id. (citations omitted). In that context, the language on which S.T. relies cannot be read to mean that we may usurp the trial court's authority to weigh evidence and resolve factual disputes:

There can be no doubt as to the division of responsibility and authority between trial and appellate courts. The trial courts of this state exclusively hear and weigh the evidence and inferences arising therefrom, and assess the credibility of witnesses, to determine the facts prior to entering judgment or taking other action. Courts of appeal have no such authority.

Whiteco Industries, Inc. v. Nickolick, 549 N.E.2d 396, 398 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).

In addition, the decision on which the Kladis panel relied does not suggest we may review sufficiency of the evidence with no deference to the trial court, see Fumo v. Medical Group of Michigan City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), reh'g denied, trans. denied, nor do any decisions since Kladis. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369 (Ind.2010) (stating the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well settled, and we will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

S.T. also cites B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), a juvenile delinquency case, for the proposition that the reasonable inferences from the evidence presented in the trial court must be drawn from “substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment.” That statement merely reflects the standard for reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to support a trial court's decision. See Scott v. State, 895 N.E.2d 369, 374 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (reviewing record for...