State v. Schaeffer

Citation87 N.J.L. 663,94 A. 598
Decision Date14 June 1915
Docket NumberNo. 48.,48.
PartiesSTATE v. SCHAEFFER.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

Error to Supreme Court.

Joseph Schaeffer was convicted of assault and battery and rape, and the conviction having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, he brings error. Affirmed.

William Greenfield and Frank E. Bradner, both of Newark, for plaintiff in error. Andrew Van Blarcom, of Newark, for the State.

KALISCH, J. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment on a conviction of the plaintiff in error of assault and battery and rape, had in the Essex county quarter sessions. We agree with the result reached by that tribunal for the reasons hereinafter stated.

For the plaintiff in error it is argued that the judgment of the Supreme Court ought to be reversed because it appeared by the record on review before that court that the trial judge permitted a sister of the prosecutrix to testify, against the objection of the plaintiff in error, that the prosecutrix made complaint to her of the alleged assault 8 or 10 hours after it had occurred. This, it is contended, was so remote in point of time as to make the testimony inadmissible. The alleged assault on the prosecutrix took place in the afternoon, and it was in the evening, when her sister called, that she complained to her of the assault. Counsel of plaintiff in error moved to strike out the testimony, and in denying the motion the trial judge said:

"It took place in the afternoon. I do not think it is too remote, because the complaint is one of the well-recognized indications of the truth or falsity of such a charge."

We think the testimony was properly admitted, and the trial judge properly refused to strike it out, but the reason that he gave for his action is not in accord with the judicial declaration of this court. Mr. Justice Garrison, in State v. Rodesky, 90 Atl. 1099, 1100, speaking for this court, says:

"Even in trials for rape, the fact that a complaint was made by the woman is admitted, not as corroborative of the facts to which she has testified on the trial, but for the purpose of meeting in advance a self-contradiction in her conduct which, if unexplained, would discredit her as a witness."

In People v. McGee, 1 Denio, 19, 22, Judge Jewett, in discussing the legal rule, says:

"It is not denied but that, if the female had been a competent witness, had been sworn and had given her evidence, it would have been competent to prove by other witnesses her acts and declarations immediately after the offense was charged to have been committed; not as confirmatory of the truth or falsity of her evidence, but as affecting the credibility of her testimony. 4 Bl. Comm. 213; 1 Phill. Ev. (Ed. 1839) 233.

The contrary view to that adopted by this court is taken by Judge Holmes in Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 51 N. E. 746, who holds that this class of evidence is admitted for the general purpose of confirming the testimony of the ravished woman. That view is supported by a number of English and American cases, but the trend of well-considered cases and the logic of the rule are in full accord with the view expressed in that regard in State v. Rodesky, supra.

Much of the brief of counsel of plaintiff in error is taken up with an attack upon the legal accuracy of the statement made by the trial judge at the time when he refused to strike out the testimony objected to, and it is strenuously urged that this statement, made in the presence of the jury, was injurious to the plaintiff in error. But the legal barrier which interposes itself against this attack is that no objection was made to the remarks made by the trial judge when he refused to strike out the testimony.

The objection made at the trial, by counsel of plaintiff in error, presents only a question as to the legal propriety of the trial judge in refusing to strike out the testimony of a witness to the effect...

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11 cases
  • State v. Bethune
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • May 1, 1989
    ...incompetent, when the delay in making the complaint can be considered as relevant to the weight to be given to such testimony. 87 N.J.L. 663, 667 (E. & A.1915). The same rationale is viable At least with regard to children of tender years, the fact that the complaint was made in response to......
  • State v. Hummel
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • January 29, 1975
    ...to the occurrence or the remoteness therefrom cannot affect its competency, but only its probative value.' State v. Schaeffer, 87 N.J.L. 663, 667, 94 A. 598, 600 (E. & A.1915). See also State v. Balles, Supra, 47 N.J. at 341, 221 A.2d 1; Wigmore, Evidence (Chad.rev.1972), § 1135 at We are s......
  • State v. Gambutti, A--291
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • June 14, 1955
    ...v. Langley, 143 A. 217, 6 N.J.Misc. 965 (Sup.Ct.1928); State v. Spallone, 97 N.J.L. 221, 117 A. 151 (E. & A.1922); State v. Schaeffer, 87 N.J.L. 663, 94 A. 598 (E. & A.1915); State v. Rodesky, 86 N.J.L. 220, 90 A. 1099 (E. & A.1914); State v. Shupe, 86 N.J.L. 410, 92 A. 53 (Sup.Ct.1914); af......
  • State v. Balles
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1966
    ...time had elapsed but we find no substance to this contention. See Wigmore, supra § 1135 at pp. 221--22; cf. State v. Schaeffer, 87 N.J.L. 663, 667, 94 A. 598 (E. & A.1915). The defendant points out that the trial court failed to make any comment in its charge with regard to Mrs. Berg's test......
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