La Unión Del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott
Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
Docket Number | 5:21-CV-0844-XR [Consolidated Cases] |
Citation | 604 F.Supp.3d 512 |
Parties | LA UNIÓN DEL PUEBLO ENTERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gregory W. ABBOTT, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this date, the Court considered the State of Texas and the Texas Secretary of State's motion to dismiss all claims brought by the Attorney General of the United States on behalf of the United States (ECF No. 145). After careful consideration, the Court issues the following order.
On September 7, 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into law the Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021, an omnibus election law commonly referred to as S.B. 1. See Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021, S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (2021). Premised on the state legislature's authority to make all laws necessary to detect and punish fraud under article VI, section 4 of the Texas Constitution, S.B. 1 went into effect on December 2, 2021, and amended the Texas Election Code (the "Election Code") by altering various election practices and procedures pertaining to voter assistance, voting by mail, and more. See generally id.
On November 4, 2021, the United States filed suit against Texas and its Secretary of State in his official capacity (together, the ) , alleging that certain provisions of S.B. 1 violate federal voting rights law.1 See Compl., United States v. Texas , No. 5:21-CV-1085-XR (W.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021), ECF No. 1. On November 30, 2021, the United States filed an amended complaint against the State Defendants. ECF No. 131.2 The United States alleges that section 6.04 of S.B. 1 violates the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") and that sections 5.07 and 5.13 of S.B. 1 violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("CRA").3 Id. ¶¶ 69, 75.
Section 6.04 amends section 64.034 of the Election Code by modifying the oath an assistor must take before assisting a voter in Texas. See S.B. 1 § 6.04. The United States contends that section 6.04 violates § 208 of the VRA, which guarantees any voter who requires assistance to vote, by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write, the right to assistance by a person of their choice, other than the voter's employer, union, or agents thereof. ECF No. 131 ¶ 69. Specifically, the United States alleges that section 6.04 violates § 208 of the VRA insofar as it "prohibits a voter's assistor of choice from providing federally protected assistance by limiting permissible actions to reading the ballot to the voter, directing the voter to read the ballot, marking the voter's ballot, or directing the voter to mark the ballot." Id. ¶ 68 (quotation marks omitted). The United States asserts that § 12(d) of the VRA authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to enforce § 208 of the VRA against the State Defendants. Id. ¶ 6.
Section 5.07 amends section 86.001 of the Election Code by now requiring the rejection of a vote-by-mail application if the applicant's driver's license, election identification certificate, or personal identification card number "does not identify the same voter identified on the applicant's application for voter registration[.]"4 S.B. 1 § 5.07. Section 5.13 amends section 87.014 of the Election Code by now similarly requiring the rejection of a mail ballot carrier envelope if it does not include a driver's license, election identification certificate, or personal identification card number identifying "the same voter identified on the voter's application for voter registration[.]"5 Id. § 5.13. The United States alleges that these provisions violate § 101 of the CRA because they require the rejection of vote-by-mail applications and mail ballot carrier envelopes based on errors or omissions that are not material to determining whether a person is qualified to vote under Texas law. ECF No. 131 ¶ 75. It submits that § 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended, authorizes the Attorney General to enforce § 101 of the CRA against the State Defendants. Id. ¶ 6.
Based on these allegations, the United States seeks a declaratory judgment that sections 6.04, 5.07, and 5.13 violate § 208 of the VRA and § 101 of the CRA. Id. at 18. It also requests an injunction barring the State Defendants from enforcing sections 6.04, 5.07, and 5.13, as well as an order directing them "to take appropriate action to ensure uniform compliance with this Court's order by state and local authorities administering the State's electoral processes[.]" Id.
On December 14, 2021, the State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss all claims brought by the United States. ECF No. 145. The United States filed a response, ECF No. 195, and the State Defendants filed a reply, ECF No. 223. On March 18, 2022, the State Defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority. ECF No. 333. On March 23, 2022, the United States filed a response to the State Defendants’ notice of supplemental authority. ECF No. 338.
The State Defendants move to dismiss the United States’ claims on two grounds. First, they argue that the United States lacks standing to bring this suit and, as a result, has not met its burden of establishing the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Second, they contend that the United States has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 208 of the VRA and § 101 of the CRA, both because the Attorney General lacks the statutory authority to enforce those federal statutes and because the S.B. 1 provisions at issue are consistent with federal law.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a federal court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.6 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Article III of the United States Constitution both establishes and limits a federal court's constitutional power to adjudicate a case. It "gives federal courts the power to adjudicate only genuine ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ " California v. Texas , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2113, 210 L.Ed.2d 230 (2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). The
Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc. , 554 U.S. 269, 273, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008). Article III standing, therefore, "is a component of subject matter jurisdiction." HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Tr. for Merrill Lynch Mortg. Loan v. Crum , 907 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 2018). It provides definition to the constitutional limits of subject matter jurisdiction, Crane v. Johnson , 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2015), by identifying "those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process," Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A federal court must consider a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "before other challenges ‘since the court must find jurisdiction before determining the validity of the claim.’ " Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann , 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1988) ). Further, a federal court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Williamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists. New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois , 533 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008). "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice[.]" Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for the dismissal of claims in a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), all factual allegations from the complaint must be taken as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc. , 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). The complaint must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
The State Defendants assert three main arguments in moving to dismiss the United States’ claims. First, the State Defendants argue that the United States lacks standing to sue either Texas or its Secretary of State in federal court to enforce the VRA and CRA. ECF No. 145 at 7–10. Second, they contend that the United States has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id. at 10–12, 15–18. And third, the State Defendants argue that the United States is textually precluded from enforcing the VRA and CRA against Texas and its Secretary. Id. at 12–15, 19–21. The Court addresses each argument in turn, beginning, as it must, with the State Defendants’...
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