936 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1991), 89-56207, Broussard v. Violet
|Citation:||936 F.2d 576|
|Party Name:||Thomas R. BROUSSARD, Mollie E., Broussard, Paige R. Parrish, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Arlene VIOLET, Defendant,and Leon A. Blais, et al, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Case Date:||June 21, 1991|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Argued and Submitted Feb. 12, 1991.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV-87-1182-AWT; A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge, Presiding.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
Before FERGUSON, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
Blais appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment, asserting that he is immune from Broussard's section 1983 action by operation of both qualified and absolute immunity. Blais also asserts that Broussard's section 1983 claim against him is barred by a previously executed claim-waiver agreement in which Broussard gave up his potential claims. We affirm in part, and dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction.
Broussard alleges that Blais acted improperly both in requesting and in executing a search warrant.
Blais' claim that he is entitled to absolute immunity for activities relating to his request for a search warrant fails. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-44 & n. 6 (1986) (stating that officers who are sued on the grounds that they have acted improperly in seeking arrest warrants are not entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983, but receive only qualified immunity); Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir.1986) (rejecting a police officer's claim of absolute immunity for his request of an arrest warrant).
Blais also claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on Broussard's claim that he unreasonably sought a warrant. The defendant-officer's immunity is lost if a reasonably well-trained officer in his position would have known that he should not apply for the warrant because he lacked probable cause. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45; Bergquist, 806 F.2d at 1367-68. Malley establishes an objective standard, not a subjective "good faith" standard. Id.
Blais argues that he satisfies Malley's reasonableness standard as a matter of law because he was...
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