Negonsott v. Samuels

• Decision Date: 08 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 88-2666,88-2666
• Parties: Emery L. NEGONSOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold SAMUELS and The Attorney General of the State of Kansas, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 818

933 F.2d 818

Emery L. NEGONSOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold SAMUELS and The Attorney General of the State of

Kansas, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-2666.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 8, 1991.

Pamela S. Thompson, Kansas City, Kan., for plaintiff-appellant.

Timothy G. Madden, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Corrections, Topeka, Kan., for defendants-appellees.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

This habeas case requires us to determine the scope of criminal jurisdiction granted by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3243 (1988) to the State of Kansas over state-law offenses committed by Indians on Indian lands. Petitioner Emery L. Negonsott claims that Kansas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute him for aggravated battery because that offense is within exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153 (1988). The district court held that the State had jurisdiction. We agree and conclude that the federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the State of Kansas in section 3243 extends to state-law offenses that are also crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act.

I.

Negonsott belongs to the Kickapoo Tribe and resided during 1985 on the Kickapoo reservation in Brown County, Kansas. He was arrested, charged, and convicted in that year of aggravated battery in the District Court of Brown County for shooting another Kickapoo Indian on the Kickapoo reservation. See Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 21-3414 (1988). The state trial judge, relying on State v. Mitchell, 231 Kan. 144, 642 P.2d 981 (1982), vacated the conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed in a decision overruling Mitchell, and Negonsott's case was remanded for sentencing. See Kansas v. Nioce, 239 Kan. 127, 716 P.2d 585 (1986). Negonsott was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three to ten years.

Negonsott filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District court for the District of Kansas, continuing his claim that the State of Kansas lacked jurisdiction to convict him for the offense of aggravated battery as defined by Kansas state law. The district court denied the writ and Negonsott appeals.

II.

The sole issue in this case is whether 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3243 confers jurisdiction on the State of Kansas to prosecute petitioner, a Kickapoo Indian, for the state-law crime of aggravated battery against another Indian committed on the reservation. This question of statutory interpretation is one of law, which we review de novo. See Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.1990).

In analyzing the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Kansas over crimes involving Indians committed on Indian land, we begin with the language of the relevant statutes. It is elementary that "[i]n construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). If a statute is susceptible to two meanings, a court will choose a meaning that gives full effect to all the provisions of the statute. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 2594, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). Moreover, statutes should be construed so that their provisions are harmonious with each other. See United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir.1982).

The statute under which the State of Kansas claims subject matter jurisdiction provides:

"Jurisdiction is conferred on the State of Kansas over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations, including trust or restricted allotments, within the State of Kansas, to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the State.

"This section shall not deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations."

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3243 (emphasis added). The second sentence of this statute appears to refer in part to the Indian Major Crimes Act, which provides:

"(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, ... within the Indian Country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

"(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense."

18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153 (1988) (emphasis added). A separate statute governs the jurisdiction and venue of the Major Crimes Act as follows:

"All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of and punishable under section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within Indian country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."

18 U.S.C. Sec. 3242 (1988) (emphasis added). ¹

The crimes of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, named in the Major Crimes Act, are defined for purposes of federal jurisdiction at 18 U.S.C. Secs. 113(c) & (f) (1988). Federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians has been held to be exclusive. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 57 L.Ed.2d 489 (1978); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 649 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1400 n. 12, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359, 82 S.Ct. 424, 429, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962); see also Langley v. Ryder, 778 F.2d 1092, 1096 n. 2 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that section 1153 preempts state criminal jurisdiction, citing John ). Negonsott contends that the Kansas Act did not confer jurisdiction on the Kansas state courts over those corresponding state law offenses which are also included in the Major Crimes Act and which are otherwise within exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The first sentence of the Kansas Act at issue here, see supra at 4, unambiguously confers criminal jurisdiction on the State of Kansas over offenses committed by Indians against Indians on Indian reservation land "to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws of the state." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3243 (emphasis added). In other words, the grant of state jurisdiction over all types of state crimes is complete. The second sentence of the Kansas Act appears intended to ensure that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to Kansas state courts over state-law crimes contained in the first sentence would not "deprive" the United States courts of its jurisdiction over federally-defined offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations. An ambiguity exists, however, because as we have noted federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians would otherwise be exclusive. Thus, we must resolve whether Congress intended to grant Kansas courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over the crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, or whether by the second sentence of the Kansas Act Congress intended to retain exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over those specific crimes.

The second sentence of the Kansas Act is of little help in resolving this conflict, since the words "shall not deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction" may be read in at least two ways. Congress may have intended, as argued by Negonsott, that the Kansas Act not deprive the federal court of any exclusive jurisdiction it enjoyed under existing law. Or, Congress may have meant to preserve the scope of federal jurisdiction over federally-defined crimes on Indian land, while modifying the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in favor of concurrent jurisdiction where the federally defined crimes and crimes under Kansas law overlapped.

In resolving this ambiguity, we are mindful that " 'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.' " Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2112, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976) (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 42, 63 L.Ed. 138 (1918)). However, "statutory provisions which are not clear on their face may "be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.' " Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n. 17, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1020 n. 17, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (citing DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1094, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975)); see also Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir.1986). We accordingly look to legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to affect the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over enumerated major crimes committed by Indians by passing the Kansas Act.

In enacting the Kansas Act, both the House and Senate Committees on Indian Affairs submitted reports. These reports incorporated a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior to the Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs concerning the bill. The letter explained the problems the legislation was designed to address and how the bill intended to solve them. See Letter from ...