Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 90-3728

Decision Date11 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-3728,90-3728
Parties56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 612, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,872, 60 USLW 2139 Young In HONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHILDREN'S MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Louis E. Sigman, Dale D. Pierson, Pasquale A. Fioretto, Baum & Sigman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald F. Peters, Jr., Thomas T. Cavanaugh, Chicago, Ann Haule, Children's Memorial Hospital, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

This case presents a challenge to the validity of a so-called workshare agreement between the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC or Commission) and the Illinois Department Human Resources (IDHR) which governs the initial jurisdiction of the two agencies over employment discrimination complaints filed in Illinois.

Young In Hong was discharged by Children's Memorial Hospital on October 20, 1987. One hundred and eighty-two days later, she attempted to file a discrimination complaint against Children's with the IDHR alleging that the hospital discharged her because of her national origin. Hong was told by state authorities that she was two days too late to file a complaint under Illinois law, but that she could still file with the EEOC because that agency operated under a 300-day federal statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). Hong took this advice; rather than file an untimely complaint with the state, she proceeded to the EEOC where she filed charges against Children's 193 days after her discharge. Soon thereafter, the EEOC granted Hong the right to sue and she filed a Title VII action against Children's in district court. The district court dismissed her suit. The court interpreted Title VII to require plaintiffs to file discrimination claims with the IDHR and await either state resolution of their claim or the passage of sixty days before they could turn to the EEOC for relief under federal law. Because Hong did not comply with this requirement and instead filed initially with the EEOC, the court held that her Title VII suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. Hong appeals the dismissal of her complaint. We reverse.

Under Title VII, in a state like Illinois, which provides an administrative remedy for employment discrimination, a plaintiff may not file a discrimination charge with the EEOC until the charge is first filed with the appropriate state agency and either (1) sixty days has elapsed or (2) the agency terminates its proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(c). 1 This so-called "deferral" mechanism was the product of a legislative compromise in the negotiations leading to the passage of Title VII; it was designed by Congress to give States a " 'reasonable opportunity to act under State law before the commencement of any Federal proceedings.' " EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107, 117, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1672, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting 110 Cong.Rec. 12708 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)); see also id. at 117 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. at 1672 n. 3 (collecting cases); cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2071, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (deferral provisions "give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by the victims of the discrimination").

Not all states, however, have taken advantage of this statutorily mandated opportunity--and we stress that it is an opportunity, not a duty, see Commercial Office Products, 486 U.S. at 118, 108 S.Ct. at 1673--to adjudicate the discrimination claims of their citizens before the federal government is allowed to enter the field. Indeed, many have decided that the deferral process is often inefficient and results in no more than the unnecessary duplication of paperwork and effort by state and federal agencies. See generally, Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae in Commercial Office Products, available on LEXIS (Genfed library, Briefs file) ("Brief for Colorado"). These states--Illinois is one--have chosen to forego their statutory right to initially process employment discrimination claims in certain circumstances. They have done so by entering into so-called "workshare agreements" with the EEOC in which they waive their exclusive right under Title VII to initially process certain claims and categorically defer first rights over those claims to the EEOC. 2 We say "certain claims" because typically--and the agreement at issue here between the IDHR and the EEOC fits the mold--the agreements set out particular categories of discrimination claims over which a state wishes to retain initial jurisdiction and other categories of claims that it would rather shunt directly to the EEOC for initial processing.

To administer the agreement and facilitate the routing of discrimination complaints to the appropriate initial reviewing agency, Illinois has designated a particular employee in the EEOC's regional office to act as its agent. That agent receives discrimination complaints like Hong's that have not been first filed with the state and determines whether Illinois waives its first dibs under the workshare agreement (and therefore the complaint should be initially processed by the EEOC) or whether the state wishes to exercise its jurisdictional prerogative under the Title VII deferral provisions (and thus the complaint should be sent back to the state authorities for further processing). In the former case, the state agent in the EEOC office officially "terminates" state processing of the complaint, so that the EEOC is free under Title VII to begin its own investigatory process. In the latter case, plaintiffs must wait until sixty days have elapsed or until the state terminates the complaint before they can file with the Commission.

In Hong's case, Illinois' designated agent in the EEOC regional office, Mitchell Edison, received her complaint and determined that it was within the category of complaints over which the state did not wish to exercise its right of initial processing. Acting as the state's agent and pursuant to the workshare agreement in force at the time, Edison terminated the state's interest in Hong's complaint. Then, acting in his capacity as an EEOC employee, he deemed the complaint filed with the federal government. All this took place well within the appropriate 300-day federal statute of limitations. What, then, was Hong's mistake?

The mistake, according to the district court, wasn't Hong's as much as that of the state and the EEOC. The court held the workshare agreement to be invalid; it ruled that Hong could not rely on Edison acting as the state's agent to terminate the state's interest in her complaint for the purposes of Title VII. Rather, the district court read Title VII, see supra note 1, to require Hong to physically file her complaint with the state and have the complaint terminated (or have sixty days pass) before she could seek redress at the Commission. The court thought the workshare agreement to be a "shell game" in which Edison acted--improperly--as a "one man IDHR."

[The state's] position basically is that [Edison] was a one-person Illinois Department of Human Rights, and in his capacity as a one-person Illinois Department of Human Rights accepted, decided and terminated the IDHR proceeding sitting in his office, signing a piece of paper. [T]his is from a substantive...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Nolen v. South Bend Public Transp. Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 7 Abril 2000
    ...of whether charges are only filed with the E.E.O.C. Russell, 51 F.3d 746, 750-51; Sofferin, 923 F.2d at 559; Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct. 1372, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1994); Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 812-1......
  • Woodson v. Scott Paper Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 6 Mayo 1997
    ...charge with the EEOC instituted state proceedings within the meaning of § 706(e)(1) of the Civil Rights Act); Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that "workshare agreement can alone effect both initiation and termination of state proceedings and t......
  • Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 02-CV-1451.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 24 Mayo 2007
    ...Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 230 (1997); Hong v. Children's Memorial Hospital, 936 F.2d 967, 970-971 (7th Cir.1991); Griffin v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 883 F.2d 940, 943 (11th 28. Cf. Universal Packaging Corp. v. New ......
  • Puryear v. Roanoke
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 4 Mayo 2000
    ...emphasize that the purpose of Title VII's deferral structure is to facilitate the state's wishes. See also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1991). Congress "clearly foresaw the possibility that States might decline to take advantage of the opportunity for enforcem......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT