Tillman v. State
| Decision Date | 06 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. SC02-717.,SC02-717. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | Ernest TILLMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Wesley Heidt and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.
The decision under review, Tillman v. State, 807 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), expressly and directly conflicts with Taylor v. State, 740 So.2d 89 (Fla.1st DCA 1999), on the issue of whether section 776.051(1), Florida Statutes (2005), which prohibits the use of force to resist an arrest notwithstanding the illegality of the officer's actions, extends to other types of police-citizen encounters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We conclude that the statute, by its plain terms, applies only to arrest situations. In non-arrest cases, in order to convict a defendant under sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005),1 which define the crimes of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the State must prove that the officer was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties" or "in the lawful execution of any legal duty."2 In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to reach the jury on this element, which is not defined in either statute, trial courts should rely on the statutory and decisional law governing the particular duty in which the officer is engaged. In accord with these determinations, we approve the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Taylor and quash the Fifth District's decision in Tillman.
The Fifth District has summarized the pertinent facts in this case:
[On November 7, 1997,] Deputy Parks Duncan, Jr., was patrolling the Deerfield Subdivision when he observed 20 to 30 people standing in front of five to six houses . . . . Among the group of mostly Hispanic people were five black males standing in the street being loud and boisterous. Duncan approached them and asked them to return to the party. As they left, one of the black males uttered loud obscenities and threatened Officer Duncan.
Due to this threat, Duncan called for back-up. After back-up arrived, Duncan and eight to ten other officers entered the screened pool enclosure at the rear of the house where the party was occurring. At that point, Duncan ... entered to "see if I could determine who made this threat to me." .. .
Deputy Timothy Henriquez testified that he responded to [the] call for backup. Duncan advised him that he had been threatened by two individuals he recognized as possible bank robbers or robbery suspects. Henriquez and other backup officers followed Duncan to the pool enclosure where Henriquez saw the two gentlemen run into the pool enclosure. Duncan pointed out Tillman and Henriquez stopped Tillman inside the pool enclosure. Tillman was wearing a "very heavy jacket" which seemed odd to Henriquez because it was not cold. Henriquez asked Tillman if he could pat him down and Tillman refused, but Henriquez patted him down anyway. Henriquez was concerned about finding weapons on Tillman because he understood that Tillman had threatened Duncan and that Duncan recognized Tillman as having "been accused, or charged at one time or another with armed robbery with weapons." Henriquez did not find any weapons on Tillman.
... Henriquez asked Tillman to sit down but Tillman refused . . . and started to walk away. Henriquez grabbed Tillman's right shoulder, at which point Tillman suddenly spun around and put Henriquez in a headlock. Henriquez attempted to remove himself from Tillman's headlock by dropping to the ground. Just then, other deputies jumped on top of Tillman and Henriquez. Tillman did not release his hold on Henriquez until he was pepper sprayed.
Tillman, 807 So.2d at 107-08.3
The jury found Tillman guilty of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 784.07(2)(d) and resisting an officer with violence pursuant to section 843.01. Tillman argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts because the State failed to present prima facie evidence that the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of his duty—a necessary element of both offenses. Tillman, 807 So.2d at 108.
The Fifth District affirmed Tillman's convictions and sentences. The district court acknowledged that the statutes governing the crimes charged require the State to prove that the officer was lawfully executing a legal duty at the time of the alleged battery or violent resistance. Id. However, the district court cited a line of district court cases that have interpreted section 843.01 in pari materia with section 776.051(1) to hold that the use of force in resisting an arrest by a person reasonably known to be a law enforcement officer is unlawful regardless of whether the arrest is technically illegal. Id. (). The Fifth District explained that it had extended this rule to the crime of battery on a law enforcement officer defined by section 784.07 and had applied it to encounters that fall short of a full-blown arrest, including illegal stops, detentions, and contacts. Id. at 109. Building on this line of precedent, the district court held that while the State must prove that the law enforcement officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, the technical illegality of the officer's actions does not preclude a conviction of resisting with violence or battery on a law enforcement officer. Id. at 110.
The Fifth District expressly declined in this case to follow Taylor. Id. at 109. In Taylor, the First District held section 776.051(1) inapplicable in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting with violence based on a defendant's violent reaction to an officer who entered the defendant's home in response to a noise complaint and attempted to lead him outside. 740 So.2d at 89-91. The First District reversed the convictions because the officer had acted unlawfully in entering the defendant's home without probable cause, permission, or exigent circumstances. Id. at 90-91. The Fifth District in this case distinguished Taylor on the ground that the officer in Tillman entered the home of another person, not the home of the defendant. The Fifth District also concluded that the patdown and detention of Tillman were less intrusive than an arrest, "so Tillman was not justified in using force to resist." Tillman, 807 So.2d at 109.
We granted review to resolve the conflict between Taylor and Tillman on the scope of section 776.051(1).
The issues in this case require us to construe sections 776.051(1), 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 776.051(1) provides:
A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.
Section 784.07 enhances the penalties for crimes against law enforcement officers and other enumerated classes of public servants by reclassifying the crimes of assault and battery committed against these persons. The reclassification from misdemeanor to felony or from a lower degree of felony to a higher degree increases the authorized sentences for the crimes. Section 784.07 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer . . ., a traffic infraction enforcement officer . . ., a parking enforcement specialist . . ., or a security officer employed by the board of trustees of a community college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
....
(d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree.
(Emphasis supplied.) Section 843.01 defines the crime of resisting an officer with violence as follows:
Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree ....
(Emphasis supplied.) The crime has sometimes been described inaccurately as "resisting arrest with violence." See, e.g., State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1996). However, neither the title of the statute, "Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person," nor its explicit terms limit it to arrest scenarios. Cf. N.H. v. State, 890 So.2d 514, 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (). The facts of this case and Taylor demonstrate that section 843.01 encompasses resistance to actions by law enforcement officers other than arrests.
Because the issues we decide are exclusively matters of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Clines v. State, 912 So.2d 550, 555 (Fla.2005). In construing statutes, we first consider the plain meaning of the language used. Id.; State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 2003). When the language is unambiguous and conveys a...
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