Anderson v. Holy See

Citation934 F.Supp.2d 954
Decision Date19 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11 C 7188.,11 C 7188.
PartiesCharles ANDERSON, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of All Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs, v. HOLY SEE, a foreign sovereign; The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a corporation sole, individually, and on behalf of all other Roman Catholic Archdioceses, Dioceses, Exarchates and/or Eparchies, as Agents of the Holy See and Necessary Parties Herein, in the United States of America, the District of Columbia, and Its Territories and Protectorates within the U.S. Commonwealth, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

James Lowell Glass, Jr., Law Office of James L. Glass, Robert A. Holstein, Holstein Law Offices LLC, Jeffrey J. Antonelli, Law Office Of Jeffrey J Antonelli Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Charles Anderson, individually and on behalf of a putative class, brings this action against the Holy See, the Catholic Bishop of Chicago (Bishop) and all administrativeunits of the Roman Catholic Church (“Church”) in the United States, alleging that he was sexually abused by priests and other employees of the Church in the 1950s and 1960s. (R. 1, Compl.) Anderson now moves for the Court to reconsider its July 19, 2012 memorandum opinion and order dismissing Anderson's complaint against the Bishop as time-barred. (R. 45, Pl.'s Rule 59 Mot.; R. 46, Pl.'s Rule 60 Mot.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 11, 2011, Anderson filed a five-count putative class action complaint alleging that he was a victim of sexual abuse by priests and other employees of the Church when he was a child. (R. 1, Compl.) A description of the claims therein and the facts giving rise to the complaint are fully described in the Court's previous opinion. Anderson v. Holy See, 878 F.Supp.2d 923, 928–29 (N.D.Ill.2012). The Court assumes familiarity with those facts. On February 17, 2012, the Bishop filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, Rule 8(a). (R. 18, Def.'s Mot.) This Court granted the Bishop's motion on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and dismissed all claims against the Bishop with prejudice on July 19, 2012. (R. 39, Min. Entry; R. 40, Mem. Op. & Order.) On July 23, 2012, the Court also dismissed the remaining defendant, Holy See, without prejudice for want of valid service. (R. 41, Min. Entry.)

On August 16, 2012, Anderson filed a motion to alter or amend the July 19th Memorandum Opinion and Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) or (d), (R. 45, Pl.'s Rule 59 Mot.), and a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) or (b)(2), (R. 46, Pl.'s Rule 60 Mot.). In his motions to reconsider, Anderson argues that the waiver and various estoppel theories he put forth in the Complaint are mixed questions of law and fact, and thus the Court's dismissal was premature. (R. 45, Pl.'s Rule 59 Mot. ¶ 5.) Anderson additionally attempts to submit “newly discovered” evidence for the Court's consideration. (R. 46, Pl.'s Rule 60 Mot. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Alternatively, Anderson seeks leave to file an amended Count I of his complaint. ( Id. ¶ 8.2.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to reconsider does not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Talano v. NW. Med. Faculty Found., 273 F.3d 757, 760 n. 1 (7th Cir.2001). Thus, a motion that seeks to challenge the merits of a ruling by a district court will automatically be considered as having been filed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir.1994) (“Though the plaintiffs did not file their motion to reconsider pursuant to any one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the fact that it challenges the merits of the district court's decision means that it must fall under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).”) (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether a motion to reconsider comes under Rule 59 or Rule 60, the substance of the motion rather than the form is determinative. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir.2008). Motions for reconsideration under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 are not appropriate vehicles for relitigating arguments that the district court previously rejected, or for arguing issues or presenting evidence that could have been raised during the pendency of the motion presently under reconsideration, Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir.2007). “Once judgment has been entered, there is a presumption that the case is finished, and the burden is on the party who wants to upset that judgment to show the court that there is good reason to set it aside.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir.2009). Whether to grant a motion to reconsider is a matter squarely within the Court's discretion. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir.1996).

Rule 59(e) “essentially enables a district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir.1995). A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) “is permissible when there is newly discovered evidence or there has been a manifest error of law or fact” Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir.2006). A manifest error of law is the “disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A ‘manifest error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party.” Id. To succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, “the movant must ‘clearly establish’ one of the aforementioned grounds for relief.” Harrington, 433 F.3d at 546 (quoting Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 n. 3 (7th Cir.2001)). Furthermore, motions to reconsider sounding under Rule 59(e) should only be granted in rare circumstances. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990).

By contrast, Rule 60(b) is designed to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances, not to address erroneous applications of law. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749. Accordingly, under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order based on, among other reasons, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), or newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2). Rule 60(b) “is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Karraker v. Rent–A–Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 131 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir.1997)).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.2009). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept[ing] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[ing] all inferences in her favor.” Reger Dev. LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.2010). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must overcome “two easy-to-clear hurdles”: (1) “the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests”; and (2) “its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level [.] Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir.2008). “Plausibility” in this context does not imply that a court “should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than not.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.2010). Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Id. In other words, “the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did they happen.” Id.

A plaintiff's failure to timely file a complaint under the governing statuteof limitations is an affirmative defense; as such, it need not be anticipated by the complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Inf. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir.2012). However, when a complaint sets forth “everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense” and plainly reveals that an action is untimely, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id. (citing Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.2009)); Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 383 (7th Cir.2010) (citations omitted) ([I]f it is plain from the complaint that the [statute of limitations] defense is indeed a bar to the suit dismissal is proper without further pleading.”). When reviewing a motion to dismiss a claim based on a state statute of limitations, courts look to state law regarding the statute of limitations and apply any state rules such as equitable estoppel that are an “integral part” of that law. Indep. Trust Corp., 665 F.3d at 935 (citing Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir.2010)).

ANALYSIS
I. Whether the Court committed a manifest error of law

Anderson first asks the Court to reconsider its prior opinion on the basis that it committed a manifest error of law in finding that the 1991 Illinois statute of repose, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13–202.2 (1992), barred Anderson's claims.1 Anderson argues that the waiver and estoppel theories he set forth in the complaint, which the Court rejected, are mixed questions of law and fact that he is entitled to attempt to prove. (R. 45, Pl.'s Rule 59 Mot. ¶ 5.) Anderson also...

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