Pearson v. Fair

Citation935 F.2d 401
Decision Date08 November 1990
Docket Number90-1272 and 90-1616,Nos. 89-2051,90-1271,s. 89-2051
PartiesDonald PEARSON, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Michael FAIR, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Donald PEARSON, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael FAIR, et al., Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
Hoag & Eliot were on brief, for Donald Pearson et al

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, SELYA, Circuit Judge, and LAGUEUX, * District Judge.

LAGUEUX, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are past or present patients at the Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons (the "Treatment Center"), a state institution located in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. Defendants are various state officials with authority over the Treatment Center, including the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, the Administrator of the Treatment Center, and the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of M.C.I. Bridgewater.

At trial, plaintiffs challenged the sequestration policy and procedure employed at the Treatment Center. They argued that consent decrees entered in King v. Greenblatt required the defendants to observe clinical standards when sequestering Treatment Center patients. For relief, plaintiffs sought enforcement or modification of the decrees and civil contempt for defendants' alleged violations of the terms of the decrees.

I. INTRODUCTION

Judge Mazzone consolidated this case with another dealing with the adequacy of treatment in the Treatment Center and presided over successive trials in the Spring of 1989. We decided the appeals of the issues raised in the adequacy of treatment cases in Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir.1991) (the so-called Bruder litigation). This opinion concerns only the matters raised in the so-called Pearson litigation.

The appeals stem from three distinct opinions of the District Court. First, plaintiffs appeal from the District Court's underlying judgment on the merits of the sequestration dispute. The District Court declined to modify the consent decrees to conform with plaintiffs' interpretation, and therefore dismissed the complaint. 1 On appeal, plaintiffs challenge several aspects of that opinion. They argue that the consent decrees themselves plainly require imposition of clinical standards to sequestrations at the Treatment Center. Even if that is not true, they contend, the equal protection clause and the doctrine of substantive due process constitutionally require that result. Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in failing to find that the defendants violated procedural due process. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the District Court's alleged failure to award final relief violated Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The second opinion appealed from concerns attorneys' fees. Shortly after trial, plaintiffs moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $673,558.00. The District Court awarded plaintiffs approximately one-tenth of their requested amount, a decision which both sides appeal. 2

The third opinion appealed from is the District Court's denial of plaintiffs' "Motion for Enforcement, Clarification, or Modification of Previous Court Orders." This motion, made approximately nine months after the District Court's sequestration For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court's opinions on the underlying sequestration dispute and on the MPU controversy. We vacate the District Court's decision on attorneys' fees and remand that cause for further proceedings.

opinion, challenged the defendants' decision to place a Treatment Center patient in the new Minimum Privilege Unit (the "MPU"). The plaintiffs appeal the denial of that motion.

II. BACKGROUND

An overview of the Treatment Center and its purposes was provided in Langton, rendering such an undertaking unnecessary here. In addition, this Court has previously outlined the King litigation and sees no purpose in reiterating that here. See Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163 (1st Cir.1986) (per curiam). Suffice it to say that two consent decrees concerning the Treatment Center emanated from the King litigation. The first decree was filed on June 3, 1974, and the second, a supplemental decree, was entered eight days later. Attached to the supplemental decree was a document entitled "Policies and Procedures Concerning Inappropriate and Unacceptable Behavior" (the "Policies"). The text of both the decrees and the Policies is set out in the appendices.

A. Procedural Path

The procedural path of the underlying sequestration dispute is long and rocky. The District Court expertly summarized the course of the litigation in its unpublished opinion. That course is reviewed here, with acknowledgements to the comprehensive history provided by the District Court's opinion.

The Pearson complaint was filed pro se on December 20, 1981 by six Treatment Center patients. An amended complaint was filed on January 20, 1982, by which time plaintiffs were represented by counsel. The District Court allowed a seventh plaintiff, Calvin Tate, also a Treatment Center patient, to intervene on May 27, 1988. 3 Class certification in this action has never been sought.

The thrust of plaintiffs' complaint is that the sequestration practices employed at the Treatment Center violate the terms of the King consent decrees. 4 Plaintiffs argue that sequestration practices must accord with generally accepted clinical standards. They point to the standards in M.G.L.A. Chapter 123, Section 21 as evidence of generally accepted clinical standards. 5

The history of the sequestration litigation is best understood by following the plaintiffs' many motions for injunctive relief. These motions sought to remedy alleged violations of the decrees and force the defendants to follow clinical standards when sequestering patients.

1. History Before Remand

Plaintiffs first requested a temporary restraining order on October 25, 1982. The motion sought to prevent the continued sequestration of plaintiff Gagne in a manner allegedly inconsistent with King. Gagne was sequestered on September 30, 1982 because a nine-inch long home-made knife was discovered in a cabinet to which he had access and because he had a history of assaultive or threatening behavior that sometimes involved the use of a knife.

Judge Tauro denied plaintiffs' motion for the temporary restraining order and referred the matter to Magistrate Collings. In a detailed report dated December 9, 1982, the Magistrate determined that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction should be allowed in part. He recommended Plaintiffs next requested injunctive relief on September 13, 1983. Complaining still about the sequestration of Gagne, this motion sought contempt, sanctions, and another preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that Gagne had continued to be sequestered in violation of King and the Court's earlier order. Further, they contended that the hearing provided to Gagne was inadequate. Judge Tauro again referred the matter to the Magistrate. Magistrate Collings held hearings in October and November of 1983. On May 2, 1984, he counselled denial of plaintiffs' motion in a fifty-two page report and recommendation.

that defendants be enjoined from continuing Gagne's sequestration until they provided him with a hearing as required by the Policies. Defendants provided Gagne with a hearing on December 30, 1982. Judge Tauro adopted the Magistrate's report and recommendation on February 9, 1983.

The Magistrate found that the defendants substantially complied with King and the Policies. He explicitly found that Gagne had not been sequestered as punishment; rather he concluded that sequestration was the only way for the Treatment Center staff to treat him and secure the safety of other patients. The Magistrate also determined that all aspects of Gagne's December, 1982 hearing were sufficient, and advised denial of injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs objected to the Magistrate's report. In November of 1984, a hearing was held before Judge Tauro and the matter was taken under advisement. Extensive settlement discussions between the parties ensued. Approximately one year later, on November 19, 1985, following the Court's suggestions, the defendants filed "Revised Policies." 6 In March of 1986, the plaintiffs moved again for contempt and a preliminary injunction. Finally, on April 4, 1986, Judge Tauro entered a final order purporting to dispose of all pending matters in the case. 7 The order denied plaintiffs' motion for a finding of contempt, sanctions, and preliminary injunction. It also ordered the defendants to comply with the King consent decrees and the Revised Policies in all future incidents of sequestration.

Both parties appealed Judge Tauro's order. This Court vacated the final order on the grounds that the District Court "fashion[ed] definitive relief without taking any evidence" and failed to make accompanying findings of fact or conclusions of law. Pearson v. Fair, 808 F.2d 163, 165 (1st Cir.1986) (per curiam). The case was remanded and reassigned to Judge Young.

2. History After Remand

After remand the plaintiffs renewed their series of motions seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Between July and December of 1988, these motions primarily concerned the sequestration of plaintiff Tate.

On July 12, 1988, plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief to remedy the sequestration of Tate, which allegedly violated both the King consent decrees and the...

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