Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, NY, 95 Civ. 10409 (WCC).
| Citation | 935 F. Supp. 418 |
| Decision Date | 01 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95 Civ. 10409 (WCC).,95 Civ. 10409 (WCC). |
| Parties | Joseph H. HOLZAPFEL, and Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, and Charles M. Kehoe, Chief of Police, Town of Newburgh Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Chamberlain and Kaufman (Alan S. Kaufman, of counsel), Albany, New York, for Plaintiffs.
Drake, Sommers, Loeb, Tarshis & Catania, P.C. (Daniel J. Schneider, of counsel), Newburgh, New York, for Defendants.
On December 11, 1995, plaintiff Joseph Holzapfel filed this action against defendants Town of Newburgh (the "Town") and Charles M. Kehoe, the Chief of Police for the Town of Newburgh Police Department. Plaintiff has alleged that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to compensate him adequately for "off the clock" activities that he performed as a police dog handler and assistant trainer. Plaintiff has also asserted a quantum meruit claim under New York state law. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), on certain issues relating to his FLSA claim. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is denied.
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff became a police officer in the Town of Newburgh Police Department in September 1990. In September 1991, plaintiff was selected to be a police dog (K-9) handler and was assigned a German Shepherd named Bandit. Due to an injury that he sustained while trying to apprehend a suspect, plaintiff has been on injury leave and unable to do patrol work since May 9, 1995. On or about January 1, 1996, the Town retired Bandit and sold him to plaintiff for one dollar.
Following plaintiff's selection as a K-9 handler, the Town sent plaintiff and Bandit to a fourteen-week training program at the Orange County Sheriff's K-9 training facility. Plaintiff was taught the basics of police K-9 work, including caring for his police dog, obedience training, agility training, tracking, criminal apprehension, searches for articles and building searches. Subsequently, in July 1994, Bandit was certified as being trained in narcotics detection. Plaintiff and defendants agree that some ongoing training is necessary to maintain a police dog's skills. Under the Town's Standard Operating Procedures for police K-9 units, police dog handlers "are encouraged to work their dogs during their tour of duty, when time permits, in areas that they are weak in, or on special training needs as designated by the trainer or Sgt. in charge." Appendix D, at 4, attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law. K-9 officers and police dogs also receive two days of training per month at the Orange County Sheriff's K-9 training facility.
Under the Town's Standard Operating Procedures, each K-9 officer keeps his police dog at his home. The Town pays for the dog's food, for any necessary equipment and for veterinary care. The officer is responsible for feeding the dog once a day, ensuring that the dog has fresh water, brushing the dog once a day, giving the dog its heartworm medicine, keeping its nails clipped, providing the dog with shelter, ensuring that the dog receives appropriate veterinary care and taking every reasonable precaution to maintain a high standard of health for the dog. The officer is also responsible for maintaining the cleanliness of the patrol vehicle to which the officer and dog are assigned.
Plaintiff has asserted that until May 9, 1995, his regularly scheduled shifts as a Town police officer totalled forty hours per week. During that time, plaintiff was paid for sixteen hours per month of training at the Orange County Sheriff's K-9 training facility. Plaintiff has asserted that prior to May 9, 1995, he spent the following amounts of off-duty time caring for and training Bandit:
Prior to May 9, 1995, plaintiff received two hours per week of overtime pay for caring for Bandit during his off-duty hours. Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to overtime pay for the additional 42½ to 43½ off-duty hours per week that he allegedly worked.2
Plaintiff, who is certified as an assistant trainer of police dogs, has also alleged that between early April 1995 and May 9, 1995, he attended approximately 20 eight-hour training classes with Officer Patricola, a Town police officer who had been assigned to be a K-9 officer and whose dog was in basic training during that time. He has asserted that he performed this work in addition to his regular forty hours per week of patrol work and, presumably, in addition to the 44½ to 45½ off-duty hours per week that he allegedly spent caring for and training Bandit. Plaintiff has alleged that he received no compensation for the hours that he spent training Patricola's dog. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to overtime compensation for those hours.
Plaintiff has alleged that between May 9, 1995, when he ceased to do patrol work, and January 1, 1996, when the Town retired Bandit, he continued to care for Bandit in his usual manner, although he no longer spent 20 minutes per day cleaning his assigned patrol car. Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to be compensated for this work as well. According to the complaint, however, these allegations relate to plaintiff's state law quantum meruit claim. See Complaint, at ¶¶ 20-25. Because plaintiff has not sought summary judgment on that claim, we will not consider these allegations at this time.
Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment on his FLSA claim. He requests an order (1) declaring that he is entitled to be paid overtime for the off-duty hours that he spent caring for and training Bandit and training Patricola's police dog, (2) fixing the number of hours per week that plaintiff spent on each activity listed above and (3) declaring that plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages.
Summary judgment should be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law...." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuine issue for trial exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. See id., at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and ... designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden on the nonmoving party is tempered, however, by the rule that "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
An activity constitutes "work," and is compensable under the FLSA, if it involves "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)," or the loss of an employee's time, that is "controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business." Reich v. New York City Transit Authority, 45 F.3d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). The FLSA requires an employer to compensate its employee for "activities performed either before or after the regular work shift ... if those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered employees are employed." Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256, 76 S.Ct. 330, 335, 100 L.Ed. 267 (1956). An employer must pay its employee overtime "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which the employee is employed" for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.3 29 U.S.C. § 207(1).
Turning first to plaintiff's claim for overtime compensation for the off-duty time that he spent caring for and training Bandit, we note that several courts have held, in deciding motions for summary judgment, that a police officer's care and training of his assigned police dog during his off-duty hours is an integral and indispensable part of his work activities. See Treece v. City of Little Rock, 923 F.Supp. 1122, 1125-26 (E.D.Ark. 1996); Andrews v. DuBois, 888 F.Supp. 213, 216-17 (D.Mass.1995); Levering v. District of Columbia, 869 F.Supp. 24, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1994); Truslow v. Spotsylvania County Sheriff, 783 F.Supp. 274, 277-79 (E.D.Va. 1992); see also Reich, 45 F.3d at 650 (dicta); Nichols v. City of Chicago, 789 F.Supp. 1438, 1442-43 (N.D.Ill.1992) (). Therefore, a K-9 officer...
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Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, New York
...and indispensable activities for which plaintiff could be entitled to compensation under the FLSA. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, New York, 935 F.Supp. 418, 422 (S.D.N.Y.1996). However, whether and to what extent plaintiff's off-duty dog-care activities were reasonably necessary was an issu......
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Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, N.Y.
...in District Court After initiating suit, plaintiff moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment. See Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh (Holzapfel I), 935 F.Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Following the trial, the district judge asked counsel for proposed jury instructions and questions, but ultimately f......