Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah

Decision Date13 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 950475,950475
Citation317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,939 P.2d 177
Parties317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 Barbara DRAKE, Respondent, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, FHP of Utah, and Transamerica Insurance Company, Petitioners.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, for Drake.

Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Industrial Commission.

Theodore E. Kanell, Todd N. Hallock, Salt Lake City, for Transamerica Insurance and FHP.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

DURHAM, Justice:

We granted certiorari in this case to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Drake v. Industrial Commission, 904 P.2d 203 (Ct.App.1995), cert. granted, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996), reversing the Industrial Commission and granting workers' compensation benefits to Barbara Drake for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Petitioners Industrial Commission of Utah, FHP of Utah, and Transamerica Insurance Company (collectively referred to as FHP) contend that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard when it reviewed the Commission's decision and erred in awarding benefits. We agree and reverse.

The facts in this case are undisputed. At the time of her accident, Drake was employed by FHP as a referral coordinator 1 in its Salt Lake City office. At some point during her employment, but several months before Drake's accident, FHP began to experience delays with its normal courier in the delivery of referrals to Salt Lake from various offices around the state. Because Drake lived in Ogden, Drake's supervisor asked her to pick up the referrals from the Ogden office two or three days a week on her way home. At the same time, she was also directed to deliver any completed referrals going to Ogden. On the days she made deliveries, Drake took a five- to six-mile detour from her normal route home. Drake was never compensated for her mileage in making these deliveries, nor was she given any extra compensation when the deliveries required her to work more than her eight-hour work day. 2

On August 14, 1991, shortly after Drake had dropped off the referrals at the Ogden office, as she was on her way to pick up her children at their child-care center, Drake was involved in an automobile accident, causing her substantial injuries. Upon denial of coverage by her automobile insurance carrier, Drake applied to the Industrial Commission for workers' compensation benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45. 3

After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) for the Industrial Commission found that Drake's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. The ALJ found that although workers' compensation benefits are generally denied for injuries sustained on the way to or from work, Drake was on a "special errand" and had deviated from her normal route home for the benefit of her employer; therefore, she was still within the course of her employment at the time of her accident. Accordingly, the ALJ granted Drake's claim for benefits.

Upon motion for review, the Industrial Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ. Although the Commission adopted the ALJ's findings of fact, it determined that Drake was not on a special errand when she delivered the referrals. It concluded that the deliveries were part of Drake's regular duties because they were "according to routine." It thus denied benefits pursuant to the recognized "going and coming rule," finding that once Drake left the Ogden office, her activities no longer took place in the course of her employment. 4

On petition for review, the court of appeals reversed. The court began its analysis by stating, "Whether petitioner was injured in the scope and course of her employment presents a question of law which, absent a grant of discretion, this court reviews for correctness." Drake, 904 P.2d at 205 (citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991)). The court then relied specifically upon Stokes v. Industrial Commission, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah.Ct.App.1992), which found that the Commission did not have any discretion to interpret or apply the Workers' Compensation Act. 5 The court then concluded from the facts of the case that Drake's accident did occur while she was still on a special errand. The court relied upon the following facts: (1) Drake "undertook the delivery of referrals between Ogden and Salt Lake City at the request of FHP solely to remedy a problem with FHP's shuttle system"; (2) these deliveries often required Drake to work beyond her regularly scheduled hours; (3) the deliveries required Drake to "make a five-to six-mile detour from her normal route home"; and (4) "FHP ... benefitted by having a referral system that operated in a timely manner." Drake, 904 P.2d at 206-07. The court found insubstantial the fact that Drake had been delivering these referrals regularly two or three times a week for several months before her accident. Id. at 207. It specifically stated that whether the deliveries were part of Drake's regular job duties was "a conclusion of law" and found that the special errand exception "does not require [one-time occurrences] in order for the injured employee to recover." Id.

On certiorari, FHP does not argue that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct legal principles, but contends that it applied the wrong standard of review when it reviewed the Commission's determination that Drake's delivery was not special but was part of her normal job duties. The Commission argues that this determination is a finding of fact and thus the court of appeals erred in applying a "correction of error" standard applicable to questions of law rather than "the absence of substantial evidence" standard employed for the review of questions of fact. Moreover, because Drake did not challenge any of the Commission's findings of fact, FHP argues that the court of appeals was required to accept the Commission's finding that the deliveries were part of Drake's normal job duties as conclusive and erred when it reviewed it de novo.

Essential to any determination of the appropriate standard of review for an issue on appeal is the characterization of that issue as either a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question requiring application of the law to the facts. Where the issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly erroneous. See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). When reviewing the factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 1098, 1099 (Utah 1990); Helf v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah.Ct.App.1995); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). We give deference to the initial decision maker on questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' recollections. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Where the issue is a question of law, however, appellate review gives no deference to the trial judge's or agency's determination, because the appellate court has "the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Id. (citation omitted). The reviewing court therefore applies a "correctness" standard, deciding the matter for itself. Id. However, not all issues fall clearly at one end of the spectrum or the other. Some issues involve mixed questions of "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law." Id. Although we review the underlying empirical facts under a deferential clear error standard, we have recently stated that the legal effect of those facts "is the province of the appellate courts, and no deference need be given a trial court's resolution of such questions of law." State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). Nevertheless, in view of our analysis in Pena, policy considerations and other factors may "lead this court to define a legal standard so that it actually grants some operational discretion to the trial courts applying it." Id. at 282 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36). As a result, a trial court's or agency's application of the law to the facts may, depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate court "with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, --- P.2d ----, ---- (Utah Dec. 31, 1996) (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39). 6

In applying these principles to the instant case, although the empirical facts of Drake's case are reviewable for clear error, the conclusion as to whether those facts qualify Drake for workers' compensation benefits under the special errand rule is reviewable for correctness. Because the underlying and historical facts of this case were undisputed, 7 our inquiry focuses on the degree of discretion that the legal standard for the special errand rule bestows upon the Commission. In other words, how closely should this court review the Commission's conclusion that a given set of facts does or does not constitute a "special errand"? Given the nature of the legal issue, we conclude that the legal standard is one that "conveys a measure of discretion to [the Commission] when applying that standard to a given set of facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.

Scope-of-employment issues are in general highly fact-dependent. Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that "whether or not the injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case." State Tax Comm'n, 685 P.2d at 1053. Whether an employee was injured while on a special errand is also highly fact-sensitive. As a result, we are less inclined to formulate and impose a fact-specific rule of law because of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
127 cases
  • Murray v. Labor Comm'n
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • February 2, 2012
    ...injuries arising out of their employment, therefore ‘alleviat[ing] hardship upon workers and their families.’ ” Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (1965) ). The Act limits......
  • Jeffs v. Stubbs
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • September 1, 1998
    ...1995). On the other hand, we uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Because appellant did not provide a trial transcript on appeal, we assume competent and substantial evidence suppo......
  • Randolph v. State
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 4, 2022
    ...added). And that is a question that appellate courts are in just as good a position to decide as district courts. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah , 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) ("[T]he legal effect of those facts ‘is the province of the appellate courts.’ " (citation omitted)).¶42 Legal sta......
  • Riggs v. Asbestos Corp.
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • April 4, 2013
    ...from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' recollections.” Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). ¶ 27 Union Carbide argues that Warren failed to prove that “Calidria ... causes peritoneal mesothelioma” in general ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 23-4, August 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...court deference. Pena, a landmark standard-of-review case,was published shortly before the 1994 article. In Drake v.Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), counseladroitly argued Pena, not to support the existing standard, butto change it. See id. at 180-82. When counsel convinced ......
  • Utah Standards of Appellate Review – Revised [1]
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 12-8, October 1999
    • Invalid date
    ...deference. Pena, a landmark standard-of-review case, was published shortly before the 1994 article. In Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997), counsel adroitly argued Pena, not to support the existing standard, but to change it. See id. at 180-82. When counsel convinced th......
  • Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 24-1, February 2011
    • Invalid date
    ...appellate courts use correction of error standard in reviewing agency's application of statutory term); Drake v. Indus Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 587-88. The terms application of the law and mixed question of law and fact have been used intercha......
  • Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 23-5, October 2010
    • Invalid date
    ...issues as legal rather than factual or discretionary so as to apply the appropriate standard of review. See Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) ("Essential to any determination of the appropriate standard of review for an issue on appeal is the characterization of that iss......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT