Raymond v. Raymond Corp.

Decision Date06 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 91-1110,91-1110
Citation938 F.2d 1518
Parties33 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1294, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,860 Jeanne RAYMOND, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Roland N. Raymond, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The RAYMOND CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Blake M. Sutton with whom Bouchard & Mallory, P.A. were on brief, Manchester, N.H., for appellant.

Richard P. Campbell with whom Campbell and Associates Professional Corporation, Boston, Mass., Patrick Schmidt and Quarles & Brady were on brief, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant, appellee.

Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and TORRES *, District Judge.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

In this strict product liability diversity action, plaintiff-appellant Jeanne Raymond, on behalf of herself and as administratrix of her husband Roland Raymond's estate, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denying her motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The plaintiff raises five evidentiary issues on appeal and also contends that a new trial is mandated by the existence of newly discovered evidence. We conclude that neither a judgment notwithstanding the verdict nor a new trial is warranted.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from an accident which occurred on April 9, 1987, on the premises of Edgcomb Metals ("Edgcomb") in Nashua, New Hampshire. Plaintiff's decedent, Roland Raymond, an Edgcomb employee, was operating a sideloader in the course of his employment. The sideloader, known as a Model 75, was manufactured and sold by defendant Raymond Corporation in 1981. 1

The accident occurred when the sideloader being operated by Roland Raymond collided with a steel channel beam which protruded into the aisle in the path of the sideloader. The beam broke through a rear-corner support post on the sideloader, pierced the operator's compartment and struck Raymond, causing him severe injuries from which he died six days later.

Decedent's estate brought suit against defendant, alleging that the sideloader was defectively designed and manufactured because 1) the vertical support post should have had full penetration welds attaching the top and bottom of the support to the base and roof of the sideloader; 2) the two rear support posts should have been connected by a backplate; and 3) the defendant failed to provide adequate warnings of these dangerous conditions.

The case was tried before a jury which returned a verdict for the defendant. Specifically, the jury responded "no" to the following special question: "Based on a preponderance of the evidence, do you find that the sideloader manufactured by the defendant Raymond Corporation was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user, at the time it was manufactured and sold?"

On October 30, 1990, plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. This motion was denied by order of the district court on December 7, 1990. This appeal followed.

II. STRICT LIABILITY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

New Hampshire has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A theory of products liability:

Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The Rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

See Fortier v. Olin Corporation, 840 F.2d 98, 99 (1st Cir.1988); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 118 N.H. 802, 813, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978); Buttrick v. Lessard, 110 N.H. 36, 38-39, 260 A.2d 111, 113 (1969).

The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user," Thibault, 118 N.H. at 807, 395 A.2d at 846 (citations omitted), as well as to show that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the product was purchased. Id. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847 (citing McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 N.H. 265, 267, 281 A.2d 587, 588 (1971)); Fortier, 840 F.2d at 100. We consider appellant's evidentiary claims in light of this standard.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge must view all the evidence and inferences flowing therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hendricks & Assoc., Inc. v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209, 214 (1st Cir.1991); Austin v. Lincoln Equipment Assoc., Inc., 888 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir.1989); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 558 (1st Cir.1989). Such a motion should be granted only if, as a matter of law, the evidence would lead a reasonable jury to only one conclusion--that the moving party was entitled to judgment. Hendricks, 923 F.2d at 214; Austin, 888 F.2d at 937; Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 558. In making this determination, the district court " 'may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.' " Hendricks, 923 F.2d at 214 (citations omitted). A denial of judgment n.o.v. is reviewed de novo; in reviewing the decision we utilize the same standards as those applied by the trial court. Hendricks, 923 F.2d at 214; Austin, 888 F.2d at 937.

Upon reviewing the evidence, we find that the jury acted within its bounds as factfinder in determining that the Model 75 sideloader was not unreasonably dangerous at the time of manufacture and sale. Defendant presented evidence showing that the Model 75 sideloader as designed met all American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") specifications in effect at that date. Defendant's expert testified that the addition of a backplate as advocated by the plaintiff would neither have prevented nor mitigated decedent's injuries.

In addition, there was undisputed evidence at trial that the sideloader's corner support post did not comport with defendant's design specifications. The Raymond design showed that the post had beveled edges, which this post did not, and that it should be attached to the frame with thicker welds than were used on this post. Plaintiff introduced testimony which, if believed, proved that neither the corner support post nor its welds had been repaired or replaced between 1985 and 1987, when the accident occurred. There was, however, no "repair" evidence at all for the years 1981 to 1985. Thus, even if the jury found that the sideloader was unreasonably dangerous at the time of the accident, it could have determined that this was due to faulty repairs conducted subsequent to the manufacture. This would be consistent with their finding that the sideloader was not unreasonably dangerous at the time of manufacture and sale.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to find as it did. The district court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

IV. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

In determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial, the district court must give due deference to " 'the jury's constitutionally sanctioned role as finder of fact.' " Hendricks, 923 F.2d at 217 (citations omitted). A trial judge may only displace the jury's verdict upon a finding that the verdict is "against the clear weight of the evidence." Id. at 217 (quoting Coffran v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc., 683 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 571, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982)).

A trial judge's denial of a motion to grant a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 217; Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 558. We will only reverse the district court's decision "if the verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the evidence as to constitute a miscarriage of justice." Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 558 (citations omitted).

Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's findings, the main issue is whether the district court erred as alleged by the plaintiff and, if so, whether any errors are sufficient to necessitate a new trial. We thus review each of the plaintiff's six arguments seriatim. We consider the relevance of the alleged errors only as they relate to the issue of whether the sideloader was unreasonably dangerous at the time of manufacture and sale, as this was the only question reached by the jury.

A. Design Modifications

The sideloader involved in this case was a Model 75 sideloader, which was manufactured and sold by defendant in 1981. Plaintiff claimed that the addition of a backplate connecting the two rear support posts with more substantial welds would have either prevented or mitigated the effect of the accident.

In its attempt to show that defendant had knowledge that the sideloader was unreasonably dangerous without these modifications, plaintiff moved in limine to introduce evidence regarding the addition of a backplate to Raymond's Model 76 sideloader, which was first manufactured in 1983. This was two years subsequent to the manufacture of the sideloader at issue. Plaintiff also sought to introduce evidence of post-accident modifications consisting of the addition of a backplate and more secure welding made by Edgcomb to the Model 75 sideloader involved in the dispute. The district court denied both motions under Federal...

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