Griffin v. Lockhart

• Citation: 935 F.2d 926
• Decision Date: 29 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-2844,89-2844
• Parties: Wesley GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 926

935 F.2d 926

Wesley GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.

No. 89-2844.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 1990.

Decided May 29, 1991.

Daniel D. Becker, Hot Springs, Ark., for appellant.

Joseph V. Svoboda, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before MAGILL and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Wesley Griffin was convicted in an Arkansas state court of interference with a law enforcement officer with the use of a firearm. He appeals from the district court order dismissing his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988). Griffin asserts that because there was sufficient doubt about his mental competency to stand trial, the state trial court denied him due process by not holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve the question. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Griffin was charged by information in June 1987 with interference with a law enforcement officer and criminal trespass (the latter charge was nolle prossed before trial). Before arraignment, Griffin filed a notice putting in issue his fitness to proceed and notifying the court of his intention to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect. Griffin also filed a motion requesting a court-ordered mental examination at the state hospital. The trial court held a hearing on Griffin's motion, during which the court expressed concern about the two- or three-month delay involved with an examination at the state hospital. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered that Griffin undergo a preliminary examination at a regional mental health center and stated that "if there is an indication there that he should be sent for further testing, the Court will direct him." Trial Transcript and Documents vol. I, at 103.

The trial court's order required that the director of the mental health center provide a written report and findings in accord with Arkansas Statutes section 41-605(4) (now codified at Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 5-2-305(d) (Supp.1989)). This report was to include a finding on Griffin's mental capacity at the time of the offense, a finding on his mental competency for trial, and a description of the nature of the mental health center's examination, "including but not limited to, the names of any tests, medications administered and total length of interviews by the examining physician." Trial Transcript and Documents vol. I, at 8-9.

Following the examination of Griffin, the director of the mental health center sent the following letter (excluding salutation and closing) in reply to the court's order Wesley Griffin was evaluated by James Vasilos, Ph.D. pursuant to court order on 07 14 87. His admitted use of alcohol and substances complicate the issue and make it difficult to answer the questions raised by the court. In staffing this case between myself [Neal Ritter, Ph.D.], James Vasilos, Ph.D., and Gene Watermann, M.D., we were unable to come up with a consensus in answering these questions. For that reason, we recommend a complete evaluation at Rogers Hall [state hospital].

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Id. at 10.

At arraignment on August 6, 1987, Griffin complained to the court that he was sick, "in extreme pain," and without his medication. Id. at 104-05. After the court explained to Griffin that the regional mental health center recommended a complete evaluation at the state hospital, Griffin responded, in part:

They started me on medication and I took it a whole month and they just completely stopped giving it to me. And that caused me to be addicted to that medicine. It wrecks my nerves and everything, you know. So, rather than going through all this to find if I'm crazy--I'm not crazy. I'd rather just go ahead and be judged....

Id. at 105. The court explained to Griffin that an examination at the state hospital would further delay his trial and that the question whether to withdraw his notice and motion regarding competency for trial was for him to decide after consultation with his attorney. Griffin responded:

I'm just in so much depression. I just sent them a letter yesterday stating that if they don't try to get me to the hospital or something, you know, to try to get me some kind of medical treatment, I'm going to go ahead and hang myself off in that cell, because I'm going through too much pain not to have no medicine or somebody to give me x-rays and find out what's causing the pain and the crippling, you know. So, that's all I'm asking for. Is asking for the Court to judge me, or the doctor to give me something to take away the pain.

Id. at 106-07. The court then gave Griffin an opportunity to consult with his attorney, after which Griffin (against his attorney's advice) withdrew his notice and motion. Despite an objection by Griffin's counsel, the court found that Griffin had "intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily" withdrawn his "plea and notice as to mental disease or defect, and that in accordance with" section 41-601 of the Arkansas Statutes, he was "fit to proceed." Id. at 109. (Section 41-601 is now codified at Ark.Code Ann. Sec. 5-2-312 (1987)).

At a pretrial hearing on September 2, 1987, the day of trial, Griffin's attorney again raised the subject of Griffin's mental fitness. Griffin's attorney stated that although he was prepared to go to trial that day he continued to object to the court's ruling permitting Griffin to withdraw his motion. The following exchange then occurred between the trial judge and Griffin:

THE COURT: Do you understand what your attorney is saying, Mr. Griffin?

DEFENDANT GRIFFIN: Yeah. He felt that I should take the treatment.

THE COURT: Sir?

DEFENDANT GRIFFIN: He felt that I should take the treatment.

THE COURT: It is your desire not to? Is that what you're saying?

DEFENDANT GRIFFIN: Yes, sir. I just--I'm wounded and have a few stiff parts on my body, that's all.

THE COURT: You have been able to cooperate with Mr. Becker [Griffin's attorney] in your defense?

DEFENDANT GRIFFIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Discussed the case with him, what witnesses might be called against you, what defenses you might have?

DEFENDANT GRIFFIN: (Affirmative nod).

Id. at 117. Shortly after this exchange, the court permitted the trial to proceed. Griffin was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the court to ten years in prison.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed Griffin's conviction on direct appeal. Griffin v. State, 25 Ark.App. 186, 755 S.W.2d 574 (1988). Griffin filed a petition in federal court seeking habeas relief pursuant to section 2254. The district court, against the recommendation of the magistrate, dismissed Griffin's petition. The sole issue before us is whether the state trial court complied with due process requirements in permitting Griffin to withdraw his notice and motion regarding competency, without an evidentiary hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

Two underlying constitutional principles govern this case. First, the conviction of a mentally incompetent accused is a violation of due process. ¹ See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Wright v. State of Minnesota, 833 F.2d 746, 748 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 1481, 99 L.Ed.2d 709 (1988). Second, due process requires that a hearing be held whenever evidence raises a sufficient doubt about the mental competency of an accused to stand trial. ² See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908; Pate, 383 U.S. at 378, 86 S.Ct. at 838; Collins v. Housewright, 664 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir.1981). The latter principle operates as a safeguard to ensure that the former principle is not violated. Collins, 664 F.2d at 183.

If there is a sufficient doubt about the mental competency of an accused, a trial court has a responsibility to order a hearing sua sponte. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 181, 95 S.Ct. at 908; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842. "Failure to provide an adequate hearing on competency ... deprives a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial." Beans v. Black, 757 F.2d 933, 935 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979, 106 S.Ct. 381, 88 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985). The exact nature and amount of evidence necessary to establish a sufficient doubt is uncertain--"no fixed or immutable signs ... invariably indicate the need" for a hearing. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908. According to the Supreme Court, factors to consider include: (1) evidence of irrational behavior by the accused, (2) the demeanor of the accused at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on the mental competency of the accused to stand trial. Id. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908. Any one of these factors alone can, "in some circumstances, be sufficient." Id. In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that an express doubt by the attorney for the accused is a legitimate factor to consider, but alone is not enough to create a sufficient doubt. Id. at 177 n. 13, 95 S.Ct. at 906 n. 13; see also Collins, 664 F.2d at 184.

In a habeas lawsuit, we generally presume that a state court's factual finding of competency is correct. See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 2264, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (per curiam). But that presumption of correctness does not apply if the accused "did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing" or "was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(6), (7) (1988); see Beans, 757 F.2d at 935. A habeas petitioner, however, has " 'the burden of proving that objective facts known to the trial court' " raised a sufficient doubt. Collins, 664 F.2d at 183 (quoting Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 487, 62 L.Ed.2d 410 (1979)). In our review then we ask ourselves " 'whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge...