People v. Miller
Decision Date | 23 September 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 107878.,107878. |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Johnny L. MILLER, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., of Sprindfield, John A. Barsanti, State's Atty., of St. Charles (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Jonathan J. Silberman, Asst. Attorneys General, of Chicago, Patrick Delfino, Lawrence M. Bauer, Sally A. Swiss, Office of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender,Deborah K. Pugh, Asst. Appellate Defender, of Office of State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee.
[345 Ill.Dec. 61, 238 Ill.2d 162]
In People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551, 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977), this courtheld that when the State charges a defendant with multiple offenses that arise "from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses" multiple convictions and sentences can be entered. The question we must decide in this case is whether, in determining when one offense is a lesser-included offense of another under King, a court should employ the "charging instrument" approach or the "abstract elements" approach. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the abstract elements approach is the proper analysis to employ.
On December 16, 2004, the defendant, Johnny L. Miller, entered a Walgreens drugstore in Elgin and was observed placing items in his jacket. Predraqe Mrkalj, a security guard, stopped defendant as he was leaving the store. Defendant agreed to accompany Mrkalj and Jim McElmury, the store manager, to an office within the store. There, defendant removed more than 20 items from his jacket. Defendant then pulled a knife out, pointed it at Mrkalj and McElmury, and fled. A woman in a car outside the store picked up defendant and drove off. However, McElmury was able to obtain the license plate number of the car and defendant was subsequently arrested.
Thereafter, defendant was charged with burglary, retail theft, and aggravated assault. The burglary indictment alleged that "defendant, without authority, knowingly entered a building of Walgreen's * * * with the intent to commit therein a theft." The retail theft indictment alleged that "defendant knowingly took possession of certain merchandise for sale in a retail mercantile establishment, Walgreen's, * * * being certain items, having a total value in excess of $150.00, with the intention of depriving the merchant, Walgreen's, permanently of the possession of such merchandise, without paying thefull retail value of such merchandise." The aggravated assault charge stemmed from defendant pointing the knife at Mrkalj and McElmury.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, at which defendant represented himself, the jury returned guilty verdicts on each count. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, but did not include a claim that retail theft was a lesser-included offense of burglary. The motion was denied. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to one year of imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction, seven years on the burglary, and six years on the retail theft, all to run concurrently. Defendant's motion to reduce sentence as excessive was denied.
On direct appeal, defendant argued that his retail theft conviction must be vacated because it is a lesser-included offense of burglary and, pursuant to King, convictions cannot be imposed for both a greater offense and a lesser-included offense. The appellate court agreed and reversed defendant's conviction. No. 2-06-1211 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The appellate court held that, although defendant did not raise the lesser-included offense claim in his posttrial motion, it would review the alleged error under the plain-error doctrine. Applying the charging instrument approach for deciding when
[345 Ill.Dec. 62, 938 N.E.2d 501]
an offense is lesser-included, the appellate court concluded that, because the indictment for burglary alleged that defendant entered the store "with the intent to commit a theft therein," it alleged the "main outline" of retail theft and, therefore, that retail theft was a lesser-included offense of burglary. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's conviction for retail theft had to be vacated under King. In reaching this holding, the appellate court declined to follow People v. Poe, 385 Ill.App.3d 763, 324 Ill.Dec. 667, 896 N.E.2d 453 (2008), wherein the court rejected the charging instrument approach and instead applied the abstract elements approach to determine thattheft was not a lesser-included offense of burglary under King.
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.
In King, this court set forth what has come to be known as the one-act, one-crime doctrine:
King, 66 Ill.2d at 566, 6 Ill.Dec. 891, 363 N.E.2d 838.
Decisions following King have explained that the one-act, one-crime doctrine involves a two-step analysis. People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill.2d 183, 186, 214 Ill.Dec. 451, 661 N.E.2d 305 (1996). First, the court must determine whether the defendant's conduct involved multiple acts or a single act. Multiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act. Second, if the conduct involved multiple acts, the court must determine whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. If an offense is a lesser-included offense, multiple convictions are improper. Rodriguez, 169 Ill.2d at 186, 214 Ill.Dec. 451, 661 N.E.2d 305. The present case is concerned solely with the second step of the King analysis and whether retail theft is a lesser-included offense of burglary.
Section 2-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines a lesser-included offense as an offense established by proofof lesser facts or mental state, or both, than the charged offense. 720 ILCS 5/2-9 (West 2004). This court has noted that this definition provides little guidance because it does not " specify what source to examine in deciding whether a particular offense is a lesser included offense of another." People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994); see also People v. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d 353, 360, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950 (2006); People v. Bryant, 113 Ill.2d 497, 505, 101 Ill.Dec. 825, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986); People v. Mays, 91 Ill.2d 251, 255, 62 Ill.Dec. 945, 437 N.E.2d 633 (1982). In the absence of statutory direction, we have identified three possible methods for determining whether a certain offense is a lesser-included offense of another: (1) the "abstract elements" approach; (2) the "charging instrument" approach; and (3) the
[345 Ill.Dec. 63, 938 N.E.2d 502]
"factual" or "evidence" adduced at trial approach. Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762.
Under the abstract elements approach, a comparison is made of the statutory elements of the two offenses. If all of the elements of one offense are included within a second offense and the first offense contains no element not included in the second offense, the first offense is deemed a lesser-included offense of the second. Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762; Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 360, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950. Although this approach is the most clearly stated and the easiest to apply (J. Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 191, 198 (Winter 1984)), it is the strictest approach in the sense that it is formulaic and rigid, and considers "solely theoretical or practical impossibility." In other words, it must be impossible to commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense. Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762; Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 360, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950.
Under the charging instrument approach, the court looks to the charging instrument to see whether the description of the greater offense contains a "broad foundation" or "main outline" of the lesser offense. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 361, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950. The indictment need not explicitlystate all of the elements of the lesser offense as long as any missing element can be reasonably inferred from the indictment allegations. This is the intermediate approach. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 361, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950.
Lastly, under the evidence or facts approach, the court looks to the facts adduced at trial to determine whether proof of the greater offense necessarily established the lesser offense. This is the broadest and most lenient approach of the three. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d at 360-61, 302 Ill.Dec. 386, 848 N.E.2d 950.
In the case at bar, the appellate court applied the charging instrument approach to determine whether retail theft is a lesser-included offense of burglary under King. The State contends that this was error. The State acknowledges that King itself did not expressly state which...
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