Meridian Intern. Logistics, Inc. v. U.S., 90-55281

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
Citation939 F.2d 740
Docket NumberNo. 90-55281,90-55281
PartiesMERIDIAN INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date19 July 1991

Mark P. Robinson and John D. Rowell, Robinson, Robinson & Phillips, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Marleigh D. Dover, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before TANG, REINHARDT and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

Meridian International Logistics, Inc. ("Meridian"), appeals from the district court's order dismissing its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Meridian originally brought this libel and slander action against Thomas Gates, an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After the United States Attorney certified that Gates was acting within the scope of his FBI employment in taking the actions giving rise to Meridian's complaint, the United States was substituted as defendant. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Federal Tort Claims Act 1) exempts libel and slander actions, and 2) requires a claimant to file an administrative claim prior to proceeding against the United States. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 1987, the FBI began an investigation of the activities of Robert Booth Nichols. Nichols, acting through Meridian, was suspected of being involved in organized crime. The investigation was led by Special Agent Thomas Gates, operating out of the FBI's Los Angeles Division. During the course of his investigation, Gates learned that Nichols had potential illegal contacts with individuals in both Japan and Australia. Gates pursued these leads through Japanese and Australian legal attaches.

On June 16, 1989, Meridian filed a complaint for libel, slander, and interference with contractual relationships in California On July 20, 1989, the United States Attorney certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d), that Gates was acting within the scope of his FBI employment in taking the actions which gave rise to Meridian's complaint. As a result of the certification, the action was removed to United States District Court for the Central District of California and the United States was substituted into the action as the sole defendant. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(2).

state court against Gates in his individual capacity. In the complaint, Meridian alleges that Gates, during his investigation, related to the Australian Federal Police and various individuals in Australia and Japan that Meridian was involved in organized crime and various specific fraudulent activities. Meridian further alleges that Gates was acting outside the scope of his employment when he initiated the contacts in Australia and Japan. The complaint prays for damages in the amount of $11,000,000.

On July 26, 1989, the United States moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of its motion, the United States submitted declarations from Gates, his supervisor, and an attorney with the Department of Justice (the "FBI declarations"). The United States applied ex parte to have the FBI declarations sealed, and the district court granted the application. The Government asserted that the FBI declarations support a conclusion that Gates was acting within the scope of his employment at all times material to Meridian's complaint. In opposition to the United States' motion to dismiss, Meridian filed a declaration from Ted Gunderson, a former special agent with the FBI. Gunderson declared that the types of foreign contacts made by Gates would never, under FBI policies, be initiated by an agent assigned to the Los Angeles field office.

On September 25, 1989, the district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Based on the United States Attorney's certification and the FBI declarations, which were reviewed in camera, the court determined that Gates was "at all times material to the incidents alleged in the Complaint, acting within the course and scope of his employment for the United States of America." The court's determination of the scope of employment issue guaranteed both the substitution of the United States as the lone defendant and the resulting applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The court then dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the FTCA 1) excepts claims arising out of libel, slander, and interference with contractual rights, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h), and 2) requires that a claimant first present any claim to the appropriate federal agency. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a).

DISCUSSION

Meridian appeals from the district court's order dismissing its complaint. We review a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Kruso v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); Jensen v. IRS, 835 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1987). Meridian focuses on the district court's granting of the Government's ex parte application to have the FBI declarations sealed, the in camera inspection of the declarations, and the court's conclusion that Gates was operating within the scope of his employment. In order to illustrate best the relevance of the district court's scope of employment determination to the ultimate dismissal of Meridian's complaint, we will first discuss the court's subject matter jurisdiction assuming that Gates acted within the scope of his employment. Then, we will address the district court's review of the scope of employment issue.

A. The District Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671 et seq., provides a remedy for persons injured by the tortious activity of an employee of the United States, where the employee was "acting within the scope of his office or employment...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). However, there are certain limitations to the right to bring suit against the United States under the FTCA, two of which apply to Meridian's suit. First, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) specifically excepts from the FTCA "[a]ny claim arising out of ... libel, slander, ... or interference with contractual rights...." Section 2680(h)'s exceptions are jurisdictional in nature. See Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426, 1426-27 (9th Cir.1987). It is uncontroverted that Meridian's complaint involves, and is limited to, libel, slander, and interference with contractual rights. Therefore, if Gates was acting within the scope of his employment, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Meridian's suit pursuant to Sec. 2680(h).

Second, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) establishes that a FTCA action "shall not be instituted" against the United States unless the claimant first presents his claim to the "appropriate Federal agency" and the claim is denied. The claim requirement of Sec. 2675(a) is a jurisdictional limitation. Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir.1977). It is uncontroverted that Meridian failed to present its claim to a federal agency prior to the initiation of this suit. Therefore, if Gates was acting within the scope of his employment, the district court additionally lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Meridian's suit pursuant to Sec. 2675(a).

B. The District Court's Review of the Scope of Employment Certification

If Gates was acting within the scope of his employment, the United States is the proper defendant, and, as discussed above, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, the only means of survival for Meridian's action is as a suit against Gates in his personal capacity. 1 Such a suit is only possible if the substitution of the United States as the defendant can be reversed by a showing that Gates was in fact acting beyond the scope of his employment in taking the alleged actions. Our analysis of the substitution issue consists of two steps. First, we address the district court's power to review the Government's scope of employment certification. Second, we consider the district court's conclusion that the substitution was proper because Gates was acting within the scope of his employment.

1. The District Court's Power to Review the Scope of Employment Certification

The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679 (the "Reform Act"), authorizes the Attorney General to certify 2 that a United States employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of an incident which gave rise to a civil claim. 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2679(d)(1) and (2). 3 Once certification is given in a civil action, the Reform Act mandates both the substitution of the United States as the defendant, id., and, if initiated in state court, the removal of the action to the United States District Court. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(2).

The instant case illustrates the operation of the Reform Act. Meridian initiated the action against Gates, as an individual, in California state court. Pursuant to Sec. 2679(d)(2), the action was removed to federal court and the United States was substituted for Gates as the lone defendant. However, in district court, Meridian challenged the Government's scope certification, and the district court entertained the challenge. The Reform Act is silent on the capacity of the district court to review scope certifications. We must, as a threshold matter, consider whether the Government's certification under Sec. 2679(d) is binding for the purpose of substitution of the Government or whether the certification is subject to judicial review. 4 This is an issue of first impression...

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