Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-4228-SAC.,94-4228-SAC.
• Citation: 936 F. Supp. 805
• Parties: Michaela A. GUDENKAUF, Plaintiff, v. STAUFFER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, d/b/a Stauffer Magazine Group, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

936 F. Supp. 805

Michaela A. GUDENKAUF, Plaintiff, v. STAUFFER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, d/b/a Stauffer Magazine Group, Defendant.

No. 94-4228-SAC.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

August 30, 1996.

Amy C. Bixler, Alan G. Warner, Margaret A. Meiering, Warner, Bixler & Associates, L.L.C., Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.

Michael W. Merriam, Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, Topeka, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CROW, District Judge.

This case comes before the court on the following motions: the plaintiff's motion for costs and attorney fees (Dk. 93); the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law (Dk. 94); and the defendant's motion to determine liability for statutory attorney's fees pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(C) (Dk. 97). The latter two motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff brought this employment discrimination action alleging the employer, Stauffer Communications, Inc. ("Stauffer") terminated her employment on the basis of her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), et seq.; on the basis of her pregnancy in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), et seq.; and on the basis of her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The plaintiff also claimed that Stauffer denied her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The plaintiff also sued Stauffer and Christy Skinner for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In its order filed February 8, 1996, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against both Stauffer and Christy Skinner for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dk. 63). In its order filed February 13, 1996, the court granted Stauffer's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims under the ADA and the FMLA and denied the motion on the PDA claim. (Dk. 64). The jury trial on the remaining PDA claim commenced June 24, 1996. After approximately three days of evidence and six hours of deliberations, the jury returned its verdict finding that the plaintiff's pregnancy was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate her but that the defendant would have still terminated her in the absence of the discriminatory motive. (Dks. 88, 91). The court entered judgment consistent with the verdict on July 1, 1996. (Dk. 92).

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (Dk. 94).

A court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMAL") only when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). The Tenth Circuit reads this rule to mean that "a court may grant the motion `only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position.'" Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Q.E.R., Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989)). The court "must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the non-moving party, and refrain from weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our judgment for that of the jury." Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1994) (citation omitted); see Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1996) (No. 96-195).

In its summary judgment motion, Stauffer did not contest the plaintiff's ability to prove a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. Instead, Stauffer said it fired the plaintiff for poor job performance and argued that the plaintiff was unable to prove pretext. In its JMAL motion, Stauffer again refers to the plaintiff's poor job performance but now argues that evidence of poor performance precludes the plaintiff from proving a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant's current version of the same argument is also without merit.

In a Title VII wrongful termination claim, one of the elements to a prima facie case is that the plaintiff "was qualified and satisfactorily performing her job." Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir.1993). The Tenth Circuit, however, has held that an employer's proffered reason for taking an adverse action is not be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir.1992); MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F.2d 1115, 1120 (10th Cir.1991). In MacDonald, the Tenth Circuit said:

a plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of discrimination in a discharge case by credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired, ..., or by her own testimony that her work was satisfactory, even when disputed by her employer, ..., or by evidence that she had held her position for a significant period of time,....

941 F.2d at 1121; see also Mayo v. Dillard's Dept. Stores, Inc., 884 F.Supp. 417, 422 (D.Kan.1995).

Gudenkauf proved this element of her prima facie case not only by the fact that at the time of discharge she possessed the same skills and objective qualifications possessed at the time of hiring but also by her own testimony that her performance had been adequate. Stauffer's dissatisfaction with Gudenkauf is a proper issue for rebuttal of the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421 (10th Cir.1991); Mayo, 884 F.Supp. at 423. Rather than pointing but one way, the evidence at trial concerning the plaintiff's performance was sharply conflicting and required the jury to assess the credibility of the different witnesses on this issue. The court is satisfied that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which the jury could find that the plaintiff's pregnancy was a motivating factor in Stauffer's decision to terminate her. The defendant's JMAL motion is denied.

MOTION TO DETERMINE LIABILITY FOR STATUTORY ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(C) (Dk. 97).

By its motion, Stauffer challenges the plaintiff's right to an award of any attorneys' fees on the basis that the "plaintiff is not a prevailing party and therefore not entitled to any attorneys' fees or costs." (Dk. 98, ¶¶ 4, 5) Relying on a quartet of Supreme Court decisions addressing the definition of "prevailing party," Stauffer concludes that the plaintiff is disqualified from an attorneys' fees award because she did not receive any relief and because the judgment did not affect the legal relationship of the parties.

This argument ignores the plain wording of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which provides:

On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court —

(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and

(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).

This statute is one of the provisions passed by Congress as part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Unlike the existing attorney's fees provisions in the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not use or even refer to the term, "prevailing party." In 1991, Congress plainly intended to do more than draft a provision that would be redundant with § 2000e-5(k). Rather than limit an attorney's fee award to the same parties already entitled to recover fees under existing statutes, Congress drafted this new provision so as to define the circumstances under which "an individual," as opposed to a "prevailing party," could recover. Those circumstances are spelled out: (1) that the individual proves a motivating factor for the adverse employment action was race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and (2) that the respondent proves the same adverse action would have been taken absent the impermissible motivating factor. Consequently, it matters not whether the plaintiff is a "prevailing party" as that term has been defined for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

Alternatively, Stauffer argues the court in its discretion should award no attorney's fees under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The statute appears to grant the judicial discretion to deny a fee request. It expressly provides that, "the court ... may grant ... attorney's fees." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Such language makes the decision to award fees a discretionary one. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, Inc., 88 F.3d 1332, 1335 (4th Cir.1996); See Clay v. Board of Trustees of Neosho County Community College, No. 94-2282-EEO, 1996 WL 370176 (D.Kan. June 19, 1996); Snell v. Reno Hilton Resort, 930 F.Supp. 1428, 1430-31 (D.Nev.1996).

The same discretionary language in § 2000e-5(k) has resulted in the rule that "a prevailing plaintiff `ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances.'" Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 535, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 1034, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)); see also Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir.1994). Given that the plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorneys' fees under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the issue is what special factors or...