94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96, Rhodes v. State Through Dept. of Transp. and Development

• Decision Date: 20 December 1996
• Citation: 94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96, Rhodes v. State Through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 684 So.2d 1134 (La. App. 1996)
• Parties: 94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana

Page 1134

684 So.2d 1134

94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96

Daniel L. RHODES and Judy Dupre Rhodes, Individually and on Behalf of Their Minor Daughter, Michelle Rhodes v.STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, and State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.

No. 94 CA 1758R.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana First Circuit.

Dec. 20, 1996.

Michael J. Samanie, Houma, for Plaintiffs/1st Appellants, Daniel Rhodes and Judy Dupre Rhodes, et al.

William Dodd, Houma, C.T. Williams and J. Elliott Baker, Metairie, for Defendant/Appellee, State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development.

Jerri Smitko, Houma, for Plaintiffs/1st Appellants, Linda and Bob Watson.

Michael Gee, Thibodaux, for Intervenor/2nd Appellant, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company.

Before CARTER, GONZALES and PARRO, JJ.

[94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 2] CARTER, Judge.

This action for damages arising out of an automobile accident is on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 16, 1991, Linda Watson was traveling north on La. Highway 24 (also known as West Park Avenue) towards the intersection with Oakshire Drive in Houma, Louisiana.At about the same time, Ron Underdonk was traveling west on Oakshire Drive toward the intersection with La. Highway 24 in an automobile owned by Daniel Rhodes; Michelle Rhodes was a guest passenger in that automobile.The intersection of La. Highway 24 and Oakshire was controlled by a semaphore traffic control signal.As Underdonk approached the intersection of La. Highway 24 and Oakshire Drive, the westbound lane of Oakshire was controlled by a green traffic light, and the traffic signal for the northbound lane of La. Highway 24 was also green.Upon entering the intersection, the vehicle Underdonk was operating was struck by the vehicle operated by Watson.As a result of this collision, Michelle Rhodes and Linda Watson sustained injuries.

On July 12, 1991, Daniel and Judy Rhodes, individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, Michelle Rhodes, (Rhodes) filed an action for damages ¹ against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development(DOTD), and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections(DPS).Rhodes alleged that DOTD was negligent in failing to properly inspect and maintain the traffic control signal, in failing to utilize procedures to assure the proper functioning of the traffic control signal, and in failing to warn of a known hazard.Rhodes also alleged that DPS was negligent in failing to report the malfunctioning traffic control signal and in failing to promptly respond upon receipt of a report of the malfunctioning of the traffic signal.Rhodes also alleged that DOTD was strictly liable for the defective condition of the traffic control signal.

[94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 3] On July 25, 1991, Linda and Bob Watson(Watson) filed an action for damages against DOTD and DPS, alleging negligence with regard to the inspection and maintenance of the traffic control signal and the failure to warn and report the malfunctioning traffic control signal, respectively.Watson also alleged that DOTD was strictly liable for the defective condition of the traffic control signal.

By motions and orders, dated August 20, 1991, and September 13, 1991, respectively, the two matters were consolidated for trial.DOTD and DPS answered the petitions, denying the allegations of each petition and alleging that Watson was negligent and that her negligence was a cause in fact of the damages.²

After a trial on the merits, the trial court determined that, although DOTD was negligent with regard to its maintenance and care of the traffic signals, Rhodes and Watson were unable to overcome the burden placed on them by LSA-R.S. 9:2800.Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment, on March 4, 1994, in favor of DOTD and DPS, dismissing the suits of Rhodes and Watson at their costs.Rhodes filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended petition for damages, which alleged that LSA-R.S. 9:2800 is unconstitutional.Thereafter, Rhodes filed a motion for new trial on the basis that LSA-R.S. 9:2800 is unconstitutional.Watson and Farm Bureau also filed a motion for leave of court to file amended petitions and motions for new trial, alleging the same grounds as were set forth in Rhodes' motions and amended petition.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions for leave of court to file amended pleadings and the motions for new trial.In denying the motions to amend, the trial court stated that the pleadings could not be amended after judgment was rendered.In denying the motions for new trial, the trial court stated that the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 9:2800 could be argued to the appellate court.

On appeal, this court determined that the legislature exceeded its authority by enacting a statute providing that, in a strict liability action against a public entity, a [94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 4]plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of a vice or defect and failed to remedy it within a reasonable period of time.This court then determined that DOTD was strictly liable and awarded plaintiffs damages.However, this court determined that DPS's response to the report of a malfunctioning traffic signal was prompt and that DPS was not liable to plaintiffs.Rhodes v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 94-1758(La.App. 1st Cir.5/5/95), 656 So.2d 650.

On writ of review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the appellate court's declaration of unconstitutionality was not essential to the resolution of the case.Accordingly, the supreme court vacated our declaration of unconstitutionality and remanded the matter to this court to consider whether plaintiffs proved DOTD's negligence under LSA-C.C. art. 2315 and, if so, what damages are due plaintiffs.³Rhodes v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 95-1848(La.5/21/96), 674 So.2d 239.

Therefore, pursuant to the remand, the only issues before us are whether Rhodes and Watson established that DOTD was liable for negligence under LSA-C.C. art. 2315, and, if so, what damages are due.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, when one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court is to make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence.Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 94-1252p. 7(La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 747.In Clement v. Frey, 95-1119 pp. 1-2(La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 612, (Lemmon, J., concurring), it was pointed out that "a de novo review, without any deference to the fact finder, is only appropriate when there is a legal error implicit in the fact finding process or when a mistake of law forecloses the fact finding process, such as when the fact finder's [94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 5] decision has been tainted by an improper and prejudicial jury instruction or erroneously admitted prejudicial evidence."See alsoHoyt v. Wood/Chuck Chipper Corp., 92-1498 pp. 3-9(La.App. 1st Cir.1/6/95), 651 So.2d 1344, 1356-59, (Gonzales, J., dissenting), writ denied, 95-0753 (La.5/19/95), 654 So.2d 695.

In the instant case, in remanding this matter, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted:

The trial court concluded "that the State was indeed negligent in its maintenance and care of traffic signals, however the Plaintiff was unable to overcome the burden placed on it by R.S. 9:2800."This conclusion is contradictory.To find the DOTD negligent, the trial court logically had to find the plaintiffs overcame the statutory burden for proving strict liability.The R.S. 9:2800"burden" placed on the plaintiffs in proving strict liability was the requirement that they prove DOTD's actual or constructive notice of the particular vice or defect in the traffic signal and that DOTD had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect but failed to do so.A finding of DOTD negligence includes the finding that DOTD knew or should have known that something about the traffic signal created an unreasonable risk of injury that resulted in damage and that DOTD failed to render the signal safe or to take adequate steps to prevent the damage caused by the signal.(emphasis added.)(Footnote omitted.)

Rhodes v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 674 So.2d at 242-43.

Clearly, while the trial court committed legal error in failing to render judgment in favor of Rhodes and Watson after stating that DOTD was negligent, such error does not interdict any specific factual finding by the trial court.Therefore, in reviewing the evidence, we are guided by the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which authorizes us to reverse a trial court's factual finding only if we find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court or that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong.SeeStobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882(La.1993);Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127(La.1987).Thus, the reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or controverts the trial court's finding.The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.SeeStobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 882.

[94 1758 La.App. 1 Cir. 6] The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder's conclusion was a reasonable one.Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d at 882.Even though an appellate court may feel...