Com. v. Ramos

Citation936 A.2d 1097
Decision Date15 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 2035 EDA 2004.,2035 EDA 2004.
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Rigoberto RAMOS, Appellant.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

Shonda Williams, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Jonathan M. Levy, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: JOYCE*, STEVENS, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, KLEIN, BENDER, GANTMAN, McCAFFERY, and PANELLA, JJ.

OPINION BY LALLY-GREEN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellant, Rigoberto Ramos, appeals from the trial court's July 7, 2004 judgment of sentence. We affirm.

¶ 2 The trial court found the following facts:

The relevant facts adduced at trial are as follows: at approximately 7:40 p.m. on the evening of April 29, 2003, Officer Victor Roldan and Officer Brian Dillard were on uniformed bicycle patrol in the area of the 100 block of West Tioga Street in Philadelphia when they were flagged down by a woman. The officers listened to the woman complain about the actions of a nearby man. As the woman told her story to the officers, an automobile drove by. The woman cried out, "There he goes!" and pointed at the driver of the car, later identified as the defendant, Rigoberto Ramos.

Officer Dillard ordered the defendant to stop, and the defendant stopped the car on the 100 block of West Tioga Street. Officer Dillard then approached the vehicle to speak with the driver, but when the officer began to dismount his bicycle, the defendant slammed on the gas and drove away. As the defendant was speeding away, he struck Officer Dillard's bike as he was dismounting it. Luckily, Officer Dillard was able to jump clear of the collision and did not suffer any injuries. His bike was damaged in the collision.

About two or three car lengths further down the street, Officer Roldan watched this scene unfold and began to back-pedal to get out of the defendant's path as he sped down the street. He wasn't fast enough, however, and the defendant's vehicle struck the front tire of his bicycle. Officer Roldan and his bicycle were thrown to the ground, and the defendant then drove the Nissan over the bicycle, missing Officer Roldan's body by only a foot. Officer Roldan suffered a large scrape from his elbow to his wrist, bruising around his ribs, and missed a week's work while recuperating. The defendant then crashed into another car that was double-parked, and was arrested.

The defendant was arraigned on April 30, 2003. On May 22, 2003 the defendant's case became listed as a "protracted matter" and was scheduled to be heard on August 12, 2003. The Quarter Sessions file shows that the Commonwealth was prepared to proceed on August 12, but the Court could not provide a necessary interpreter, and the matter was therefore continued to the next available "protracted matter" date — November 18, 2003. On November 18, the Commonwealth required a continuance because one of the above-listed officers was in training. At the next hearing date — March 24, 2004 — the "protracted matter" was finally resolved and the defendant was held for trial. On April 14, 2004 the defendant was arraigned, and the matter was scheduled for trial before this Court on July 2, 2004. On July 7, 2004, this Court heard the defendant's Rule 600 motion and denied it, finding in its discretion that the delay in bringing the defendant to trial was due to judicial delay and that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in bringing the matter to trial. A waiver trial ensued, at which time this Court adjudged the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault, among other offenses.[1]

...

The Quarter Sessions file reveals that this case suffered extensive delays due to the congestion of the court system. Specifically, a gap of 82 days existed between the May 22, 2003 preliminary hearing date and the August 12, 2003 "protracted matter" hearing date. Though the Quarter Sessions file is silent as to whether August 12 was the earliest possible date for the "protracted matter" hearing to be heard, this Court is aware that three month lead times are typically necessary to schedule "protracted matter" hearings because they require a greater amount of the Court's already meager resources and overburdened docket. Armed with this knowledge, this Court concluded that August 12 was likely the earliest date that the "protracted matter" hearing could be held. These facts led this Court to find that the gap between the May 22, 2003 preliminary hearing date and the August 12, 2003 "protracted matter" hearing date was due to judicial delay — attributable neither to the Commonwealth nor to the defendant — and that an extension of the Rule 600 run date was warranted.

Additionally, this Court found that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing this matter to trial. Prior to the date when the defendant's [Rule] 600 motion was initially heard, the Commonwealth had requested a continuance on only two occasions. The Quarter Sessions file shows that the Commonwealth first required a continuance on August 12 because a Spanish interpreter was needed for one of their witnesses, but the Court could not supply one. The next "protracted matter" listing in courtroom 1003 was scheduled 98 days later, on November 18, 2003. On that date the Commonwealth needed a second continuance because a necessary police officer was in training. The next available date in Room 1003 was on March 24, 2004 — over 120 days later. Given that the Commonwealth was otherwise prepared on August 12, 2003, this Court concluded that the Commonwealth would most likely have been prepared to go to trial well in advance of the Rule 600 run date had it not been for the excessive 224-day delay caused in large part by the difficulty in scheduling "protracted matter" hearings.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/05, at 1-2, 5.

¶ 3 Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

Did not the trial court err by failing to grant Appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, where the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing Appellant to trial within 365 days?

Appellant's Brief at 3.2

¶ 4 We review Appellant's Rule 600 argument according to the following principles:

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In considering [these] matters . . ., courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238-1239 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) appeal denied, 583 Pa. 659, 875 A.2d 1073 (Pa.2005).

¶ 5 Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

...

[(A)](3) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

...

(B) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(C) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom:

(1) the period of time between the filing of the written complaint and the defendant's arrest, provided that the defendant could not be apprehended because his or her whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence;

(2) any period of time for which the defendant expressly waives Rule 600;

(3) such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:

(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant's attorney;

(b) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant's attorney.

...

(G) For defendants on bail after the expiration of 365 days, at any time before trial, the defendant or the defendant's attorney may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard thereon.

If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the Commonwealth...

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  • Commonwealth of Pa. v. Peterson
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • May 4, 2011
    ... ... Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa.Super.2007) ( en banc ) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super.2004) ( en banc )). Rule ... ...
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    ... ... Commonwealth v. Peterson , 19 A.3d 1131, 113435 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos , 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007). Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows: Rule 600. Prompt Trial (A) Commencement of Trial; Time ... See , e.g. , Sci. Games Int'l , Inc. v. Com. , 620 Pa. 175, 66 A.3d 740, 753 (2013) (citing Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh , 608 Pa. 386, 11 A.3d 960, 966 (2011) (reiterating the axiom that ... ...
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    ...of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well.Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc)). Rule 600(A)(2) states that when a co......
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    ... ... In considering [these] matters ... , courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well ...          Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa.Super.2007) ( en banc ) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238-39 (Pa.Super.2004) ( en banc )) ...         ¶ 28 Under Rule 600, there is a distinction between excludable time and excusable delay: ...         "Excludable time" is defined ... ...
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