Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo.
| Citation | 931 F.2d 1273 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1534,90-1534 |
| Parties | , 67 Ed. Law Rep. 487 Kalima JENKINS, by her friend, Kamau AGYEI; Carolyn Dawson, by her next friend Richard Dawson; Tufanza A. Byrd, by her next friend, Teresa Byrd; Derek A. Dydell, by his next friend, Maurice Dydell; Terrance Cason, by his next friend, Antoria Cason; Jonathan Wiggins, by his next friend, Rosemary Jacobs Love; Kirk Allan Ward, by his next friend, Mary Ward; Robert M. Hall, by his next friend, Denise Hall; Dwayne A. Turrentine, by his next friend, Shelia Turrentine; Gregory A. Pugh, by his next friend, David Winters, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Appellees, American Federation of Teachers, Local 691, v. The STATE OF MISSOURI; Honorable John Ashcroft, Governor of the State of Missouri; Wendell Bailey, Treasurer of the State of Missouri; Missouri State Board of Education, Roseann Bentley, Dan Blackwell, Gary M. Cunningham, Roger L. Tolliver, Raymond McCallister, Jr., Susan D. Finke, Thomas R. Davis, Cynthia B. Thompson, Members of the Missouri State Board of Education, Robert E. Bartman, Commissioner of Education of the State of Missouri, Appellants, and School District of Kansas City, Missouri and Claude C. Perkins, Superintendent thereof. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Bart Matanic, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.
Russell E. Lovell II, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
The State of Missouri appeals from an order of the district court 1 holding that the Jenkins class is entitled to post-judgment interest on its attorneys' fees accruing from the date when the court first determined that the class was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, rather than the date when the court quantified the fees. Jenkins v. Missouri, 731 F.Supp. 1437, 1440-41 (W.D.Mo.1990). The district court thus held that post-judgment interest should accrue from February 24, 1986, the date on which it determined entitlement to the fees. Id. at 1441. The State argues that the accrual should not begin until May 11, 1987, the date when the district court quantified the fees. We affirm the order of the district court.
This action for post-judgment interest on attorneys' fees has its origins in the 1977 lawsuit that challenged segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District. Arthur A. Benson, II, entered his appearance on behalf of the plaintiffs in March 1979, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund entered as co-counsel in March 1982. Following a three-month bench trial, the district court in September 1984 held the State defendants and the KCMSD liable for intradistrict segregation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F.Supp. 1485, 1505-06 (W.D.Mo.1984). In June 1985, after a two-week hearing on remedies, the district court entered judgment on the merits, ordering $87 million in capital improvements and operating programs. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19, 43-44 (W.D.Mo.1985), aff'd as modified, 807 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816, 108 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987).
On February 5, 1986, the Jenkins class filed application for attorneys' fees under The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1988). On February 24, 1986, the district court found that "[c]learly under the law, counsel for plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney's fees" and ordered the State to make an immediate partial payment of $200, 000 to Benson. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D.Mo. Feb. 24, 1986). The State did not appeal this award, and it made three payments, totalling $347,332.93, to Benson during the litigation of the fees dispute in district court. In May and July of 1987, the district court entered two separate orders directing the State to pay Benson a total additional amount of $1,381,897.44 in attorneys' fees and expenses. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 16 ; Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D.Mo. July 16, 1987). It also awarded the Legal Defense Fund $2,365,875.74 in fees and expenses. Jenkins, slip op. at 16 (May 11, 1987). This court and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders. Jenkins v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 268 (8th Cir.1988), aff'd, 491 U.S. 274, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2472, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989).
In December 1989, the Jenkins class filed a motion for post-judgment interest. The district court found that Benson and the Legal Defense Fund were entitled to such interest from February 24, 1986, the date when it had first determined that the class was entitled to attorneys' fees, rather than from May 11, 1987, the date when the court had quantified the fees. Jenkins, 731 F.Supp. at 1438-40. The district court also held that interest should accrue at a rate of 7.71 percent, the U.S. Treasury Bill rate on February 24, 1986. Id. at 1441. See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(a) (1988) ().
The parties here agree that the Jenkins class is entitled to post-judgment interest on its attorney fee award under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(a), which states:
Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.... Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment.
(Emphasis added).
The phrase "any money judgment" in section 1961(a) is construed as including a judgment awarding attorneys' fees. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527, 78 L.Ed.2d 710 (1983); Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir.1982). In Dalton, this court held that post-judgment interest on attorneys' fees was mandatory under section 1961(a) and that denial of such interest constituted reversible error. 712 F.2d at 1234-35.
With the entitlement to post-judgment interest clear, the parties' disagreement is confined to the meaning of the phrase "shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment." The State contends that the proper construction of this language establishes that the relevant date is when the fee award is quantified or "liquidated." The Jenkins class contends that the relevant date is when the prevailing party becomes unconditionally entitled to fees, either because of a statutory right or because the court in its discretion has determined the party is entitled to attorneys' fees.
The district court concluded that all of the relevant authority supported the plaintiffs' position. 731 F.Supp. at 1438-40. After the district court issued its opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit decided Fleming v. County of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 565 (7th Cir.1990), which awarded the plaintiff post-judgment interest on his attorneys' fees from the date the fees were quantified. Id. at 565. The Fleming court did not explain why it selected the date of fee quantification rather than the date of fee entitlement, and it is not clear whether the parties presented this issue. Fleming reversed the district court's ruling that had awarded pre-judgment interest on the attorney's fees. The Fleming court explained: "Prior to the date the judgment on attorney's fees was entered, plaintiff's attorneys' claim for unpaid attorney's fees was unliquidated and, as such, not entitled to interest." Id. The court then concluded that the "award of attorney's fees was entered" on the date the fees were quantified. Id.
The Fleming result runs counter to the holdings of the Fifth Circuit in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam), and the Federal Circuit in Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 760 (Fed.Cir.1988). The Copper Liquor court prescribed a two-part test to determine when attorneys' fees should begin to accrue interest:
If a judgment is rendered that does not mention the right to attorneys' fees, and the prevailing party is unconditionally entitled to such fees by statutory right, interest will accrue from the date of judgment. If, however, judgment is rendered without mention of attorneys' fees and the allowance of fees is within the discretion of the court, interest will accrue only from the date the court recognizes the right to such fees in a judgment.
Id. at 545. Under either part of the Copper Liquor test, interest accrues from the date that the party becomes unconditionally entitled to fees, even if those fees are not yet quantified. Id. The Mathis court followed Copper Liquor, stating that "[i]nterest on an attorney fee award ... runs from the date of the judgment establishing the right to the award, not the date of the judgment establishing its quantum." 857 F.2d at 760. The Jenkins class contends that under Copper Liquor and Mathis, post-judgment interest should accrue from a date no later than February 24, 1986. 2
The State argues that there is no need to apply Copper Liquor or Mathis because an Eighth Circuit case, Dalton, holds that post-judgment interest does not begin to accrue until the date when the fees are quantified. 3 In Dalton, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on October 14, 1980. 712 F.2d at 1228. On March 30, 1982, it entered a final judgment awarding costs and fees to the plaintiffs. Id. Following the district court's denial of post-judgment interest on the attorneys' fees, this court reversed and held that post-judgment interest should accrue from the March 30, 1982, award of fees. Id. at 1234-35.
The State argues that Dalton stands for the proposition that post-judgment interest does not begin to accrue until the date...
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