Roe v. Doe

• Decision Date: 31 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 22737,22737
• Citation: 931 P.2d 657,129 Idaho 663
• Parties: In the Matter of Termination of the Parental Rights of Jane DOE and John Doe and John Roe. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, an Infant. John ROE, Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal, v. John DOE I and Jane Doe I, Respondents-Appellants on Appeal.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 657

931 P.2d 657

129 Idaho 663

In the Matter of Termination of the Parental Rights of Jane DOE and John Doe and John Roe. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, an Infant.

John ROE, Petitioner-Respondent on Appeal, v. John DOE I and Jane Doe I, Respondents-Appellants on Appeal.

No. 22737.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 31, 1996.

Petition for Review Denied Feb. 28, 1997.

Ellsworth, May, Sudweeks, Stubbs, Ipsen & Perry, Twin Falls, for respondents-appellants on appeal. Bart D. Browning (argued).

Petitioner-respondent on appeal did not participate in the appeal. ¹

LANSING, Judge.

This is an action for termination of the parental rights of the natural father of a young child. As a consequence of certain discovery violations by the natural father, the court imposed sanctions under I.R.C.P. 37(b) and (d) which precluded the natural father from presenting at trial his exhibits and the testimony of several of his witnesses. After a judgment adverse to the natural father was rendered by the magistrate, an appeal challenging the discovery sanctions was taken to the district court. The district court reversed and ordered a new trial. On further appeal to this Court, we affirm the district court's determination that the severity of the discovery sanctions imposed by the magistrate constituted an abuse of discretion in the circumstances presented here.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS

On April 16, 1994, John and Jane Doe, a married couple, took physical custody of an infant born on April 13, 1994, with the intent to adopt the child. The unmarried natural mother of the infant signed a voluntary termination of her parental rights on April 21, 1994. Because the natural mother represented that her pregnancy had resulted from a rape by a stranger, the identity of the natural father was unknown to the Does. The Does initiated adoption proceedings and published notice of those proceedings in a local newspaper. The notice came to the attention of John Roe, who had been residing with the natural mother during the time when the conception occurred. Roe then registered as the putative father of the infant pursuant to I.C. § 16-1513. As a result, on August 4, 1994, the Does filed this action to terminate Roe's parental rights. Soon thereafter, Roe filed a motion for genetic testing, to which the Does stipulated. The results of the test showed a high probability that Roe is the biological father of the child.

The trial was scheduled to begin on May 22, 1995. In late April or early May, Roe changed attorneys, and Harry W. DeHaan became Roe's counsel of record. On April 25, 1995, the Does served Roe with interrogatories and requests for production of documents, and they served a second set of interrogatories on April 28, 1995. These interrogatories and requests sought the production of any exhibits that Roe intended to use at trial and the disclosure of his lay witnesses, expert witnesses, and the facts upon which his experts relied in forming their opinions. By terms of I.R.C.P. 33(a)(2) and 34(b)(2), the responses to these requests were due on May 9, 1995, and May 12, 1995, respectively. Roe, however, did not serve timely responses. On May 18, 1995, the Does filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(b) and (d) asking that Roe be precluded from presenting any lay witnesses, expert witnesses or documentary evidence at trial because he had not responded to discovery requests in a timely manner. The next day, Roe served his responses to the interrogatories and requests for production. These responses were apparently complete with the exception that Roe did not state the facts upon which his expert witness relied in forming the opinions to which she would testify.

A hearing on the motion for sanctions was conducted in the magistrate division of the district court on the morning of May 22, the trial date. At the hearing, Roe's attorney On appeal to the district court, Roe argued that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his witnesses and other evidence because these sanctions were out of proportion to Roe's discovery violation. Roe also contended that the trial court's finding of parental neglect was not supported by the evidence. The district court held that the discovery sanctions were unduly severe and constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. On that basis, the district court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Consequently, the district court did not review the remaining issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. The Does now appeal from the district court's decision. They argue that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing sanctions for Roe's failure to serve timely discovery responses.

                denied that there had been any intent to withhold information.  He asserted that in the month since his appearance as Roe's attorney, he had engaged in "an open file program" of informally exchanging information and that most of the Does' interrogatories had been answered earlier in the deposition of Roe.  The magistrate granted the Does' motion and precluded Roe from presenting any evidence beyond his own testimony and his examination of court-appointed witnesses. 2  Roe's counsel urged reconsideration of that decision and suggested, as an alternative, that the trial be rescheduled to allow time for Roe to complete his discovery responses and to permit both parties full opportunity to present their evidence.  The court, however, rejected this alternative and adhered to its decision excluding Roe's witnesses and his documentary evidence.  The court trial was conducted on May 22 and May 24.  Roe's excluded trial witnesses included his parents, his previous attorney, and his expert witness.  On June 21, 1995, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion, which served as findings of fact and conclusions of law.  See I.R.C.P. 52(a).  The trial court found that Roe had not visited the child, had not made any payment for the child's support or for the expenses of prenatal care and delivery, and had not otherwise sought to involve himself in the child's life.  Based on these findings the trial court concluded that Roe's parental rights should be terminated on the ground of neglect, pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005
                

ANALYSIS

When we review the decision of a magistrate following an intermediate appeal to the district court, we independently examine the proceedings in the magistrate division while giving due consideration, but not deference, to the district court's appellate decision. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 957-58, 855 P.2d 40, 42-43 (1993); Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App.1988).

A court possesses authority under I.R.C.P. 37(d) to impose sanctions upon a party who fails to serve timely responses to discovery requests. This rule provides in relevant part:

If a party ... fails ... to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or ... to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34 after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.

Thus, the following orders, inter alia, listed in Rule 37(b)(2) and made applicable by reference in Rule 37(d), may be entered for a failure to respond to discovery requests:

(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence;

(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.

In addition, Rule 37(a) authorizes the court to issue orders compelling discovery responses and to award against the delinquent party the movant's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in obtaining the order.

The imposition of sanctions for discovery violations is committed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Ashby v. W. Council, Lumber Production and Industrial Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 434, 436 (1990); Southern Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n (SIPCA) v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 746 P.2d 985 (1987); Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, 107 Idaho 1, 684 P.2d 978 (1984); Kleine v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 124 Idaho 44, 47, 855 P.2d 881, 884 (Ct.App.1992); Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 121, 822 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ct.App.1991). In reviewing a discretionary decision we ask: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

There is some question as to whether the first prong of this three-part test--the court's recognition of the issue as one of discretion--is satisfied here. In imposing the sanctions the trial court stated:

[W]hile there may have been a free exchange of information and an open file approach to discovery, this would in no way alleviate the duty to comply with the requirements of the discovery rules. Petitioner was, and is, entitled to have the rules complied with and the court is not at liberty to waive the rules in...