94 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996), 95-6227, Foy v. Holston
| Citation | 94 F.3d 1528 |
| Party Name | Terry FOY, and Gloria Foy, individually, and as parents and next friend of Theresa [*] Foy, Darron Foy, Tabitha Foy and Lasonya Foy, minors; Booker Grantham, and Fannie Grantham, individually, and as parents and next friend of Jamie Grantham, a minor, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Febru HOLSTON, |
| Case Date | September 17, 1996 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Page 1528
Page 1529
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Page 1530
William F. Prendergast, Kathy Perry Brasfield, Sharon E. Ficquette, Ala. Dept. of Human Resources, Montgomery, AL, for appellants.
Ira Drayton Pruitt, Jr., Pruitt, Pruitt & Watkins, Livingston, AL, for appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and FARRIS [**], Senior Circuit Judge.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether certain Alabama officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their acts involving the Holyland, a religious community. Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that a defendant violated clearly established federal law, we reverse and instruct the district court to grant each individual defendant summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We remand for further proceedings on claims which are not foreclosed by the granting of qualified immunity.
I. Facts 1
The Foys and the Granthams are married couples with minor children who belong to Christ Temple Church and live in "The Holyland"--property in Sumter County, Alabama, which the Church owns. When the Foy's daughter, Teresa, was 15 she became friends with Angela Smith, an adult who lived and worked at the Holyland. Teresa's school work and overall comportment deteriorated, and she eventually ran away from home. After three days living outside the Holyland at Angela's aunt's house, Teresa returned to her family.
Upon her return, Teresa was spanked with a belt by her father; her arm was bruised when she dropped her hands to cover her rear. About a week later, Teresa ran away again--this time accompanied by another Holyland youth, Monica Sandifer. After spending the first night away at a house close to the Holyland, the two went to Angela's aunt's house. Angela told her aunt to send the girls to an abandoned store. The Sumter County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") received a tip that two teenagers who had run away from the Holyland were at the store. 2
DHR employees (and defendants below) Iola Williams and Charlotte Boatright went to the store and picked up the two girls. The girls said they had run away from the Holyland; Teresa, who was crying, told Defendants that she had been hit by her father with a belt--she also displayed the bruises on her arm. Monica described being pinched on her breast by a Holyland staffer. The girls alleged other children--naming specifically the Grantham children--were also abused at the Holyland.
Teresa told Defendants that she did not want to see her parents or return to the Holyland; she did not want to have her parents contacted. Monica asked Defendants to call her mother who lived in Mississippi.
Page 1531
Williams told Teresa that her parents had to be contacted because of the abuse allegations and to tell them that their daughter was safe. Williams called the Holyland but was told that the Foys were not in. Williams left her name and phone number so that the Foys could call.
Teresa and Monica were taken by Williams to a medical doctor for a physical exam. The doctor reported that Teresa told him that she did not want to go back to the Holyland. In addition, Teresa said she would kill herself if she had to go back. The doctor also said he observed the bruises on Teresa's arm and said that he observed marks on Monica's breast.
Teresa was placed in foster care. About 10 days after Teresa was picked up, a "72-hour hearing" was held before Judge Hardaway. (Judge Hardaway had signed a "pick-up" order for Teresa the day before.) Defendant Williams, herself, was notified of the 30 April hearing on 29 April. She called the Holyland to notify Teresa's parents. Teresa's mother attended the hearing with an appointed lawyer. At the hearing, Teresa testified and also talked with Judge Hardaway privately; she informed Judge Hardaway that she did not wish to return to the Holyland and said she did not want to have contact with her parents. Teresa's mother was not allowed to talk to Teresa before or during the hearing. Just over a week later, the Juvenile Court held another hearing; and the court gave temporary custody of Teresa to DHR.
Monica was picked up by her mother; but Teresa remained in foster care. While in foster care, Teresa was permitted telephone contact with her mother. Defendants Boatright and Williams called Teresa on the phone and also drove Teresa to counseling sessions. In her later deposition, Teresa testified that Defendants Boatright and Williams (as well as another DHR worker, Ms. Widemon) were supportive and told her that things were going to be all right. Initially, the Foys had little contact with their daughter; but Teresa eventually decided that she wanted to see her mother, and DHR employees set up meetings between the two. In August 1993, Teresa returned to her parents.
Meanwhile, DHR, filed a June 1993 petition (called the "Grantham case") in Juvenile Court seeking to investigate allegations that 17 children living in the Holyland had been abused. In October, a court ordered the children to be produced; and DHR conducted videotaped interviews with the children. By November 1993, the interviews were completed and soon thereafter DHR moved to dismiss the Grantham case.
In December 1993, Defendant Hornsby, Commissioner of the Department of Human Resources, conducted a multi-agency meeting about the Holyland. State and County officials discussed the Holyland's sewage system, a fire on the Holyland's grounds, the application of child labor laws to the Holyland, and reports of child abuse. The different agencies discussed their contacts with and responsibilities for the Holyland. The agencies also prepared memoranda about the concerns raised at the meeting. The record does not show that this meeting spurred acts by state officials directed against the Holyland or its residents.
Plaintiffs sued various state officials connected with DHR under section 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the state official defendants were prejudiced against the Holyland and its residents and had denied them the rights "of Freedom of Religion and the free exercise of their religion and their right to freedom of association and freedom of speech as guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States." Plaintiffs also alleged equal protection violations. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied this motion. Defendants took this interlocutory appeal. 3
Page 1532
II. Discussion
Claims for money damages against government officials in their individual capacity involve substantial costs not only for the individual official--who incidentally may be innocent--but for society in general. "These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' " Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (citations omitted).
The qualified immunity defense is the public servant's (and society's) strong shield against these dangerous costs. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trials (and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery) and from liability if their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. According to the Supreme Court, the Harlow standard "purged qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective components," Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), and "rejected the inquiry into state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard," Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3017, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). As the Supreme Court has written just this year, "Harlow adopted this criterion of 'objective legal reasonableness,' rather than good faith, precisely in order to 'permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial.' " Behrens v. Pelletier, 468 U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 834, 838, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (citations omitted). "Objective legal reasonableness is the touchstone." Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc).
Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the federal rights allegedly violated were clearly established. See Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-28, 105 S.Ct. at 2816). This burden is not easily discharged: "That qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against...
To continue reading
Request your trial