FISHER v. State of Ind., 10A01-1001-CR-21.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana
Citation933 N.E.2d 526
Docket NumberNo. 10A01-1001-CR-21.,10A01-1001-CR-21.
PartiesAlphonzo FISHER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Decision Date30 August 2010

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bart M. Betteau, Betteau Law Office, LLC, New Albany, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Henry A. Flores, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, Alphonzo Fisher challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to discharge. Fisher presents two issues, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the trial court improperly deny his motion to discharge?

We reverse.

On June 19, 2001, Fisher was charged with two counts of class A felony dealing in cocaine. An initial hearing at which Fisher appeared was held on June 21, 2001. A final pre-trial hearing was initially set for September 13 with a jury trial to follow on October 23, 2001. Upon Fisher's motion, the final pre-trial hearing and jury trial were continued. The court reset the final pre-trial hearing for December 6, 2001, with the jury trial to follow on January 15, 2002. At the December 6 hearing, Fisher's counsel appeared and advised the court that Fisher was in federal custody in an unrelated case. The court reset the jury trial for April 16, 2002, with a final pre-trial conference set for March 14, 2002. Due to being in federal custody, Fisher failed to appear for the final pre-trial conference held on March 14. The court issued a bench warrant for Fisher's failure to appear.

On July 25, 2006, the next entry on the chronological case summary (CCS), Fisher, by counsel, filed a notice of availability for prosecution and an objection to the delay in prosecution. The next entry on the CCS is for December 3, 2007, on which date Fisher filed a motion to discharge contending that his constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights had been violated. The court held a hearing on Fisher's motion on February 11, 2008, and thereafter took the matter under advisement. On March 4, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying Fisher's motion to discharge. Fisher pursued an interlocutory appeal, which was denied by this court.

Thereafter, on November 3, 2008, the trial court reset a final pre-trial conference for December 4, 2008. In anticipation of the hearing, Fisher filed a motion for transport, which the trial court granted. On November 21, 2008, the State filed an objection to the transport order, arguing that any transportation would violate the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) ( see Ind.Code Ann. § 35-33-10-4 (West, Westlaw through 2010 2nd Regular Sess.)) because the necessary paperwork had not been completed and that Fisher could not be transported until he finished serving his federal sentence. On its own motion, the court stayed the transport order and scheduled the matter to be heard at the final pre-trial conference. On December 4, 2008, Fisher filed an objection to the trial court holding a final pre-trial conference in his absence and again demanded a speedy trial.

On January 14, 2009, Fisher filed a “Certificate of Readiness for Trial.” Appellant's Appendix at 37. In July, Fisher, pro se, filed a motion to dismiss citing the State's failure to comply with the IAD. 1 On October 27, 2009, Fisher filed a second motion for discharge alleging that his speedy trial rights under both the state and federal Constitutions and under Criminal Rule 4(C) had been violated. The trial court entered its order denying Fisher's motion to discharge on December 15, 2009. In its order, the court set forth the relevant stipulated facts as follows:

3. As indicated by the chronological case summary, incorporated by reference, the parties appeared on December 6, 2001. At that time, the Court was advised that the Accused was incarcerated in Floyd County, Indiana on federal charges.

4. The Accused has been continuously incarcerated on federal charges since that time. The State of Indiana has been aware of that fact at least since December 6, 2001.

5. The State of Indiana has a policy whereby no attempt is made to secure the attendance of an Accused who is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction, until that person has finished serving their sentence in that jurisdiction....

* * *

7. The accused has consistently, repeatedly and diligently attempted to bring this matter to trial.

Appellant's Appendix at 41-42. Given these facts, the court concluded:

even in this case where this action has been pending since June 19th, 2001, and the State has been aware of the location of the Accused since December 6th, 2001 but has not pursued prosecution until the Accused finishes his federal sentence, and the Accused has consistently and diligently sought trial in this matter, there is no authority supporting the Accused's request for dismissal of this action.

Id. at 42-3. Also in its December 15 order, the trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal noting:

the question presented in this action-whether the State has an affirmative obligation to pursue prosecution under the current circumstances-is a substantial question of law and of obvious, critical importance, not only in this action, but also in Indiana criminal cases generally.

Id. at 43. This court accepted jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal on March 2, 2010.

On appeal, Fisher argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to discharge. Specifically, Fisher argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, was violated. Fisher also argues that his discharge was required because the State failed to bring him to trial within one year as required by Crim. R. 4(C).

We begin with Crim. R. 4, which provides for the discharge of defendants when the State delays in bringing a defendant to trial. In essence, Crim. R. 4 is Indiana's codification of a defendant's speedy trial rights. Indiana has long held, however, that Crim. R. 4 “does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). In cases involving speedy trial rights of a defendant incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction, we apply the IAD rather than Crim. R. 4. Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242.

By way of background, we note that the IAD is an interstate compact between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government that creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer. See State v. Robinson, 863 N.E.2d 894 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. The IAD's purpose is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions. Id. The IAD process begins when the state bringing charges against a defendant in custody in another IAD jurisdiction files a detainer. Id.; see also I.C. § 35-33-10-4. Once the detainer is filed, the defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement under the IAD that he be brought to trial within 180 days. See I.C. § 35-33-10-4. There is, however, no statutory mandate obligating the State to file a detainer within a set time frame. Indeed, here, the State acknowledges that since learning that Fisher was in federal custody in December 2001, it has taken no action to pursue prosecution of Fisher, including the filing of a detainer under the IAD. Absent the filing of a detainer, the provisions of the IAD are not triggered.

Given that Crim. R. 4 and the IAD do not provide grounds for Fisher's discharge, Fisher's argument must then be confined to a constitutional analysis of his right to a speedy trial. In evaluating whether delay has violated a defendant's constitutional rights, we review issues of fact using a clear error standard and questions of law de novo. State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994 (Ind.2007) (citing United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204 (6th Cir.1996); and United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.1996)), clarified on reh'g on other grounds 875 N.E.2d 701.

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548 (Ind.1995). This “fundamental principle of constitutional law” has long been zealously guarded by our courts. Id. at 551. Thus, to answer the broad question posed by this case: yes, the State has an affirmative duty to pursue prosecution of criminal defendants. Such duty arises out of the criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

The inquiry as to whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment involves balancing a number of factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) any resulting prejudice to the defendant. Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)), trans. denied. [N]one of the four factors ... [is] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Barker analysis is triggered where the delay exceeds one year. Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)). Indiana has employed the same balancing test to evaluate speedy trial claims pursued under our state constitution. Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied.

Here, the State acknowledges that it has an affirmative duty to pursue prosecution of Fisher. This, however,...

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