Wilmington Trust v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Hawaii
| Decision Date | 07 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-70433,90-70433 |
| Citation | 934 F.2d 1026 |
| Parties | , 19 Fed.R.Serv.3d 100 WILMINGTON TRUST and International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Petitioners, v. The UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII, Respondent, and Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, National Association Wartsila Marine Industries, Inc. and Oy Wartsila AB, Real Parties in Interest; VSE Corporation; Theodavies Marine Agencies, Inc.; Pacifico Creative Service, Inc.; the Maritime Institute of Technology and Graduate Studies; International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots and John F. Sokolowski; Hawaii Stevedores, Inc.; H.T. & T. Co., Inc.; McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., Inc.; Matson Services, Inc.; American Ship Management, Inc.; Jas W. Glover, Ltd.; Cosmetics Consultants of Hawaii; Andres Suguitan; Manuela Suguitan; Leon Marvin Yarborough; Timothy C. Aspinall; Martin S. Doten; Velma M. Sullivan; Bethlehem Steel Corporation; and the Lihue Plantation Company, Limited dba Kauai Sugar Storage Company, Other Parties. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John F. Keating, Hill, Betts & Nash, New York City, for petitioners.
Michael Evan Jaffe, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C., for real parties in interest.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.
Before TANG and NOONAN, Circuit Judges, and SHUBB, * District Judge.
I
Petitioners Wilmington Trust, as trustee for the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots ("Union"), and the Union request this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing United States District Judge Samuel P. King to try the Union's claims before a jury. The court has jurisdiction to consider and issue the writ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a). 1
The underlying action was initiated by Respondent Connecticut Bank & Trust Company ("Connecticut Bank"), solely as indenture trustee for Wartsila Marine Industries, Inc. ("Wartsila") a Finnish corporation. The complaint consists of an in rem claim to foreclose a First Preferred Ship Mortgage against the SS Monterey ("vessel"), and a related in personam claim against the owner of the vessel, the SS Monterey Limited Partnership ("Partnership"). 2 The complaint also includes the assertion that "Plaintiff's claim is an Admiralty and Maritime Claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 911 et seq." 3
The Union, though not a named defendant, answered the complaint and filed an in rem claim against the vessel to foreclose a Second Preferred Ship Mortgage and several other claims designated as "counterclaims" ("Counterclaims") against Wartsila. The Union demanded a jury trial. Those Counterclaims include both legal and equitable claims. Independent jurisdictional Wartsila's foreclosure action, and the Union's Counterclaims and foreclosure action, are factually interrelated and arise out of the following transactions. The Union exchanged its ownership interest in the vessel to the Partnership for a second preferred ship mortgage, an interest in the Partnership, and an agreement that the vessel would be staffed exclusively with Union members. One of the purposes of the exchange was to generate capital to refurbish the vessel. The Partnership contracted with Wartsila to refurbish the vessel and Wartsila extended credit to the Partnership in exchange for a first preferred ship mortgage.
grounds are alleged for each claim and their joinder is not contested.
The district court ordered the interlocutory sale of the vessel. Wartsila's indenture trustee, Connecticut Bank, is the named purchaser of the ship on behalf of Wartsila. According to undocumented assertions of counsel, Wartsila is involved in bankruptcy proceedings in Finland, and the Finnish Guaranty Board ("FGB"), a "foreign state" within the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1602-1611, extended a letter of credit to Connecticut Bank on behalf of Wartsila enabling the bank to purchase the vessel at the interlocutory sale.
On July 30, 1990, the district court entered an order striking the Union's timely jury demand for the "reasons set forth in the memoranda of the Plaintiff Connecticut Bank." Connecticut Bank had urged the district court to strike the Union's jury demand on two grounds: first, Wartsila's 9(h) election to proceed within the court's admiralty jurisdiction extinguished any right to a jury trial that the Union may have had; second, Wartsila has a right to a non-jury trial pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. For the reasons discussed below, we order the writ to issue.
II
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy "which is awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of sound judicial discretion." Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U.S. 308, 311-12, 38 S.Ct. 99, 100-01, 62 L.Ed. 309 (1917). Generally, a writ should issue only if the petitioner meets "the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable.' " Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953). The right to a jury trial, however, has occupied an exceptional place in the history of the law of federal mandamus permitting a writ to issue although the petitioner is unable to show a "clear and indisputable" right. See In re Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 239-240, 38 S.Ct. 497, 497-98, 62 L.Ed. 1094 (1918). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472, 82 S.Ct. 894, 897, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511, 79 S.Ct. 948, 957, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) ().
This Court recognizes that a party may seek relief in the form of mandamus to protect the party's right to a jury trial. See Mondor v. United States Dist. Court, 910 F.2d 585, 586-87 (9th Cir.1990); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 698 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir.1983). The only question before us is "whether the district court erred in denying petitioner's request for a jury trial." Mondor, 910 F.2d at 586.
III
The basis for admiralty jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333, which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
The "saving-to-suitors" clause establishes the right of a party to choose whether to proceed within the court's admiralty jurisdiction or general civil jurisdiction when both admiralty and non-admiralty federal jurisdiction exist. See e.g., Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 359-60, 82 S.Ct. 780, 783-84, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962).
Prior to the 1966 merger of law and admiralty, a plaintiff exercised this option by filing a claim on the admiralty side or the civil side of the federal court. Id. With the merger of law and admiralty, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure advisory committee recognized the need for a mechanism to inform the court of a claimant's election to proceed in admiralty on claims cognizable both in admiralty and the court's general civil jurisdiction. Consequently, the committee noted:
Many claims, however, are cognizable by the district courts whether asserted in admiralty or in a civil action, assuming the existence of a nonmaritime ground of jurisdiction. Thus at present the pleader has power to determine procedural consequences by the way in which he exercises the classic privilege given by the saving-to-suitors clause (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333) or by equivalent statutory provisions.
* * * * * *
One of the important procedural consequences is that in the civil action either party may demand a jury trial, while in the suit in admiralty there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.
* * * * * *
It is no part of the purpose of unification to inject a right to jury trial into those admiralty cases in which that right is not provided by statute.... The unified rules must therefore provide some device for preserving the present power of the pleader to determine whether these historically maritime procedures shall be applicable to his claim or not; the pleader must be afforded some means of designating his claim as the counterpart of the present suit in admiralty, where its character as such is not clear.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(h) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment.
Rule 9(h) provides the modern-day mechanism for invoking admiralty jurisdiction of claims that could also be brought within the court's general civil jurisdiction. Rule 9(h) provides in part:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claims as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rule 14(c), 38(e), 82 and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not.
A pleader may thus designate a claim as an "admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)" to inform the court that the pleader has elected to proceed within the court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require trial by jury in admiralty cases, it neither forbids trial by jury nor creates a right to a non-jury...
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