United Paperworks Intern., Local No. 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.

Decision Date20 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-3675,90-3675
Parties137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2614, 59 USLW 2736, 119 Lab.Cas. P 10,772 UNITED PAPERWORKS INTERNATIONAL, LOCAL # 395, United Paperworkers International, Local # 766, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ITT RAYONIER, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Guy O. Farmer, II, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

John F. MacLennan, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before FAY, COX and MARKEY *, Circuit Judges.

COX, Circuit Judge:

United Paperworkers International, Local No. 395 and Local No. 766 (the Union), initiated this action to compel ITT Rayonier, Inc. (ITT) to arbitrate a dispute between the parties, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The issue on appeal is the proper statute of limitations to be applied to this suit. The district court concluded that a one-year statute of limitations found in Florida law, instead of a six-month limitation period found in federal law, applies. We agree with the district court and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed. The relationship between the Union and ITT is governed by a collective bargaining agreement. 1 That agreement sets out a procedure for resolving disputes "as to the interpretation or application of this Agreement...." 2 The final step in that procedure, if preliminary steps do not resolve the dispute, is the referral of the dispute to an impartial arbitrator. 3 On July 11, 1988, representatives of each of the local unions in this case filed a grievance; the grievance concerned the subcontracting out of work previously performed by members of the Union. By letter, ITT communicated to the Union its notice of refusal to arbitrate on July 15, 1988. The Union filed this action on June 27, 1989, under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 4, seeking an order compelling ITT to arbitrate the dispute. The Union argues the action is governed by Florida's one-year statute of limitations for bringing an action for specific performance of a contract. 5 ITT contends the six-month statute of limitations found in section 10(b) of the LMRA 6 should be applied in this case. The parties agree that if the six-month statute applies, this action is barred, but that if the one-year statute applies, the action was timely filed.

The district court, in ruling on ITT's motion for summary judgment, and in a thoroughly-researched and well-reasoned opinion, agreed with the Union's position that the one-year statute applies and denied ITT's motion. United Paperworkers Int'l Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 740 F.Supp. 833 (M.D.Fla.1990). In a separate order, the court granted the Union's motion for summary judgment, denied ITT's cross-motion for summary judgment and ordered ITT to arbitrate the dispute pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. United Paperworkers Int'l Local 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 427 (M.D.Fla.1990). ITT appeals and asserts the district court erred in concluding that the one-year statute of limitations applies to this suit.

II. DISCUSSION
A. General principles

Congress sometimes fails to supply a statute of limitations when it creates a federal cause of action. "When that occurs '[w]e have generally concluded that Congress intended that courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.' " Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989) (quoting DelCostello v. International Brd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)). However, because "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind ... it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Therefore, there is an exception to the general rule that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law. A court should decline to borrow a state statute of limitations only " 'when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.' " Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. at 625 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294); see also Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local 225, 893 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (11th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this exception is "narrow" and "closely circumscribed," and that "application of a federal statute will be unusual," while " 'resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing limitations periods.' " Id. (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294). ITT asserts this exception applies; the Union argues we should apply the general rule.

The narrow exception to the general rule of borrowing state statutes of limitation was created by the Supreme Court in DelCostello v. International Brd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). DelCostello involved a "hybrid" claim under section 301. 7 The Court decided the six-month limitation period contained in section 10(b) was more appropriate for such actions than was a 90-day state statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards. The question whether the section 10(b) limitation period should apply to straightforward section 301 claims was left unanswered.

The Supreme Court emphasized the narrowness of the DelCostello exception in Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). In Reed, an employee alleged that his union violated his right to free speech under section 101(a)(2) of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 8 The suit was not filed until two years after the last complained-of event had occurred.

The Supreme Court held the section 10(b) limitation period not applicable. Reed, 488 U.S. at 334, 109 S.Ct. at 630. To support this decision, the Court stated first, that the employee's section 101 action found a closer analogy in state personal injury law than in federal labor law. Reed, 488 U.S. at 326-27, 109 S.Ct. at 626-27. Turning next to the "practicality/policy" prong of the DelCostello exception, the Court stated that the case before it raised none of the practical problems that had been raised in DelCostello. The problem in DelCostello, the Court explained, lay in the 90-day limitation period that governed state suits to vacate arbitration awards: the typical labor plaintiff could hardly be expected, within such a short time, to identify his or her injury, retain counsel, and file a complaint. Reed, 488 U.S. at 328 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 627-28 n. 4. Along these same lines, the Court stated that practical problems would most likely arise "where distinct forms of action are combined, making the possibility of finding a single analogous state statute more remote." 9 Id. Finally, the Reed Court stated that intra-union disputes often fail to implicate sufficiently the national policy concerns balanced by section 10(b)'s six-month period. Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 109 S.Ct. at 628-29.

With this background in mind, we begin our analysis. We assume the general rule of borrowing state statutes of limitation applies unless (1) a rule from federal law " 'clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes' and (2) 'the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that [federal] rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.' " Pruitt v. Carpenters' Local 225, 893 F.2d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294) (brackets in original).

B. Is there a closer analogy in federal law?

The Union argues, and the district court held, that the state law cause of action for specific performance of a contract provides a closer analogy to the Union's action to compel arbitration than does the federal cause of action for unfair labor practices. We agree with that conclusion.

An action for specific performance of a contract is closely analogous to an action to compel arbitration. We need go no further than the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), to demonstrate this. In Lincoln Mills, the Court had to decide whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew jurisdiction to compel arbitration of grievance disputes. In answering the question in the negative, the Court stated, "we see no justification in policy for restricting Sec. 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act." Id. at 458, 77 S.Ct. at 918. It is clear, then, that the Supreme Court has characterized a suit to compel arbitration as a suit for specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes. Our circuit has done likewise. See, e.g., South Western Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 454 F.2d 1333, 1336 (5th Cir.1971) 10 (need uniform standard of arbitrability, "regardless of whether the suit asks for the injunction of a strike ... or the specific performance of an arbitration clause"); Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 417 (5th Cir.1966) (under Lincoln Mills, district courts have jurisdiction to "grant specific performance of arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements"); Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896, 80 S.Ct. 199, 80 S.Ct. 199, 4 L.Ed.2d 152 (1959) (district court, before ordering "specific performance of a...

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