Penneti v. L&T Tech. Servs.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-CV-00525-E |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2023 |
| Parties | RAJESH PENNETI, Plaintiff, v. L&T TECHNOLOGY SERVICES LTD and SONIM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant Sonim Technologies Inc. (Sonim)'s motion for summary judgment (Sonim's Motion), which seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiff Rajesh Penneti's claims against it. Penneti has responded, and Sonim has replied. For the reasons enumerated below, the Court GRANTS Sonim's Motion.
Penneti began working for Defendant L&T Technology Services Ltd (LTTS) in January 2014. (ECF No. 79 at 5). LTTS provides IT staffing services to customers in the medical, IT, and telecom industries. (ECF No. 79 at 5). In 2017, Penneti began treatment with a psychotherapist for depression. (ECF No. 79 at 5). In 2019, a psychiatrist diagnosed Penneti with major depressive disorder and general anxiety disorder. (ECF No. 79 at 5).
In September 2019, LTTS assigned Penneti to work a project at Sonim after LTTS submitted its recommendation of Penneti to Sonim. (ECF No. 71 at 34; ECF No. 79 at 5).[1]On the Sonim project, Penneti worked as a mobile handset protocol field test engineer. (ECF No. 71 at 45). In November 2019, Penneti's physician recommended he take leave from work; on November 26, 2019, Penneti emailed LTTS's human resources that he would like to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). (ECF No. 79 at 6). On December 11, 2019, Penneti submitted a completed FMLA form to LTTS. (ECF No. 79 at 40-48). On January 10, 2020, LTTS approved Penneti's FMLA leave from January 13, 2020 to March 16, 2020. (ECF No. 79 at 8, 49-59).
On January 13, 2020, Bonde-who was Penneti's supervisor at LTTS-emailed Penneti's project Test Manager at Sonim, Rajesekar Dhanasekaran, the following:
Rajesh P who is working on SONIM assignment in Dallas is facing some medical issues, Doctor has suggested him to take some rest hence he has applied FMLA. Doctor has suggested him to take 2 days of leave every week for sometime. He will be taking Monday and Tuesday leave every week from today. Hope this if fine with you [sic]
(ECF No. 79 at 73). That same day, Dhanasekaran responded:
We didn't get any information prior to this email and We are NOT okay with below proposal. We would request the engineer to continue his support till we find a replacement with KT. Also we are unhappy with things happening at FT which is affecting our “QA deliverables”.
(ECF No. 79 at 73). Bonde proposed a plan to Sonim regarding Penneti's leave involving other workers “to minimize the impact on project deliverable.” (ECF No. 44 at 97). On January 14, 2020, Dhanasekaran at Sonim removed Penneti from the Sonim project, effective January 17, 2020. (ECF No. 79 at 72). From March 12, 2020, to May 5, 2020, Penneti worked on a training project at LTTS. (ECF No. 79 at 9). On April 27, 2020, Sonim placed a hold on all further requirements from LTTS because Sonim ended its contract with LTTS. (ECF No. 71 at 50). On May 13, 2020, LTTS terminated Penneti's employment at LTTS. (ECF No. 79 at 9).
On March 8, 2021, Penneti filed his complaint, which asserts claims against Sonim for (i) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (ii) disability discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA); (iii) failure to accommodate disability under the ADA; (iv) failure to accommodate disability under the TCHRA; (v) interference with exercise of rights under the FMLA; and (vi) discrimination and retaliation under the FMLA. Sonim has moved for summary judgment on each of these claims. Having been fully briefed, the Court GRANTS Sonim's Motion for the reasons enumerated hereunder.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and evidence on file show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to a party opposing a summary judgment motion. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). A court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on the motion. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55. Moreover, the evidence the non-movant provides must raise “more than ... some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the non-movant is unable to make such a showing, the court must grant summary judgment. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court there is no genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party with the burden of proof on an issue “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis omitted). When, as here, a nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may demonstrate it is entitled to summary judgment either by (1) submitting evidence that negates the existence of an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or affirmative defense, or (2) arguing there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or affirmative defense. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25 (emphasis added). There is “no genuine issue as to any material fact [if] a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish there is a genuine issue of material fact so that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “[C]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions” will not satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A court “resolve[s] factual controversies in favor of a nonmoving party . . . only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999).
“A party opposing such a summary judgment motion may not rest upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-57). The Fifth Circuit has explained:
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.... “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.” Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992).
Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Regarding assertions of fact, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states:
[i]f a party fails . . . to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [and] (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it[.]
Because several of Penneti's claims allege discrimination or retaliation, the Court provides the following McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework analyses, which are common to employment discrimination and retaliation claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) () (collecting cases); E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014) (addressing ADA discrimination claim under burden- shifting framework); Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2021) ();[2] Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2006) (addressing FMLA retaliation under burden-shifting framework)
“A plaintiff can prove a claim of intentional discrimination by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Gaalla v. Brown, 460 Fed.Appx. 469, 479 (5th Cir. 2012) (addressing racial discrimination). Regarding direct evidence, the Fifth Circuit has explained:
Direct evidence [of discriminatory intent] is evidence...
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