Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia

Citation937 F.2d 144
Decision Date22 July 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-4336,90-4336
Parties57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,912, 68 Ed. Law Rep. 575 David DELAHOUSSAYE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW IBERIA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

R. James Kellogg, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Susan Stafford, David G. Sanders, Asst. Attys. Gen., William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., La. Dept. of Justice, Div. of Risk Litigation, Baton Rouge, La., for Slu & Davis.

Laura K. Austin, Andrew H. Meyers, Preis & Kraft, Lafayette, La., for City of New Iberia, Daigre & Davis.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, KING, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

The City of New Iberia, Louisiana (the City) removed the plaintiff-appellant David Delahoussaye (Delahoussaye) from its civil service re-employment list as a result of information indicating that Delahoussaye may have engaged in homosexual activities in the University of Southwestern Louisiana's (the University's) restrooms several years before Delahoussaye began his employment with the City as a police officer. Delahoussaye sued the City and the University, alleging that the City's decision not to rehire him violated, inter alia, his rights to procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the University violated these same rights by revealing information concerning these incidents to the City. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University because it found that the University is an arm of the state and therefore is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City because it concluded that the City's action in removing Delahoussaye from its re-employment list was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to Delahoussaye's employment as a police officer by the City of New Iberia in late November, 1985, he had been detained twice by the University of Southwestern Louisiana's campus police with regard to alleged homosexual activity in the University's public restrooms. On each occasion, the University placed a record of Delahoussaye's detention in its "banned" box but released Delahoussaye without bringing charges. 1 After about a year of employment as a police officer, the City laid off Delahoussaye for economic reasons. Shortly before Delahoussaye was to have been re-employed, a campus police officer informed the New Iberia Police Department (the Department) about Delahoussaye's earlier detentions by the campus police. After a pre-disciplinary hearing the City removed Delahoussaye's name from its civil service re-employment list because the City concluded that Delahoussaye's actions in connection with the detentions were prejudicial to the Department and contrary to the public interest.

Delahoussaye sued the City of New Iberia and the University, alleging, inter alia, that the University violated his rights to due process and equal protection by revealing information concerning the detentions to the Department, and that the City violated these same rights by removing his name from its re-employment list. 2 The City and the University filed separate motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted both motions in separate rulings.

The district court reasoned that the University was an arm of the state of Louisiana and entitled to immunity from damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Because Delahoussaye sued the campus police officer only in his official capacity, the district court concluded that Delahoussaye's action against the officer also must fail. 3 Finally, the district court rejected Delahoussaye's claims against the City because the City's action in removing Delahoussaye from its re-employment list was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting the Department from acts prejudicial to the Department and the public interest. The district court signed one judgment incorporating both rulings, and Delahoussaye filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

On review of a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same substantive standard as the district court. Our task is to determine whether a genuine issue exists concerning any material fact, and if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; City of Madison, Miss. v. Bear Creek Water Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 1057, 1059 (5th Cir.1987). The parties do not dispute the essential facts in this case, and the only question before this court is whether the University and the City were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A. Eleventh Amendment
1. Suit against the state

"The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court by citizens of a state against their own state or a state agency or department." 4 Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir.1986). Although Delahoussaye's amended complaint did not name the state as a party, suit nevertheless may be barred if the state is the real party in interest. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) ("[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Louisiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945)).

Delahoussaye seeks actual and compensatory damages for lost wages and other employment benefits, costs, and attorney's fees. The University argues that any damages awarded to Delahoussaye would be paid from public funds. Such an award is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment, the University reasons, unless the state through the University's Board of Supervisors waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The state has not given an express waiver of its immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 13:5106. Delahoussaye, however, argues that the University is independent of the state and contends that the district court had no evidence before it that an award against the University would be paid from the state treasury.

The University asserts that the state is the real party in interest because the University is an arm of the state. We have stated that "[a] federal court must examine the particular entity in question and its powers and characteristics as created by state law to determine whether the suit is in reality a suit against the state itself." Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital, 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). The following factors must be examined to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state:

(1) whether the state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state;

(2) the source of funds for the entity;

(3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys;

(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;

(5) whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name;

(6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.

Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir.1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir.1986)). We agree with the district court's conclusion that these factors establish that the University of Southwestern Louisiana is an arm of the state.

(1) Whether state law characterizes the agency as an arm of

the state

State law created the University of Southwestern Louisiana, see La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 17:3217, although that fact alone is not conclusive. 5 In addition, state law characterizes the University as an entity within the State Colleges and University system under the supervision and management of the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities (the Board). La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Secs. 17:3351, 17:3217. The University only acts under the direction of the Board, a constitutionally created agency within the Department of Education and therefore a part of the executive branch of state government. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Secs. 17:651, 36:651(D)(1); La. Const. art. 8, Sec. 6; see also Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1059-60 (5th Cir.1987) (finding that state law characterizes the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) and the Charity Hospital in New Orleans as arms of the state because state statute created DHHR as part of the executive branch and Charity Hospital is a part of DHHR).

(2) The source of funds for the entity

"[B]ecause an important goal of the Eleventh Amendment is the protection of state treasuries, the most significant factor in assessing an entity's status is whether a judgment against it will be paid with state funds." McDonald v. Board of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901, 907 (5th Cir.1987). Delahoussaye observes that state law empowers the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities to seek and accept donations, bequests, or other forms of financial assistance on behalf of the University from public or private persons or the federal government. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 17:3351(A)(2). The Board also has the authority to borrow money and issue notes, bonds and certificates of indebtedness. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 17:3351(A)(4).

The University points out, however, that the Board also receives funding from the State of Louisiana as an agency within the executive branch. Although the Board may seek additional sources of funding, state law requires that "the board employ the proceeds of all donations, grants, subscriptions and bequests to a university, or to any school, [or] college ... so as to effectuate the purposes and in...

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